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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The South African mining industry has not been shielded from the criminal threat the 
country faces. In this case study, the nature and extent of asset theft at one of the 
largest mining companies in South Africa is analysed. The crime prevention strategy 
adopted by the mine to curb asset theft was studied over a period of five years. This 
involved a survey of the views of the security managers on the effectiveness of the 
strategy implemented by the mine. Against the background of the South African 
Government’s broad description of the crime prevention approach adopted by the 
country, the researcher explored whether it would be practicable to implement an 
integrated crime prevention strategy – encompassing situational, social and law 
enforcement crime prevention approaches on primary, secondary and tertiary level – at 
the participating mine in order to curb asset theft. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
 
Asset category:  
“Copper-related assets”: All copper and copper cable belonging to the participating 
mine. 
“Property-related assets”: All property belonging to the participating mine, including 
movable items such as tools, equipment, personal belongings of personnel and vehicles. It 
excludes the prime product of the mine and any copper or cable thefts, which are recorded 
separately. 
Employment category:  
“Contractor”: Personnel of vendors (contracting companies) or suppliers. “Contracting” 
employees are subjected to the same procedures and governance as “permanent 
employees”.  
 “Mine”: Personnel employed permanently by the participating mine. 
“Non-mine”: Offenders that are employed elsewhere but are trespassing on the mine 
premises. 
“Security”: Personnel performing asset protection duties either full time as permanent 
staff or through external security contracts. 
“Unemployed”: Offenders that are not employed and are trespassing on the mine 
premises. 
Result category:  
“Guilty”: Referring to any offender found guilty of the crime in either a departmental 
disciplinary hearing or a criminal court hearing or both. 
“Not guilty”: Referring to any offender found not guilty of the crime in either a 
departmental disciplinary hearing or a criminal court hearing or both. 
“Recovery only”: Cases where the perpetrators of the crime have not been identified, but 
a full recovery was made either physically or the employee found to be negligent in 
securing the mine asset refunded the mine for the losses.  
“Undetected”: Cases where the offenders of the crime have not been identified, or 
suspects fled but no warrant has been issued for their arrest. 
“Warrant of arrest”: Cases where the offenders have been identified but failed to appear 
in court and a warrant for arrest has been issued. 
“Withdrawn”: Cases that were closed when no further action was taken by the mine or 
the court has declined to prosecute as the evidence was not sufficient to go to trial. 
 
Value category:  
“Insurance claims”: Included in the category “value involved” but also specified 
separately in order to monitor the claims. “Production losses”: Value in ZAR of financial 
losses as a result of production downtime caused by crime.  
“Total loss to mine”: Value in ZAR of financial losses as a result of any crime, including 
the value of assets not recovered physically or through insurance claims, the excess fee of 
insurance claims, and production downtime losses. The participating mine records other 
secondary losses such as additional overtime and replacement labour costs separately, but 
this is not mandatory and such losses were therefore not included in this report as it would 
only partially reflect said losses. 
“Value involved”: Value in ZAR of the assets involved, excluding any secondary values 
associated with the crime, such as additional overtime paid, production losses, damage to 
fences or buildings and replacement labour costs. 
“Value recovered”: Value in ZAR of the assets involved that were recovered physically by 
security personnel and the SAPS or through insurance claims. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and research methodology 
 
1.1  INTRODUCTION  
“South Africa is blessed with a special geological heritage. As such, the mining industry 
has been the bedrock of the South African economy for more than a century.” (President 
Nelson Mandela, 104th Annual General Meeting of the Chamber of Mines of South Africa, 
8 November 1994) 
Despite the implementation of a wide range of security measures, the South African 
mining industry has not been shielded from the criminal threat the country faces. Asset 
protection remains a challenge and continues to be a major concern for the industry 
(Chamber of Mines 2006:60-61).  
Thousands of households are dependent on the continued financial success of the mining 
industry, one of the largest employers in South Africa. By virtue of the place the mining 
industry occupies in the South African economy, it can make a special contribution to the 
transformation of society and in the process improve the quality of life of numerous 
South African citizens. The loss of assets and product as a result of theft has a direct 
negative impact on the mine’s profit margin and financial sustainability (Coetzee & Horn 
2007:91). The criminal threat to the mining industry “is thus becoming a threat to South 
Africa’s national growth and economic future” (ibid:105). 
1.1.1  The research problem 
Crime in South Africa has been a topic of concern for the government since 1994. In an 
effort to address crime, the government and various private sector security divisions 
started to adopt a proactive approach focusing on crime prevention more holistically. The 
National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) launched by the South African Government in 
May 1996 billed a holistic national strategy for reducing crime in South Africa. The 
strategy emerged from the deliberations and research of a multi-disciplinary team of 
experts from the state and civil society tasked with establishing a long-term strategy to 
focus the state's attention on addressing the root causes of crime in the country. This 
was premised on the understanding that to effectively reduce crime, a proactive 
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approach that included but went beyond the criminal justice system was required (South 
African Government 1998b:9-12). 
The Minister of Safety and Security highlighted the importance of a multi-agency 
approach to crime prevention in the White Paper on Safety and Security 1999-2004 and 
stated that “those, other than the police, who have been involved in crime prevention 
have also been challenged in ensuring a wider recognition of the fact that crime is more 
than a security issue” (South African Government 1998b:4). 
The United Nations Guidelines for the prevention of crime as defined at the 11th Session 
of the United Nations in Geneva in 2002 stated that “crime prevention” comprises an 
extensive range of approaches. When clarifying the objectives, countries should aim to 
achieve the following with their respective crime prevention strategies: 
 To promote the welfare of individuals and encourage pro-social behaviour through 
social, economic, health and educational measures, with a particular focus on the 
risk and protective factors associated with crime and victimisation (prevention 
through social development – also known as social crime prevention models); 
 To change the conditions in residential areas that contribute towards offending, 
victimisation and the insecurity that results from crime by building on the 
initiatives, expertise, and commitment of community members (locally based, also 
known as community-based crime prevention models); 
 To aim at preventing the occurrence of crimes by reducing the opportunities, 
increasing the risks of being apprehended and minimising the benefits, including 
situational crime prevention models and crime prevention through environmental 
design models; and 
 To prevent recidivism by assisting in the social reintegration and rehabilitation of 
offenders and by providing assistance and information to potential and actual 
victims (reintegration programmes). 
Reflecting worldwide trends, the private security domain in South Africa has experienced 
rapid growth in the last decade. That growth combined with changing policing styles in 
South Africa led to increased  demands for greater involvement from the private sector in 
policing and crime prevention activities (Minnaar 2004:1). 
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) examined the occurrence and trends of theft of 
precious metals in the South African mining industry over a period of five years, namely 
January 2000 to December 2004. It was found that considerable differences between the 
physical location of mines and other external influencing factors have led to various 
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methodologies being adopted by the different mining houses in South Africa concerning 
the best method of asset protection for the industry. These diverse proactive approaches 
led to substantial variations in the allocation of human resources involved in the physical 
protection of assets, as well as in the technology used to supplement the active security 
methods. It was found that most South African mines implement state-of-the-art security 
measures in an effort to protect their assets against theft. Physical security measures are 
however continuously tested by offenders and therefore need to be constantly evaluated 
and improved (Coetzee & Horn 2007:97-100). 
1.1.2  Purpose statement 
One of the largest mining companies in South Africa agreed to take part in a research 
study aimed at examining the extent of asset theft at a particular mine and to survey the 
perceptions and experiences of the participating mine’s security managers on the 
effectiveness of the crime prevention strategy applied at the mine with the objective of 
providing information the participating mine can use for their crime prevention strategy 
to address asset theft.  
Preliminary interviews were conducted with the head of security at the participating mine 
during 2007 to determine the proactive approach the mine applies in general to address 
crime and to establish which preventative strategy was implemented to prevent theft of 
mine assets in particular. 
It was established that the security measures implemented by the participating mine on 
the mining sites were aimed at protecting all mine assets, property, products and 
personnel. It was also the responsibility of the security division to manage access of 
permanently employed personnel (employees) and personnel of sub-contracting 
companies (contractors) to the mine. In general, theft prevention strategies implemented 
at the participating mine were predominantly based on the principles of situational crime 
prevention methods at the time. 
Situational crime prevention (SCP) is a specific target-oriented approach to crime 
prevention utilising managerial techniques, design and manipulation of the environment 
to reduce the criminal risks by making it more risky and less rewarding (Bajpai 2004:10). 
The purpose of this research was to explore, by conducting a case study, alternative 
crime prevention approaches that can be used to supplement the preventative strategy 
adopted by the participating mine to address asset theft. 
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The case study as a research strategy can be defined as an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context and explores the 
boundaries between the phenomenon and its context during which multiple sources of 
evidence (including quantitative findings) are used to contribute to greater understanding 
(Yin 1984:14). 
1.1.2.1  Objectives of the study 
The case study was conducted at a particular mining company based in South Africa 
(who requested to remain anonymous) over a period of five years, namely 2006 to 2010.  
The aim of the case study was not to generalise findings as representative of the mining 
industry in South Africa, although it is plausible that other mining companies in South 
Africa may experience similar problems with asset theft and could apply a similar 
proactive approach.  
The focus of the case study included the following: 
 To establish the extent of asset theft at the participating mine during the period 
January 2006 to December 2010, focusing on: 
o Number of incidents 
o Type of assets at risk  
o Modus operandi used by perpetrators 
o Financial losses involved 
o Type of perpetrators (employees, contractors or non-mine employees) 
o Results of incidents (criminal cases) 
 To examine the best practices at the participating mine on the crime prevention 
strategy implemented in terms of effectiveness and efficiency  
 To review literature in crime prevention for similar contexts and 
 To make recommendations on the most viable preventative strategy for the 
participating mine 
The research question can be stated as:  
“Which crime prevention approaches to curb asset theft are practicable at the 
participating mine?” 
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1.1.3  Key theoretical concepts 
The terms defined below are to be used for the purpose of this case study. 
1.1.3.1  Crime prevention (proactive approach) 
“Crime reduction” and “crime prevention” are essentially the same things, namely 
combinations of actions designed to eliminate and/or minimise the occurrence of crime 
and the harm associated with it (Andersen & Brown 2005:2).  
The South African Government provided a broad new description of crime prevention 
encompassing all activities which can reduce, deter or prevent the incidence of crime.  
For the purpose of this case study “crime prevention” (the proactive approach) will be 
considered to include all three focus areas of crime reduction defined by the South 
African Government, namely altering the environment in which crime occurs; changing 
the conditions which are considered to cause crime; and providing a strong deterrent 
against crime with an effective criminal justice system (South African Government 
1998b:20). 
1.1.3.2  Theft 
For the purpose of this case study, “theft” will be considered in the context of South 
African Criminal Law and defined as the unlawful and intentional removal of movable 
property belonging to another (Snyman 1986:511). 
1.1.3.3  Mine property (assets) 
An asset is defined as a present economic resource to which an entity has a present right 
or other privileged access (International Accounting Standards Board 2006:4). 
For the purpose of this case study, “mine property” (assets) of the participating mine will 
denote any movable economic resource owned by the mine from which any present or 
future economic benefits may be obtained. 
1.1.4  Value of the research 
According to the Chamber of Mines (2006:11) mining companies are being constrained 
from investing in new mining projects in South Africa owing to the increasing uncertainty 
over legal titles and mining prospecting rights. The Chamber estimated that about R10 
billion of fixed investment in South Africa’s mining sector is being forfeited annually as a 
result of these constraints. Many large mining companies face having to retrench 
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thousands of employees as the boundaries of their existing mining rights are reached and 
new prospecting rights have not yet been issued.  
In addition, the activities of illegal miners and the theft of precious metals continue to 
pose a risk to the sustainability of the South African mining industry. Not only is there a 
direct financial loss to the mining company concerned, but there are also knock-on 
financial losses to employees and the government (such as reduced employment and 
taxes). In the light of the difficulties the South African mining industry faces, further 
losses as a result of crime – theft in particular – raise serious concerns (Chamber of 
Mines 2010:125). 
The participating mine has not been shielded from the global financial difficulties or the 
impact of crime the South African mining industry face and according to the head of 
security, asset theft in particular remains a big challenge. This case study contributes to 
a better understanding of the crime prevention strategy needed to address asset theft at 
the participating mine.  
Other mining companies and organisations, like the Chamber of Mines, may also benefit 
from the case study by acquiring a better understanding of the phenomena and 
considering the findings and recommendations when formulating crime prevention 
strategies to address asset theft in the South African mining industry. 
1.2  RESEARCH DESIGN 
Creswell (2009:3-5) describes three types of research design, namely qualitative (a 
means for exploring and understanding the meaning in a social context), quantitative (a 
means for testing of theories objectively by examining the relationship among 
measurable variables) and mixed methods (a combination of these two approaches). 
Research designs are procedures for research that span the decisions from broad 
assumptions to detailed methods of data interpretation. Research design can be regarded 
as the proposal to conduct research and involves the intersection of philosophy, 
strategies of inquiry, and the specific methods used (ibid:5). 
According to Creswell (2009:3) informing the decision which research design to use for 
the study of a specific topic should be the worldview (philosophical) assumptions the 
researcher brings to the study; the research approach (procedures of inquiry or 
strategies); and the research method (data collection, analysis and interpretation).  
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1.2.1  Philosophical worldview 
A paradigm or worldview can be defined as the basic set of beliefs that guides the actions 
of people (Guba 1990:17-18). Many paradigms guide the actions of people: the 
adversarial paradigm guides the legal system; the judgmental paradigm guides winners 
in sporting events; religious paradigms guide spiritual and moral life, and so forth. In 
research, however, the focus is on those paradigms that guide disciplined inquiry. The 
answers given to three basic questions characterise the basic belief systems or 
paradigms that may be adopted. These questions are: 
 Ontological: What is the nature of the “knowable” or “reality”? 
 Epistemological: What is the nature of the relationship between the knower 
(inquirer) and the known? 
 Methodological: How should the inquirer go about finding knowledge? 
A worldview is a general orientation about the world and the nature of research that a 
researcher embraces (Creswell 2009:6-11). There are four main worldviews:   
 Postpositivism is more suitable for quantitative research. It is sometimes called 
the scientific method or empirical science, and believes that absolute truth can 
never be found. 
 Constructivism is more suitable for qualitative research and is often combined 
with interpretivism in order to understand the subjective meanings, historical, 
cultural and social perspectives of the participants. 
 The advocacy/participatory worldview is typically associated with qualitative 
research, but can form the foundation for quantitative research. Here, the focus of 
the research inquiry is generally intertwined with a political agenda. 
 The fourth worldview is that of pragmatism. It mostly applies to mixed methods 
and techniques are chosen that best meet the needs. Truth is what works at the 
time and multiple methods, different worldviews, assumptions and a variety of 
forms of data collection and analysis are used to provide the best understanding 
of a research problem. 
Postpositivists hold a deterministic philosophy to identify and assess the causes that 
influence the outcomes and is also reductionistic in that ideas are reduced to a small, 
discrete set of variables to test, thus developing numeric measures of observations and 
data sets. There are laws or theories that govern the world which needs to be tested or 
verified and refined in order to understand the world and phenomena found in the data 
(Creswell 2009:7). 
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The essence of the postpositivism paradigm is the belief that although a real world driven 
by real natural cases exists, it is not possible for humans to accurately perceive it with 
their imperfect sensory and intellective mechanisms (Guba 1990:20-23). Therefore 
inquirers need to be critical about their research precisely because of those human 
frailties. However, although one can never be certain that the ultimate truth has been 
uncovered, there is no doubt that reality is “out there”. Methodologically, in the interests 
of conforming to the commitment of critical realism and modified subjectivity, 
postpositivists place emphasis on critical multiplism, which can be regarded as a form of 
elaborated triangulation of information.  
Postpositivists recognise that many imbalances have been allowed to emerge in the 
pursuit for achieving realistic, objective inquiry. A major part of the postpositivist agenda 
has been devoted to identifying and redressing these imbalances. The imbalance 
between precision and richness is considered critical to a science that defines its major 
goal to be prediction and control. It is therefore recognised that the zeal for precision 
lead to an overemphasis on quantitative research and mathematical and statistical 
methods. In order to redress this imbalance, more qualitative methods of inquiry have 
been adopted (Guba 1990:20-23). 
Even though postpositivists may engage in qualitative research, the term qualitative is 
only a “methods-level term” and not a “paradigm-level term” as “the call for qualitative 
methods is by itself not a call for a paradigm shift” (Guba 1990:22). 
1.2.1.1  The researcher’s role 
Although philosophical ideas remain largely hidden in research studies, they still influence 
the practice of research and therefore need to be identified and explained (Creswell 
2009:5). 
The researcher has been involved in crime information management for the past 
eighteen years, conducting mostly quantitative research and statistical analysis to 
identify patterns in crime trends, which embraced the researcher’s postpositivist 
worldview. True to the beliefs of postpositivism pertaining to the imbalance of inquiry, in 
the researcher’s quest to comprehend the crime phenomena holistically, qualitative 
methods were also explored towards acquiring greater understanding.  
As part of this journey, the researcher was engaged in sessions as a therapist during 
which she interviewed victims and their families traumatised by crime. In addition to 
learning more about the victims of crime, the researcher became involved in crime 
investigations as an offender profiler. She interviewed suspects of crimes that included 
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child abuse, rape, robbery, murder, urban terrorism and organised crime syndicate 
activities. The exposure of the researcher as therapist and profiler gave her the 
opportunity to conduct various qualitative research studies to understand the role of the 
criminal justice system and the effect thereof on crime offenders as well as victims of 
crimes. 
The researcher’s continuous need to be reductionistic and develop numeric measures of 
observations and data sets to give meaning to it, enriched with an appreciation of the 
value added by a more in-depth understanding of the research topic, has led to the 
researcher’s preference to adopt a mixed methods research approach. 
The researcher found that a combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
approaches used when examining the relationship and patterns in data sets objectively, 
whilst exploring the perspectives and meanings of individuals or groups inductively, 
contributed to a better understanding of how to deter criminal behaviour. This approach 
led to her interest in the crime prevention research field.  
For the past five years the researcher has been employed in the South African mining 
industry as a crime analyst. Her core function is analysing criminal trends to aid in the 
prevention of crime and the management of security threats. This understanding and 
knowledge of the research topic could however shape the way the researcher viewed and 
interpreted the findings.  
The researcher commenced this study in the belief that crime will always exist and that 
crime prevention is merely the strategic management of an ongoing challenge to reduce 
the risk of loss by increasing the likelihood to be caught and by decreasing conditions 
that contribute to crime. 
The researcher holds the opinion that despite social and cultural factors that could play a 
role in the occurrence of theft-related crimes, the criminal still chooses to commit theft 
and that these decisions result in deliberate actions based on the analysis of the 
circumstances or opportunities in which the theft is contemplated. 
It is therefore the researcher’s belief that crime prevention is a continuous chess game of 
strategy against opportunity and determinism. 
1.2.2  Research approach 
Strategies of enquiry are types of qualitative, quantitative and mixed method designs 
that provide specific direction for procedures – also called approaches or methodologies – 
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in the research design (Creswell 2009:11-13). The three approaches are not entirely 
separate entities, however, qualitative and quantitative approaches should not be seen 
as polar opposites; instead, they rather represent ends on a continuum. Mixed methods 
research, on the other hand, is located in the middle of the continuum because it 
incorporates elements of both approaches (ibid:3).  
Mixed methods research can be defined as “an approach to inquiry that combines or 
associates both qualitative and quantitative forms” as it involves the mixing of the 
qualitative and quantitative approaches and philosophical assumptions in a research 
study. Thus it is more than simply collecting and analysing the two kinds of research 
data; it also involves the use of these approaches in tandem so that the strength of the 
study is greater than either qualitative or quantitative research (ibid:4). 
Mixed methods research includes sequential (elaborating or expanding on the findings of 
one method with another method), concurrent (merging quantitative and qualitative data 
in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research problem) or transformative 
(using a theoretical lens that provides a framework for topics and methods of collecting 
data that involves a sequential or a concurrent approach) strategies of inquiry (ibid:14-
15). 
The concurrent embedded mixed methods research approach was chosen for this 
particular research study. It incorporates both the qualitative and quantitative strategies 
of inquiry, with the latter being the dominant strategy. 
Quantitative strategies include survey research which provides a numeric description of 
trends by studying a sample of a population. Survey research includes cross-sectional 
studies using structured questionnaires for data collection with the intent of generalising 
from the sample to a specific population (Babbie 2007:253). In this research study, the 
asset theft incidences recorded by the participating mine over a period of five years are 
analysed to identify trends and offender profiles.  
Many choices characterise the field of qualitative research, which can be described as a 
moment of discovery and rediscovery as new ways of looking, interpreting, arguing, and 
writing are debated and discussed (Denzin & Lincoln 2000:18). Qualitative research is a 
field of inquiry which crosscuts disciplines, fields and subject matters (ibid:2). 
Qualitative strategies include case studies in which a process or activity is explored in 
depth. The conceptual structure of case studies focuses on seeking a greater 
understanding of the case, appreciating the uniqueness and complexity of its 
embeddedness and interaction with its contexts, to identify the “issues” (Stake 1995:16).  
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The focus of qualitative research is also on perceptions and experiences of participants 
(Miller 1992:195). In this case study, the proactive approaches used by a specific mine in 
South Africa and the perceptions of the security managers on the effectiveness of the 
proactive approaches used are examined. 
This particular mining company was selected for the case study because it is one of 
largest mining companies in South Africa. The mining sites of the participating mining 
company are situated mainly in the Northern and North West provinces of South Africa. 
1.2.2.1  Concurrent embedded mixed methods 
Several typologies exist for the classification and identification of the types of strategies 
to be used in a mixed methods research study. The four most important aspects that 
influence the design of procedures for a mixed methods research study are timing, 
weighting, mixing and theorising (Creswell 2009:206-210).  
Qualitative and quantitative data collection can either happen in phases (sequential) or at 
the same time (concurrent). When data are collected concurrently, quantitative and 
qualitative data are gathered at the same time and implementation is generally 
simultaneous. In this case study the information was gathered and analysed within the 
same timeframe. 
Weighting in a mixed methods study refers to the priority given to qualitative and 
quantitative data in a particular research study. The weight can either be equal or it may 
emphasise one or the other. A preference for one type is determined by the objective of 
the research and depends on the interests of the researcher. In this case study, the 
views of the security managers were explored to obtain a better understanding of the 
preventive strategy applied at the participating mine as well as the other crime 
prevention approaches that can be considered to address the research question. In order 
to make recommendations on formulating proactive strategies to address asset theft at 
the participating mine, a deeper understanding of the crime phenomenon at the 
participating mine was essential. Quantitative analysis of the asset theft incidents were 
therefore an integral focus of the research approach used.  
The different types of data can be mixed at several stages: in the data collection, data 
analysis, or interpretation stage, or during more than one phase. In this case study, 
quantitative and qualitative data were mixed during the interpretation phase in order to 
better understand the crime phenomenon and preventive strategy of the participating 
mine.  
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Mixing also involves the way in which the different types of data are merged on one end 
of the continuum, kept separate at the other end of the continuum, or combined in some 
way between the two extremes. When a researcher uses secondary data in a supporting 
role in a study, the secondary form of data is embedded within a larger and different 
form of data which then serves as the primary database (Creswell 2009:208). In this 
case study, the smaller data sample, namely the views of the security managers 
employed at the time of the study at the participating mine, was embedded within the 
larger sample of data, namely the asset theft incidents recorded by the participating 
mine over a period of five years.  
Theorising or transforming perspectives is a final factor to consider when using a mixed 
methods approach. All researchers bring theories, frameworks and hunches to their 
research inquiries and these theories may be made explicit, may remain implicit, or may 
not be mentioned. An explicit theoretical perspective was used for this case study and 
the researcher’s role (paragraph 1.2.1.1) describes the background and views of the 
researcher that may have influenced the research and explicates the primary method 
applied. 
1.2.3  Research methods 
The third major element in the framework is the specific research methods to be used, 
which involves the forms of data collection, analysis and interpretation (Creswell 
2009:15). 
In this case study, a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques were used to 
examine the incidents of asset theft, to establish the crime prevention strategy 
implemented, to explore the perceptions of the effectiveness of the crime prevention 
strategy utilised by the participating mine, and to review the literature on other crime 
prevention approaches that can be integrated to test the research question. 
1.2.3.1  Data collection 
The aspects of a research sample that requires description includes mainly identification 
of the population and the selection process; a discussion of the procedures used for the 
selection of the sample from the available population; and a description of the sample 
size and how the size was computed (Creswell 2009:148).  
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(a)  Qualitative approach 
The qualitative approach to the case study included interviews with the head of the 
security division of the participating mine to ascertain the existing crime prevention 
strategy, as well as an open-ended interview questionnaire survey to explore the 
experiences of mine security managers regarding the effectiveness of existing security 
measures to prevent theft at the participating mine (see Annexure A). 
During preliminary interviews at the participating mine to identify the research 
population, it was established that one security department was responsible for 
preventing and reducing security threats (including crime) in order to ensure a safe and 
secure business at the participating mine. For the purpose of this case study, the security 
department of the participating mine represented the population (individuals of interest). 
More than a thousand employees worked in this department, including asset protection 
officers, surveillance operators, investigators, forensic auditors, analysts, and a security 
management division. 
A sample is a set of individuals selected from a population intended to represent the 
population in a research study (Gravetter & Wallnau 2008:4). During the preliminary 
interviews to identify the sample, it was established that all crime incidents and security 
risks detected by any member of the security department were reported to the security 
management division of the participating mine. It was further established that it was the 
responsibility of the security management division to conduct risk assessments and to 
implement security measures to manage the identified risks and to manage the crime 
prevention strategy of the participating mine. This division comprised a group manager 
(the head of the security division), three divisional security managers, and eleven site 
security managers.  
The idea behind qualitative research is to purposefully select participants that will best 
contribute to the researcher’s understanding of the research problem (Creswell 
2009:178). To enable the researcher to evaluate the crime prevention strategy used by 
the participating mine effectively, the participants selected for the study had to be 
familiar with the security risks, the measures implemented to address these risks, the 
extent and nature of the crime incidents, and the overall crime prevention strategy 
adopted by the participating mine. The participants further had to be in a position to 
provide insight on the effectiveness of the crime prevention strategies based on their 
experience and role in the mine. 
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A non-probability sampling technique, purposive sampling, was used to identify the 
participants for the interview survey. Purposive sampling is a technique applied to 
deliberately obtain the units of analysis regarded as being representative of a relevant 
population (Welman & Kruger 2001:63). In this sampling method the units to be 
observed are selected based on the researcher’s judgement about who will be most 
representative of the population (Babbie 2007:193). 
As each member of the security management division is responsible for a different 
business unit and the members therefore collectively represent all the different functional 
areas of the security department, it was decided to use saturated sampling and to include 
all the members of the security management division in the sample. Accordingly, fifteen 
participants were included in the sample for the open-ended interview questionnaire 
survey. Permission was obtained from the participating mine to interview all the selected 
participants. 
(b)  Quantitative approach 
The quantitative approach to the research consisted of a survey using a closed-ended 
incident questionnaire to establish the extent of asset theft at the participating mine (see 
Annexure B).  
In order to identify the population for the closed-ended incident questionnaire, 
preliminary interviews were held with the head of security of the participating mine. It 
was determined that the mine comprised various corporate offices, overseas operations 
and mining sites. Eleven mining sites – seven mining operations, two smelters and two 
refineries – were situated in South Africa. All crime-related and security-related incidents 
that occurred at the eleven mining sites were recorded by the mine’s security 
department. The security manager of each mining site was responsible for the accuracy 
of the incidents reported and verified the correctness of each electronically recorded 
incident before the incident report was stored in an electronic database.  
For the purpose of this case study, all asset theft-related incidents recorded by the 
security department of the participating mine during the period of the study at the eleven 
mining sites in South Africa represented the population (incidents of interest). Owing to 
the sensitivity of prime product-related thefts, the participating mine agreed to make all 
the required information available to the researcher for every other asset theft-related 
incident recorded at each of the eleven South African mining sites during the period 1 
January 2006 to 31 December 2010, excluding incidents relating to the mine’s prime 
mining product. 
15 
 
During preliminary interviews to identify the sample, it was established that the different 
phases of the mining process result in the prime mining product having different risk 
levels, which are managed with different risk strategies. Since the prime mining product 
has a low precious metal gram per tonne concentration during some phases of the 
mining process, such mining sites are less likely to fall victim to product theft as the 
perpetrators would have to steal tonnes of ore to extract only a few grams of product. As 
the product is refined through the different mining phases, the precious metal gram per 
tonne concentration increases and therefore the likelihood of product theft increases. 
Consequently budget and resources allocated for the risk strategy increase as well. Not 
all geographical areas in which the mining sites are situated are equally exposed to 
product crime and therefore not all the sites have the same budget and resources 
available to use for their risk strategies. In the event of asset theft, however, such a 
distinction is not made by perpetrators.  A laptop stolen from a refinery (the highest 
classified product theft risk site) has the same monetary value as a laptop stolen from a 
mining operation (lowest classified product theft risk site). 
Probability sampling methods are based on the probability theory, a mathematical 
concept based on accepted statistical principles that refers to the ability to predict the 
statistical likelihood that a random event will occur. Therefore every element has a 
change of being chosen (Rubin & Babbie 2007:144-145). In order to understand the 
nature of asset theft at the participating mine (excluding the prime product), the 
objective of the study was to discover the other type of asset at risk and, in particular, to 
establish the extent of the values involved and losses that occurred as a result of asset 
thefts recorded at the participating mine over the period of the study.  
As result of the limited research available on asset theft at South African mines in the 
last decade and the rare opportunity to examine the extent of asset thefts recorded at 
eleven mining sites situated in South Africa, although uncommon in quantitative 
research, it was decided to use saturated sampling for the purpose of this case study. All 
asset theft-related incidents (excluding the incidents related to the prime product of the 
participating mine) recorded at each of the eleven South African mining sites of the 
participating mine during the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010 were 
therefore included in the sample. In this period, 6,045 incidences of asset theft were 
recorded and 6,045 incident questionnaires completed. 
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(c)  Literature review 
A literature review of the crime prevention approaches, crime risk reduction models and 
crime management strategies available on the research topic was done for the study. The 
following crime prevention models were discussed in relation to the research question: 
 Situational crime prevention 
 Crime prevention through environmental design 
 Social crime prevention 
 Crime prevention through effective law enforcement 
 Community-based crime prevention 
Crime prevention is an extensive research field and it should therefore be pointed out 
that this case study is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive review of all the crime 
prevention strategies, approaches and models available. 
1.2.3.2  Data analysis 
Data are measurements or observations, a data set is a collection of measurements or 
observations, and a datum is a single measurement or observation commonly called a 
score (Gravetter & Wallnau 2008:5). 
In qualitative research, the researcher is the primary instrument in data collection. The 
data that emerge are descriptive and primarily consist of the participants’ reported words 
(Miller 1992:195). Idiographic interpretation is then utilised, in other words attention is 
given to the particulars and the data are interpreted with reference to the particulars of 
the case rather than generalisations.  
Qualitative research assumes that there are multiple realities and that the world is not an 
objective “thing” out there, but a function of personal interaction and perceptions 
(Merriam 1998:17). The world is regarded as a highly subjective phenomenon which 
needs interpreting rather than measuring. Data analysis involves collecting open-ended 
data based on asking general questions and developing an analysis from the information 
supplied by the participants (Creswell 2009:184). 
(a)  Open-ended interview survey 
The open-ended interview survey of the case study was focused on exploring the 
experiences of security managers on crime prevention strategies implemented to address 
asset theft at the participating mine. The questionnaire was structured such as to 
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integrate the participants’ personal experience and knowledge into the case study (see 
Annexure A). The interview questionnaire was circulated to all the participants to 
complete and follow-up interviews were conducted to clarify the answers provided. In 
addition to the interview questionnaire, further interviews were held during the period of 
the study with the participants and site visits were conducted at the participating mine to 
enrich the interpretation of the data. Owing to the sensitive nature of the security policy 
of the participating mine pertaining to audio and visual recordings, the researcher made 
use of field notes to record the interviews with the participants and the researcher’s 
observations during site visits. 
Qualitative data analysis is the process of systematically searching, reducing and 
arranging of information including interview transcripts, field notes, and other materials 
that were accumulated to increase the researcher’s understanding of the data and to 
enable him or her to present what was discovered to others (Bogdan & Biklen 1992:40-
44).  
A central approach to data reduction and data display is the process of coding (O’Flaherty 
& Whalley 2004:2). Miles and Huberman (1994:57-58) described coding as labelling or 
assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a 
study. The different type of codes includes descriptive codes, which involves little 
interpretation, interpretative codes, representing motive, and pattern codes representing 
recurrent patterns found in the data.  
Tesch (1990:142-145) described the analysis process of qualitative data in eight steps 
with guidelines on how to complete the coding of the information. These eight steps 
involve a systematic process of analysing textual data. According to Creswell (2009:185-
190) variations in this process exist and the qualitative data analysis technique can be 
described in six steps. These six steps have been used to analyse the open-ended 
interview questionnaire survey responses of this study and comprise the following: 
 Organise and prepare the data for analysis (transcribe interviews and type up field 
notes). 
 Read through the data (obtain a general sense of the information to reflect on its 
overall meaning). 
 Code the information (organising the data into segments of text before bringing 
meaning to the information). 
 Use the coding process to classify the information into themes for analysis (these 
themes are considered the major findings and are often used to create headings 
in the findings section). 
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 Advance how the description and themes will be represented in the qualitative 
narrative. 
 Interpret the data. 
The coding of qualitative data can be developed on the basis of the emerging information 
collected, or predetermined codes can be used and the data fitted into them, or a 
combination of predetermined and emerging codes can be used (Creswell 2009:186-
187). The coding should however address the following: 
 Codes dealing with topics which are expected to be found based on past literature 
 Codes that are surprising and expected 
 Codes that are unusual and of conceptual interest 
 Codes that address the larger theoretical perspective of the study 
Bogdan and Biklen (1992:166-172) gave a list of the types of codes that can be used in 
analysing qualitative data, including setting, perceptions, process, activity and strategy. 
For the purpose of this case study, a combination of predetermined and emerging codes 
was used to analyse the qualitative data. The predetermined theme codes used for 
analysis of the crime prevention methods/activities in this case study include the 
following: 
 Situational (access control, target hardening, physical security) 
 Environmental (natural surroundings, natural surveillance) 
 Social (education, awareness, socio-economic upliftment) 
 Law enforcement (community policing, collaboration) 
(b)  Structured incident questionnaire 
In terms of the quantitative part of this case study, the structured incident questionnaire 
was focused on exploring the phenomenon of asset theft at the participating mine to 
enable the researcher to make recommendations on the most viable preventative 
strategy to address asset theft at the mine.  
The quantitative data analysis steps described by Creswell (2009:151-153) were used to 
prepare for analysis of the structured incident survey responses of the case study. 
The participating mine completed 6,045 questionnaires (as per Annexure B) for asset 
theft-related incidents recorded at the eleven South African mining sites of the 
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participating mine during the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010. A 
representative response of the sample was therefore obtained. 
The participating mine supplied electronically recorded data extract sets from the mine’s 
central database in populated Microsoft Access Database Files which have been verified 
for content accuracy by the security manager of each mining site to use for validation of 
the information supplied on the questionnaires. 
A variable is a characteristic or a condition that changes or has different values. In order 
to demonstrate changes in variables, it is necessary to measure the variables being 
examined (Gravetter & Wallnau 2008:5). When describing data, it is necessary to 
distinguish whether the data came from a population or a sample used for the research 
study. A characteristic that describes a population is called a parameter, which is usually 
a numerical value that describes the population and may be derived from a set of 
measurements from the population. A characteristic that describes a sample is called a 
statistic, which is a numerical value that describes a sample and may be derived from a 
set of measurements from the sample. 
For purposes of this case study, the saturated sample comprising 6,045 asset thefts 
recorded at eleven South African mining sites of the participating mine was analysed 
using frequency data analysis. The aim of the survey was to establish the recorded 
losses, type of mine asset at risk, modus operandi used, and type of offender identified.  
The statistical information was analysed using sums, cross tabulations and percentages 
to determine the extent of asset theft at the participating mine. This included the number 
of incidents, financial implications (both primary and secondary), time-line hotspots 
(month of year, day of week, time of day), type of property at risk, modus operandi used 
by the perpetrators, the type of perpetrators (employees, contractors or non-mine 
persons) where suspects had been identified, result of criminal cases (withdrawn, 
imprisonment, fines), and the type of mining site where the crimes most frequently 
occurred. 
1.2.4  Reliability and validity 
To understand the meaning of reliability and validity in research studies, it is necessary 
to consider the interpretation of researchers from different perspectives (Golafshani 
2003:600). 
The ontology – dealing with the nature of being – of postpositivists can be portrayed as 
critical realism, “real reality”, but is only imperfectly and probabilistically apprehensible 
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(Lincoln & Guba 2000:195-196). According to the postpositivist paradigm the extent to 
which results are consistent over time and represent the total population included in a 
research study accurately is referred to as reliability. If the results of a research study 
can be reproduced under a similar methodology, the research instrument is considered to 
be “reliable”. Validity, on the other hand, is used to determine whether the research truly 
measures that which it was intended to measure and also how “truthful” the research 
results are (Joppe 2000:1). 
Researchers state that historical research and descriptive studies are more concerned 
with finding new explanations and interpretations of existing information than collecting 
new information (Welman & Kruger 2001:180). In historical research, in view of the 
uniqueness of historical incidences, reliability and validity do not enjoy such a high 
priority as “replicability” (the extent to which measurement techniques constantly 
construct the same results). The scientific requirement of replicability does not refer to a 
repetition of events, but the ability to duplicate procedures, analyses and conclusions. 
Internal validity reflects the extent to which available sources make it possible to rule out 
alternative explanations or conclusions. External validity reflects the effectiveness with 
which the findings enable the researcher to predict the course of events in other times 
and places.  
The use of primary sources is an important principle of historical research as the transfer 
of information from one source to another may be inadvertently distorted. In historical 
research, information from primary sources is usually obtained through purposive or 
snowball sampling and unstructured or semi-structured interviews. Information from 
both primary and secondary sources should therefore be subjected to stringent criticism. 
External criticism is directed at the genuineness and authenticity of the source whilst 
internal criticism reflects the accuracy or credibility of the contents of the source. The 
information that stood the test of internal and external criticism should be synthesised 
and interpreted in an attempt to propose explanations and correlations. Fundamentally 
such explanations amount to interpretations of the evaluated information by means of 
inductive logic. 
While the terms reliability and validity are considered to be essential criteria for quality in 
quantitative paradigms, the terms credibility, neutrality or confirmability, consistency or 
dependability and applicability or transferability are considered to be the essential criteria 
for quality in qualitative paradigms (Lincoln & Guba 1985:300).  
The term “dependability” in qualitative research closely corresponds with the notion of 
the term “reliability” in quantitative research (Lincoln & Guba 1985:300). The traditional 
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quantitative view of reliability is based on the assumption of repeatability. The idea of 
dependability, on the other hand, emphasises the need for the researcher to account for 
the ever-changing context within which the research occurs and is responsible for 
describing the changes that occur in the setting and how these changes affected the way 
the research is approached in the particular study. “Transferability” refers to the degree 
to which the results of the qualitative research can be applied to other contexts or 
settings. 
Sustaining the “trustworthiness” of a research study depends on the issues, 
quantitatively, considered as validity and reliability (Lincoln & Guba 1985:266). The idea 
of discovering truth through reliability and validity is replaced by the concept of 
trustworthiness. The “credibility” criteria involve establishing that the results of the 
qualitative research are believable from the perspective of the participant in the research. 
“Confirmability” refers to the degree to which the results of the qualitative research could 
be confirmed or corroborated by others. 
Although objectivity and truthfulness are critical to both qualitative and quantitative 
research, the criteria for evaluating qualitative research differs from quantitative 
research, however, as the researcher seeks believability based on coherence, insight, 
instrumental utility and trustworthiness through a process of verification rather than 
applying traditional validity and reliability measures used for quantitative research (Miller 
1992:196). The value of qualitative research lies in the particular description and themes 
developed in context to the specific site and particularity is characteristic of qualitative 
research rather than generalisability. Qualitative reliability shows that the research 
approach is consistent across different researchers and different projects while qualitative 
validity indicates that the researcher checks for accuracy using validity strategies to 
assess the findings. Several reliability procedures are available, including the checking of 
transcripts for obvious mistakes and ensuring there is not a drift in the definition of codes 
(Creswell 2009:190-193).  
Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the validity is 
sufficient to establish reliability (Lincoln & Guba 1985:316). To ensure internal validity, 
the following strategies are used in this case study. 
 Triangulation is defined as a validity procedure where researchers search for 
convergence among multiple and different sources of information to form the 
themes or categories in a research study (Creswell & Miller 2000:126). In 
addition, triangulation strengthens a study by combining methods using several 
kinds of data, including using both quantitative and qualitative approaches to test 
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for validity (Patton 2001:247). The research conducted in this case study includes 
describing the extent of asset theft (quantitative method) and the preventive 
approach (qualitative method) to address asset theft implemented by a South 
African mine, as well as literature reviews on available research pertaining to 
crime prevention strategies with the aim of recommending the most viable 
preventative strategy for the participating mine. If themes are established based 
on converging several sources of data, it can be claimed that the process has 
contributed to the validity of the study (Creswell 2009:191). 
 Member checking is used in qualitative research methods to determine accuracy 
by referring the basic themes back to the participants for confirmation (Creswell 
2009:191). In this case study the themes are established based on converging 
the perspectives from participants, the field notes of observations done by the 
researcher during site visits, and literature available on best practices in crime 
prevention. A representative of the participating mine was made available to 
validate the interpretations made by the researcher. 
 Spending a prolonged period in the field contributes to the validity of a study as 
the researcher develops an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied (Creswell 2009192). The researcher developed the themes for this case 
study over a period of five years during which she had access to the participating 
mining sites and the participants. 
 Peer briefing enhances the accuracy of the study and thereby the validity, as this 
strategy involves the interpretation of the data beyond the researcher (Creswell 
2009:192). A social researcher of the Institute for Security Studies served as a 
peer reviewer to verify the accuracy of the interpretations made by the researcher 
as well as the correctness of the statistical findings.  
 Secondary audits were applied to the research findings of the case study to 
ensure statistical validity and replicability. The measurement of the quantitative 
data was correlated and verified for correctness and meticulous record was kept of 
all information described in the study or used to base findings on.  
 Clarification of possible researcher bias was described in section 1.2.1.1.  This 
self-reflection creates an open and honest narrative that contains comments by 
the researcher about how his or her interpretation of the findings is shaped by 
background and experience (Creswell 2009:192). 
1.3  ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
On 12 July 1974 the National Research Act was signed into law in the United States, 
thereby creating the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research which provides the basic ethical principles that 
23 
 
should underlie the conduct of research involving human subjects, generally referred to 
as the "Belmont Report". These "basic ethical principles" refer to the general judgements 
that serve as a basic justification for the many particular ethical prescriptions and 
evaluations of human actions that should be considered: 
 Respect for persons incorporates at least two ethical convictions: first, that 
individuals should be treated as autonomous agents, and second, that persons 
with diminished autonomy are entitled to protection (United States of America 
1979:4).  
 Beneficence implies that persons should be treated in an ethical manner not only 
by respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by making 
efforts to secure their wellbeing (ibid:5). 
 Justice means a sense of "fairness in distribution" or "what is deserved". An 
injustice occurs when a benefit to which a person is entitled to is denied without a 
valid reason, or when some burden is imposed unduly (ibid:6).  
Applying these general principles in conducting research leads to the consideration of the 
following requirements: 
(a)  Informed consent 
Informed consent in respect of persons requires that research subjects, to the degree 
that they are capable, be given the opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen 
to them (ibid:7). The following needs to be considered in this context: 
 Information: Most codes of research establish specific items for disclosure to 
ensure that subjects are given sufficient information. These items generally 
include the research procedure, the purposes, risks and anticipated benefits, and 
a statement offering the subject the opportunity to ask questions and to withdraw 
from the research at any time (ibid:7-8). 
 Comprehension: The manner and context in which the information is conveyed is 
as important as the information itself (ibid:8).  
 Voluntariness: Agreeing to participate in the research constitutes a valid consent 
only if given voluntarily (ibid:9).   
An assessment of risks and benefits requires a careful arrangement of relevant data, 
which should present both an opportunity and a responsibility to gather systematic and 
comprehensive information about the proposed research (ibid:10-11). 
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(b)  Selection of subjects 
Similar to the principle of respect for persons – which focuses on the requirements of 
consent and the principle of beneficence with a focus on risk and benefit assessment – 
the principle of justice gives rise to moral requirements that there be fair procedures and 
outcomes in the selection of research subjects (ibid:11). 
The ethical principles contained in the Belmont Report were considered while undertaking 
the case study. A comprehensive research proposal was presented to the head of 
security of the participating mine at the time in order to obtain “informed consent” to 
undertake the proposed research from the relevant authorities.  
The “assessment of the risks and benefits” of the intended research was reviewed by an 
independent panel at the participating mine and written consent was given on condition 
that the identity of the participating mining company and all participants be kept 
anonymous and all information received be dealt with as confidential. A confidentiality 
agreement was signed by the researcher in this regard to ensure that all information 
obtained for research purposes will be secured and will be used for this case study only 
and not be disclosed to any other party or utilised for any other purpose.  
As the researcher has acknowledged the obligation to respect the company values of the 
participating mine pertaining to safety, all site visits to gather information were 
conducted under the supervision of a safety officer or security officer. 
In addition, the researcher applied the ethical standards of the University of South Africa 
as outlined in the Code of Ethics for Research (Technikon SA 2000) by using accurate 
referencing techniques, avoiding plagiarising, and acknowledging all sources of 
information used in conducting the case study. 
1.4  CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED DURING THE RESEARCH STUDY 
The researcher wishes to express her sincere gratitude to the participating mine for the 
opportunity granted to conduct this case study. The mine’s willingness to take part in the 
case study enabled the researcher to contribute towards a research topic that has not 
been explored commonly thus far in South Africa. 
As with any research study, the researcher faced various research challenges and 
unanticipated difficulties, which will be discussed briefly below. 
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The research proposal for the case study was approved by the participating mine in 
January 2007. The initial timeframe decided on for the data collection phase of the 
research study was for the year 2007. The initial scope of the case study included 
analysis of the asset theft-related incidents recorded by the participating mine in the 
period January 2005 to December 2006. The first electronic dataset comprising the asset 
theft-related incidents recorded in the above period included 2,825 incidents and was 
made available to the researcher during 2007. Simultaneously, the researcher distributed 
open-ended interview questionnaires to the participants, and conducted follow-up 
interviews with the participants towards the end of 2007. The information gathered were 
analysed during the first semester of 2008 and the initial research report drafted. Shortly 
thereafter the researcher accepted a new position, which unfortunately allowed limited 
time to continue with the research. 
Crime is an ever-changing phenomenon. For that reason, proactive strategies are 
continuously revised and updated to meet ever-changing security challenges. In order to 
ensure the case study remained valuable to the participating mine, the information 
pertaining to the asset thefts, as well as the crime prevention strategies continuously 
adopted to address the crime incidents, had to remain relevant in order to be useful. The 
timeframe for the case study was consequently adjusted to accommodate the 
researcher’s limited availability and to accommodate the participating mine’s need for an 
up-to-date research product. 
The new timeframe increased the scope of the case study significantly, however.  The 
number of recorded asset theft-related incidents increased from 2,825 to 6,045 (2006-
2010) and more interviews with the participants were required each time another year’s 
incidents were released to the researcher. This was done to ensure that the researcher 
remained up to date with changes in the proactive strategies and followed the concurrent 
embedded mixed methods research design principles in order to stay true to the 
approach selected for the intended research case study. 
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Chapter 2 
A background to crime in South Africa 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The complex and various factors that contribute towards crime are now better and more 
widely understood than before (Homel 2004:1). These factors can range from aspects of 
individuals‟ personal characteristics and how they relate to their families and 
communities, through to social and structural factors such as access to and complete 
achievement and utilisation of health, education, employment and housing opportunities. 
Understanding the causes of crime also improve our understanding of the type and mix 
of measures that can be used to bring about sustained reductions and the long-term 
prevention of crime.  
This chapter focuses on some of the perceptions of and theories about how the history of 
South Africa impacts on the overall crime threat faced by the country. When formulating 
an integrated and holistic crime prevention strategy, it is essential to appreciate the 
underlying factors that could contribute towards criminal behaviour.  
At the participating mine, all crime incidents are reported to the security management department. This 
department is also responsible for conducting risk assessments and implementing security measures 
to manage the identified risks. An open-ended interview questionnaire was distributed to 15 security 
managers for completion prior to the interviews (see Annexure A). At the time the 15 participants 
collectively had 370 years’ experience in the security field and 198 years’ experience in the mining 
industry at the time (see Annexure C). Interviews with the security managers of the participating mine 
were conducted in 2007 and 2008 to contextualise the perceptions of the participants regarding the 
underlying causes of the crimes their mining company faced at the time. In accordance with the 
concurrent mixed methods approach used for this study, the literature review was done during the 
same period. 
 
2.2  THE HISTORY OF CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Butchart, Hamber, Terreblanche and Seedat (1998:237-238) stated that according to the 
Foucaultian perspective, a productive relationship exists between power and knowledge. 
An apparently objective phenomenon such as violence is in fact fabricated in historically 
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dependent ways as a result of this relationship. Simultaneous with the collapse of 
apartheid and progress towards democracy, the use of violence for sovereign ends was 
de-legitimised. The concern after the new democratic government had been implemented 
no longer was the demonstration of violence as a means to obtain political power, but 
rather the consequences of violence, which is reflected in the high levels of crime as well 
as the violent nature of crime prevalent in South Africa. 
The social disorganisation theory, in contrast to other theories on the causative factors of 
crime, posits that crime occurs not necessarily where the opportunity for crime is the 
greatest, but rather where social structural factors produce an environment that is 
conducive to crime (Rice 2003:11). According to this theory, a post-conflict society would 
arguable be influenced in this way. Whilst the social disorganisation theory insists that 
spatial patterns of crime emerge because neighbourhood and community characteristics 
are susceptible to criminality, the routine activity theory, on the other hand, emphasises 
that spatial patterns of crime emerge as a result of contextual differences in 
opportunities for criminal acts (ibid:11-12). Given that a criminal event requires both a 
motivated offender and an opportunity, it has been recognised that these two theories, 
though independent, are complementary in nature. Characteristics associated with the 
production of criminality and the creation of opportunity may be independently 
associated with spatial patterns of criminal events, but when they occur simultaneously 
in the same location, the interaction may result in a multiplicative rather than an additive 
effect.  
The routine activity theory further assumes that crime is engaged as a rational choice in 
which offenders attempt to maximise their gains and minimise their losses, proposing 
that crime is a result of routine activity (Clarke 1984:74-83). This theory perceives crime 
as a function of everyday behaviour, supposing that crime will occur more frequently 
where daily activities create the most opportunities for the most profitable crime and the 
least chance of retaliation. More specifically, the theory suggests that there are three 
basic elements of routine activity that influence crime rates: accessibility, guardianship, 
and target suitability. It is proposed that converting opportunity into criminal acts 
depends on the subjective evaluation of the ease and attractiveness of the perceived 
opportunity and that this evaluation occurs in the context of criminal motivation, 
experience and knowledge. Seen in the light of high levels of poverty and unemployment, 
crime levels would thus be influenced substantially. 
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2.2.1  Moral regeneration 
Many participants in the case study mentioned a general lawlessness or low moral standards when 
reflecting on factors contributing towards crime in the mining industry. Participant 9 stated that the 
country has a “culture of entitlement”, while Participant 1 remarked that a “national culture of 
lawlessness” prevailed. 
Peter Gastrow, a crime analyst at the Institute for Security Studies in Cape Town, said in 
a news interview that South Africa is an extraordinarily violent society and that nobody 
knows the reason for this (Conroy 2006). There are plenty of theories, many tied to 
South Africa's unique history and the belief that the struggle against apartheid created a 
culture of lawlessness, but the reasons seem to be unbelievably complex. “There is no 
explanation that makes sense,” Gastrow said (ibid). Mamphele Ramphela's response to 
South Africa's extraordinarily low score in the safety and security category in the 2008 
Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, in which South Africa ranked 42nd out of 48 
sub-Saharan countries, was that the culture of lawlessness was rampant. She said the 
police were deeply corrupt and that law enforcement authorities were weak and had 
never managed to get on top of the crisis (Pienaar 2008). 
Simpson (1998:67-68) stated that the new democratic government had inherited many 
state institutions and personnel and with them, as a result of their functions under 
apartheid, inevitably a legacy of mistrust. The most widely distrusted government 
institutions during apartheid were the police, the justice system and correctional 
services. Despite various changes that were implemented, the criminal justice system 
had not yet produced new, legitimate and respected sources of social authority, with the 
result that a culture of impunity reigns. This enables criminals to operate freely and at 
the same time sanctions private justice, with the dangers of violent revenge that 
accompany it. Unrealistic expectations that better living conditions would be delivered 
swiftly once the democratic government takes the reigns were destined to cause deep-
seated frustration. Although the political backlash that many feared has not occurred, the 
rising crime rate and rampant violence point to growing disaffection, especially among 
the young. 
According to Leggett (2005:581-583) it is often argued that a crime wave following 
South Africa's transition to democracy was inevitable. Major political or social transitions 
seem to be accompanied by an increase in crime rates, as seen in the former Eastern 
Bloc countries. Many reasons for this phenomenon have been suggested, ranging from 
widespread social disorder to a deep sense of “normlessness” which in turn results in 
“lawlessness”. Apartheid also relegated the majority of the people to poverty, and the 
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pace of social reform was tempered by the need to make the economy investor-friendly. 
It may be argued that people who had suffered so profoundly for so long are entitled to a 
little informal redistributive activity such as crime. In addition, post-conflict situations are 
generally characterised by more crime. After decades of systematic oppression some 
deep-seated hatred could be expected.  
In June 1997 President Nelson Mandela, describing the spiritual malaise underpinning the 
crime problem, stated:  
 [Our] hopes and dreams, at times, seem to be overcome by cynicism, self-
 centredness and fear. This spiritual malaise sows itself as a lack of good spirit, as 
 pessimism, or lack of hope and faith. And from it emerge the problems of greed 
 and cruelty, of laziness and egotism, of personal and family failure. It both helps 
 fuel the problems of crime and corruption and hinders our efforts to deal with 
 them (Rauch 2005:15). 
After the 1999 election, with Thabo Mbeki as president and Jacob Zuma as deputy 
president, a “moral regeneration” initiative to address this spiritual malaise began to 
enjoy more formal attention from the presidency. In dividing up political and 
administrative tasks between the president and deputy president, Zuma was allocated 
responsibility for this initiative. Staff in the presidency expressed it as a routine division 
of labour, with no great political significance. However, subsequent allegations of 
corruption levelled against Deputy President Zuma‟s financial advisor, and later his own 
involvement, led to various criticisms being voiced about his role in the moral 
regeneration initiative, often insinuating some political significance in his association with 
the campaign. The moral regeneration campaign had, however, been conceptualised as 
an expanding partnership between government and civil society (particularly faith-based 
organisations) who would engage in campaigning and other activities to rebuild the social 
fabric of society and improve the moral fibre of the nation. However, it never became 
clear what these activities should be or how they would rebuild morality in order to 
combat crime (Rauch 2005:23-25). 
2.2.2  Violent nature of crime 
Nearly half of the participants of this case study raised concern for the safety of employees and 
security personnel because of the growing incidence of violence and crime in South Africa. Participant 
1 stated that crime is considered a “safety threat to workers in service” of the mining industry. 
Participant 4 subscribed to this view stating: “Crime is becoming a safety threat in the mining industry. 
Lives of employees are threatened.” The participating mine had fallen victim to numerous armed 
attacks and in some instances, the consequences had been fatal. Participant 8 expressed concern 
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that “the better we protect our assets the more violent crime becomes”. In order to address the 
increase in violence, the participating mine replaced all response vehicles with armoured vehicles as 
part of their safety drive against violent crimes. 
Crime and violence are arguably the greatest obstacles to a prosperous and peaceful 
South Africa where a society can live together free from fear and able to participate in all 
that the country has to offer (Holtmann 2008:13). The police has recorded nearly two 
million serious crimes each year during the period 2000 to 2007, more significantly, of 
these crimes, about a third are so-called “contact crimes” such as murder, hijacking, 
armed robbery and rape. 
The distinctive feature of crime in South Africa is not the volume of crime but the violent 
nature of crime (Stone 2006:4). The homicide rate presents the extent of violence in the 
country most starkly. Although the rate has declined substantially since 1994 when South 
Africa recorded 67 murders per 100,000 people, it was reported to be at 40 for the 
period 2004/05, which is still among the highest national murder rates recorded in the 
world. Statistically a South African is 12 times more likely to be murdered than the 
average American and the chances of being killed are 50 times greater than if he or she 
lived in Europe (Conroy 2006). Markinor has been involved in public opinion studies on 
government performance since 1994, and when asking South Africans for the April/May 
2007 study whether they perceived the crime rate to be on the increase, about three in 
every five South African adults (59%) indicated that they believed the crime level had 
increased. The remainder believed that it had either decreased (15%) or remained the 
same (24%). A small minority (2%) did not have an opinion at all (Harris & Radaelli 
2007:1-3). 
In July 2007, the Safety and Security Minister at the time, Charles Nqakula, addressed 
community policing forums (CPFs) and said that crime trends had been narrowed down 
to an increase of 2.4% in murder and 4.6% in aggravated robbery. The minister 
explained that the increases were the result of a spike in violent crime between April and 
June of 2006, which had not been emphasised. He added that "another critical factor that 
was overlooked was that this spike took place in the wake of the security strikes” 
(Sakoana 2007). 
Official statistics released by the South African Police Service (SAPS) in 2006 and 2007 
indicated significant increases in violent crimes. For the period April 2006 to March 2007, 
eight serious crimes were grouped together in a category for “contact crime” against the 
person. These crimes involve physical contact between the victims and offenders and 
were generally found to be of a violent nature. The crimes included in this category are 
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murder, attempted murder, rape, assault with the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm 
(GBH), common assault, indecent assault, aggravated robbery, and other robbery. The 
above crimes accounted for a disturbing 33.3% of South Africa‟s recorded serious crime 
in the corresponding period.  
Moreover, theft had become violent, general thefts had decreased by 4%, and 
aggravated theft (robberies) had increased by 6% in the corresponding period. 
Aggravated robbery is the second-largest generator of contact crimes, particularly 
attempted murder and murder, because victims are often killed and/or seriously injured 
during such thefts.  
The vast majority of house robberies, car-jackings, business robberies, cash-in-transit 
robberies and bank robberies are committed with firearms and shots are frequently fired 
at victims. In the period April 2006 to March 2007, a total of 197,714 robberies were 
reported to the SAPS. Robbery at business premises increased by 52.5% (from 4,387 
cases to 6,689) in the period April to March 2006/07 compared to the corresponding 
period in 2005/06.  
According to Burger (2007:1) when the SAPS released the above crime statistics, they 
confirmed what many had expected – that there had been a serious increase in violence 
in the country. Apart from murder and rape, aggravated robbery – certainly because of 
its nature and the violence or threat of violence associated with it – seems to be the 
most feared crime in the country (ibid:4).  
In a press release in July 2007, the National Commissioner of the SAPS at the time, 
Jackie Selebi, said in response to the concerns expressed about the violence associated 
with crime in the country that “we want to assure all South Africans that we will continue 
to cut crime” (Hosken 2007). 
Business Against Crime South Africa (BACSA) stated in a media release in June 2008 that 
despite the increased efforts of the police, they were deeply concerned that the crime 
level in South Africa remained unacceptably high and was exacerbated by the high levels 
of violence that threatened South Africans‟ feeling of safety and security. Although 
robbery with aggravating circumstances had decreased by 7.4% overall between the 
period 2006/07 and 2007/08, business robberies increased by 47.7% and truck-jackings 
by 39.6% (BACSA 2008). 
The Institute for Security Studies (ISS) conducted the 2007 National Victim Survey with 
a design that was comparable with the 1998 Statistics South Africa Victim Survey and 
the 2003 ISS Victim Survey. In general the percentage of participants who had been 
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victims of crime decreased by 12% since 1998 and 4% since 2003. Compared to official 
SAPS statistics, the victim survey indicated significant increases in the robbery category, 
however (Pharoah 2008:7). 
2.3  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO CRIME IN SOUTH AFRICA  
Between January and March 1998 the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation 
(CSVR) conducted a survey research project by means of structured interviews with 
station commissioners at each of the police stations within the Greater Johannesburg 
Metropolitan area. Most of the responses of the 38 station commissioners to the question 
"What do you think are the main causes of crime, or factors contributing to crime, in your 
area?" indicated that they viewed the socio-economic situation and criminal organisations 
in South Africa as the major problems. Many alluded to factors in the category 
“community attitudes and values” that contribute to crime. These ranged from alcohol 
abuse – citing the frustration-aggression hypothesis and the absence of appropriate role 
models for young people – to the hostility and lack of co-operation the police experience 
in the communities they serve. Other factors mentioned included illegal immigrants, 
environmental factors, and aspects of urbanisation and development that may contribute 
to crime (Rauch 1998).  
Between April and July 2000 the Community Agency for Social Enquiry (CASE) conducted 
a research study among youth in South Africa and carried out a survey in all nine 
provinces. The sample included 2,500 people between the ages of 16 and 35. When 
asked what they perceived as the main reasons for the high crime rate in South Africa, 
72% of the participants ranked unemployment first, while 12% placed it second. The 
second reason given for the high crime rate was poverty. While unemployment and 
poverty are generally perceived to be the main factors contributing to crime, additional 
causes advanced by the participants included drug abuse, gangs, and people‟s perception 
that they would not get caught (Braehmer, Kimmie, Greenstein, Morake & Seutloadi 
2000:81-82).  
The 2007 National Victim Survey conducted by the ISS included 4 500 interviews 
conducted in all nine provinces in the period October-November 2007. The participants 
were randomly selected in a representative stratified sample of the national population 
over the age of 16. When asked, “What motivates most people who commit crime in your 
area?” in response to a question on to property-related crime, 43% of the participants 
indicated greed, 24% indicated that it was the result of real need, and 27% believed that 
property crime was committed for non-financial motives (Louw 2008:18). 
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In response to the question, “What do you think are the causative factors or general 
factors contributing towards crime in the mining industry?” the participants of the case 
study had similar responses to those highlighted in the above research studies. Most 
were of the opinion that the availability of assets (opportunity) as a result of a lack of 
proper security controls was an important factor contributing to asset theft in the mining 
industry.  
More than half of the participants indicated that unemployment, poverty and poor socio-
economic conditions greatly contributed to the high crime levels in the mining industry. 
Other factors cited by the participants included a general culture of normlessness 
(lawlessness), greed, urbanisation, and informal settlements, as well as a lack of 
awareness among employees. 
Although various factors can contribute towards crime in South Africa, this case study will 
focus on socio-economic and developmental factors. These themes have emerged 
consistently in research studies undertaken in South Africa and were also highlighted by 
the participants. 
2.3.1  Poverty and socio-economic factors 
“The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my continent is a 
blight that we share. The blight on our happiness that derives from this … leaves us in a 
persistent shadow of despair. This is a savage road to which nobody should be 
condemned.” (Statement of Deputy President Thabo Mbeki at the adoption of the 
Republic of South Africa Constitution Bill, 1996) 
Even in the post-apartheid era, deprivation among South Africans continues to pose a 
major social challenge to the country. People are confronted by the reality that some are 
still poor even after years of democracy (Mathole 2005:20-21). 
The Poverty and Inequality Report (PIR) released by the South African Government in 
1998 mentioned that the poverty phenomenon that is common to many countries can be 
seen as the inability of many to satisfy their essential needs while a minority enjoys 
extreme prosperity. The specificity of this condition in South Africa has mainly been the 
result of historically institutionalised discrimination. Colonial and Union government 
policies directed at the extraction of cheap labour were built upon by apartheid 
legislation. The result was a practice of state-driven underdevelopment that 
encompassed dispossession and exclusion for the majority of South Africans. 
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In response to the question what the participants of this case study considered the best 
and most effective way to deal with causative factors contributing towards crime in the 
mining industry, nearly half of the participants held the opinion that uplifting poverty in 
the communities situated close to the mining operations would decrease crime.  
There is a complex relationship between crime and poverty (Rauch 2003:2-4). Although 
this relationship is not linear and it cannot be assumed that if poverty is addressed the 
crime problem will disappear, or that poverty is the sole contributing factor to crime, it is 
accepted that there is a causal relationship between the poverty in certain areas and the 
high levels of crime and violence recorded in these areas. 
The relationship between crime, poverty, and social development has been the subject of 
various research initiatives (Frank 2006:95-96). A few primary themes have emerged 
from this debate, including the assertion that poverty, or a lack of development, causes 
crime. 
Kothari (1993:113) defined poverty as a summation of a variety of concrete phenomena, 
which include growing disproportion in living standards, rising underemployment and 
unemployment, increasing marginalisation and declining access to vital and primary 
resources, social discrimination, and ecological deprivation.  
Poverty is defined by Potgieter (1998:198) as a standard of living which is lower than the 
expectations of society or as a uniform gap between one‟s own resources and those of 
others. In this way poverty can also be seen as a lack of something others have and 
which the deprived person feels entitled to have. 
Poverty and unemployment can be associated with certain crimes, according to Louw and 
Shaw (1997:4-5). But focusing on such structural features as causes of crime does not 
always explain crime patterns and trends in particular areas and is not particularly helpful 
to policy-makers. Poverty and unemployment often explain the contexts within which 
crime occurs, but  in terms of patterns and trends, these arguments are too general and 
do not explain why crime rates are substantially higher in one area compared to other 
areas that are equally or more affected by unemployment and poverty. 
The Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) at the University of Cape Town conducted 
a post-apartheid economic and labour market review utilising data from the 1995 
October Household Survey and the September 2003 Labour Force Survey. The findings 
indicated that while the South African economy created more than 2 million jobs between 
1995 and 2003, unemployment levels were still showing a rapid increase. It was 
established that the narrow unemployment rate increased from 17.6% in 1995 to 28.2% 
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in 2003. Particularly among individuals between the ages of 15 and 34 years 
unemployment emerged as a serious problem, with the broad youth unemployment rate 
increasing from 40% in 1995 to 55% in 2003. This indicates that the rapid surge in the 
overall broad unemployment rate had been driven largely by rapidly rising 
unemployment among people between the ages of 15 and 34 (Bhorat 2005:3). 
The South African Government has however acknowledged that poverty plays a major 
role in the high crime levels in the country. In March 2007 the then Minister of Finance, 
Trevor Manuel, stated in a press release that he could not fathom why the South African 
Government's commitment to fight crime was doubted, as every official from President 
Thabo Mbeki down had said on innumerable occasions that the crime rates in South 
Africa were unacceptably high. Evidence of the government's commitment, Manuel said, 
could be found in the massive resources allocated each year to the criminal justice 
system, as well as in its concerted campaign to address the root cause of crime, namely 
poverty. The financial resources budget to address crime for 2007 was estimated at more 
than R55 billion (Ensor 2007). 
Participant 6 mentioned that the “lack of income due to unemployment drives people to 
commit crime in the hope to survive”.  Frank (2006:95-96) also stated that the causative 
link was announced together with a great deal of evidence linking crime and poverty.  
Richards (2004:53-57) stated that poverty is characterised by the inability of individuals, 
households or even entire communities to obtain and sustain sufficient vital resources to 
satisfy basic needs. Many South Africans do not have access to the most basic required 
physical needs, including sufficient food, housing, clean water, health care, and education 
facilities. Without these, the deterioration of the body may impair or restrict mental 
vision and degrade the spirit. People that are deprived of basic shelter and on the edge of 
starvation cannot always make choices cognitively or attain self-fulfilment without 
crossing some lines. Millions of South Africans are severely affected by poverty and the 
increase in potential offenders should be seen against this background.  
Participant 15 explicated that the “socio-economic conditions and poverty in informal settlements 
situated close to the mining areas create circumstances where desperate individuals who cannot find 
employment at the mines are recruited by organised criminal groups”.  
Poverty is often considered a product of a system of deprivation and insecurity, 
aggravated by a society that allows the conditions that create poverty to flourish. 
According to Van der Walt and Morolo (1996:136-138) this factor is significant in the 
South African context, where the development of the greater part of the population has 
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been negatively affected by apartheid policies, setting in motion conditions that trapped 
individuals, households, groups, and even entire communities in poverty.  
Two key psychosocial consequences of the depth and pattern of inequality in South Africa 
are a profound sense of exclusion from the formal economy and the absence of hope that 
one will find a job. Income distribution among African-headed households was found to 
be much more unequal than in households of any other racial group. It appears that the 
discrepancy between the relative success of a minority of African-headed households and 
the continued poverty of the majority of African-headed households has led to an 
increased sense of relative deprivation. However, violence is not a response to economic 
inequality as much as it is a response to the dehumanisation and humiliation created by 
economic and social exclusion. Violence is, one might say, a reaction to the crisis of 
legitimacy surrounding all social institutions, each of which promises equality and 
opportunity but all of which fail to deliver (Altbeker 2008:39-48). 
2.3.2  Urbanisation and developmental factors 
According to Cox, Hemson and Todes (2004:2) migrant labour has a long history in 
South Africa and substantial literature and research developed around it and its socio-
political significance, including Wolpe 1972, Mabin 1990 and Posel 2003. 
Cox et al (2004:2-3) explained that the limits to permanent urbanisation instituted by 
the National Party came to be known as influx control, which in effect, served to 
perpetuate migrant labour. This is because Africans with the appropriate stamps in their 
passbooks could work as migrant workers in the so-called “white” cities without being 
permanent residents. Increasing numbers of migrant workers came from the old native 
reserves – the areas that were to become known under apartheid as the homelands – to 
the “white” cities. In that period apartheid and migrant labour benefited from fairly 
optimistic labour markets until at least the mid-seventies, but from then on formal work 
opportunities in the cities – and, more recently, on the mines – have been showing a 
dramatic decrease. Despite fewer opportunities, the number of migrant labourers has 
continued to grow, however.  
In the 1997 Household Survey it was found that of the almost 65,000 black households 
identified, 21% included migrant workers. It can be argued that since crime and 
outbreaks of violence were prevalent in both the cities and in rural areas, having a base 
in both could allow criminals to move between the two as circumstances or opportunities 
change. The rural areas are also the place unemployed members of the household return 
to when they become unemployed. Some migrant workers expressed strong patriarchal 
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views in terms of family bonds, but many single mothers‟ attitude towards the old 
traditional views were deeply sceptical. These women increasingly had their “home 
elsewhere” and sooner or later broke their ties with the traditional “homelands”. City 
women, on the other hand, are often viewed by their peers in the traditional rural areas 
as being “loose” or immoral as they are mostly perceived to be interested only in money. 
This is often believed to drive men to crime to satisfy their demands (Cox et al 2004:4). 
Simpson (1998:66-71) stated that urbanisation under apartheid placed enormous 
pressure on family structures and destroyed the support structures of the extended 
traditional family. Traditional and customary legal structures were manipulated for the 
purpose of social control in the apartheid era. Schools operated as mechanisms of control 
and consequently lost their potential as places of social cohesion and identity for young 
people and became sites of political struggle. Young black people were educationally, 
economically, politically and emotionally disempowered. They proved resilient in the face 
of marginalisation, however, which led to the creation of new sub-cultures within political 
organisations, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. Before independence, and despite 
the government's apartheid policy, rural poverty caused massive migration to urban 
centres. Since migration was contrary to official policy, basic requirements such as 
housing, infrastructure and services were not provided to black South Africans living in 
urban townships. The perceptions of white-owned wealth amidst grinding poverty, 
massive unemployment, and scarcity of even basic resources eventually led to intense 
conflict, contributing to a situation in which criminal activity was generally seen as 
legitimate and socially acceptable. 
The social disorganisation theory attributes variation in crime and delinquency to the 
absence or breakdown of communal institutions – for example family, school, church and 
local government – and communal relationships that traditionally encouraged cooperative 
relationships among people. The concept is mainly defined in terms of the absence or 
breakdown of certain types of relationships among people (Jensen 2003).  
Urbanisation is a growing concern of the participating mine in terms of managing crime. Participant 8 
explained that the general misperception people have that the “mining industry has everything in 
abundance” has led to “informal settlements rising on the boundaries of mining operations” and the 
“presence of refugees from neighbouring countries in these settlements, all hoping to get an income or 
job from these mining operations”.  
Another theme that relates to criminal acts as a barrier to development is corruption and 
fraud relating to services necessary for development, such as the delivery of social 
security. Crime within government, especially fraud and corruption, has a serious impact 
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not only on the nature and quality of service delivery, but on achieving the overall goals 
of democracy and development. The failure of government to deal effectively with 
internal fraud and corruption are highlighted by the public perception of government 
employees as corrupt and untrustworthy (Frank 2006:95-96).  
In the African tradition, as in many other cultures, leaders are expected to be kind and 
compassionate towards their people, especially in difficult times. Africans may even end 
up condemning corruption when it does not benefit them personally or their relatives, 
while they condone it if it brings them some benefits. Furthermore, it is the African 
practice that young people who migrate to the urban areas in search of employment will 
rely on their more established relatives to provide food and shelter. Even more, if such a 
relative holds a senior civil service position, it will be expected of him or her to provide 
job security as well. Such age-old cultural expectations can easily nurture the practice of 
corruption in a new political environment (Balia 2005:56). 
Fraud and corruption was also highlighted by the participating mine as a serious concern. Participant 1 
commented on the importance to “establish strong supporting checks and balances to detect white 
collar crime”. Participant 10 boldly stated that “I am of the opinion that white collar crime poses the 
biggest risk to the industry” and added that “one needs to remember that these crimes are normally 
being committed by those whom you would never suspect of committing it, such as senior 
management with years of service. White collar crime can close a mine down completely.”  
2.4  NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY 
 
“When sovereign and ministers show perversity of mind, it is impossible even for a Sun 
Tzu to encounter the foe.” (Sun Tzu in Giles 1910:7) 
 
Du Plessis and Louw (2005:427) stated that South Africa's transition since 1994 has 
required an extensive overhaul of its institutions, laws and policing strategies. The period 
1994-2004 in particular was characterised by the introduction of a number of new 
policies and legislation in the criminal justice sector. After 1994, one of the government's 
priorities was the introduction in 1996 of the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS), 
which recognised the impact of social and developmental causes of crime, as well as the 
need to involve a range of government departments and civil society partnerships in 
addressing crime phenomena in a more holistic manner. 
According to Rauch (2005:9) the link between criminal behaviour and the moral 
breakdown of a society is a very old one in social theory, pre-dating modern Western 
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sociology. In the NCPS the South African government linked the crime problem most 
strongly with the progression of the political transition that South Africa underwent in the 
early 1990s. In its study of the crime problem, the NCPS pointed out that the transition 
from authoritarian to democratic government resulted in significant implications for social 
cohesion and values. One of the aims of the NCPS in respect of public values and 
education was the development of strong community values and social pressure against 
activities which support criminal behaviour (Rauch 2005:12-13).  
More than half of the participants recognised the importance of education and awareness as part of a 
crime prevention approach. Participant 15 emphasised that one of the most effective ways to address 
the increased levels of crime at the participating mine is to make use of “effective awareness 
campaigns and training of employees with a zero tolerance for crime policy”. 
According to the NCPS the violence and intolerance which had dominated the apartheid 
political culture was “spilling over” into the social and domestic arenas of the country. 
Criminalisation of political activity under apartheid had blurred the dividing line between 
political and criminal activity and criminals used this to rationalise their illegal activities. 
Law enforcement and criminal justice agencies had been discredited, which contributed 
to popular approval of illegal activities. The NCPS also emphasised the apartheid era‟s 
socio-economic legacy of “poverty, unemployment, and relative deprivation” as well as 
“youth marginalisation”. Stark disparities in wealth, the NCPS said, operated as an 
incentive for criminal activity and, with political rationalisation, are even used as 
justification for crime. The NCPS indicated that South Africa was undergoing a new 
process of transition, and that the culture of violence and rationalisation of criminality 
were also reinforced by a "culture of entitlement" owing to expectations generated by the 
process of political change. The slow pace of change led to further frustration, however, 
contributing to an escalation in social conflict as well as violent and acquisitive crime 
(Bruce 2006:31-33).  
In the opinion of Leggett (2005:590-594) the most common reasons for the increase in 
crime levels included the restructuring of the criminal justice system, initiating a period 
of reduced effectiveness. Furthermore, basic conflicts between the methods and 
strategies of the criminal justice system departments remain, as their operations seem 
"un-integrated". For example, the police strategy emphasises making massive numbers 
of arrests while the prosecutorial strategy emphasises cutting down on case backlogs and 
achieving more convictions. Then, of course, the prison system is on the receiving end, 
with the number of prisoners awaiting trial increasing as case backlogs grow.  Prisoners 
are sentenced as convictions increase, which in turn makes the stated goal – 
rehabilitation – practically impossible. Democratisation implies greater concern for the 
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rights of the public, which often places an impediment on crime prevention. The South 
African crime policy debate has involved fundamental philosophical tension between two 
polarised perspectives on the best approach to address crime: the law enforcement 
approach and the crime prevention approach. The law enforcement approach is based on 
the premise that the best way to reduce crime is by jailing criminals. This incapacitates 
the problem individuals, at least for the period of their incarceration, and hypothetically 
serves as a deterrent to those who wish to avoid a similar fate.  
However, it is also about rehabilitation, and thus opportunities and incentives for reform 
should be provided. In a society characterised by the kind of poverty seen in South 
Africa, poverty may to some extent counteract the supposed deterrence and 
opportunities of the corrective nature of incarceration. The crime prevention approach, on 
the other hand, is based on the notion that crime is caused by social conditions and that 
crime can only be addressed effectively addressing these underlying problems. 
Unfortunately, the causes of crime are often cast in the broad terms of poverty and 
inequality, which blurs the line between crime prevention and the social justice role. As a 
result the law enforcement approach is often seen as a long-term policy without any clear 
indication of responsibility. 
According to Pelser (2007:2) the real issue is not so much that South Africa‟s crime 
prevention policy is wrong or ineffective, but that the rhetoric associated with the 
supposedly tough approach adopted by the police following the 1999 elections put the 
police at the centre of “a war against crime”. This has allowed the then departments of 
Social Development, Education, Health, Housing and Transport to either ignore or 
abdicate their responsibilities in addressing crime with the result that the police continue 
to be seen – erroneously – as the primary crime prevention agency. 
Participant 8 held the opinion that “very little can be done about the socio-economic situation because 
of the magnitude of the problem. The mining industry will have to accept the fact that they‟ll have to 
deal with the challenges themselves and that this responsibility will grow as conditions worsens and 
the conditions of other agents responsible to address crime deteriorate.” Participant 10 stressed that 
“crime does not only pose a risk to the mining industry, but can affect the country and those who 
work for the industry directly”. 
2.5  SUMMARY 
From the literature review above, it can be argued that understanding and addressing 
the underlying factors that contribute towards crime in South Africa could play an 
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important role in the effective implementation of the crime prevention strategy adopted 
by the South African Government.  
In formulating a holistic and integrated proactive approach to curbing asset theft at the 
participating mine, the participants showed that they appreciated the fact that their crime 
prevention efforts had little chance of being successful if these external factors were not 
addressed as well. However, if addressing these external factors does not form part of 
their crime prevention strategy in a formal context, with clear objectives and properly 
governed action steps, it would be impossible to achieve the aim of reducing crime 
optimally. 
When formulating a holistic and integrated crime prevention strategy, it is important not 
only to understand the factors contributing towards crime but also to reflect on the 
extent of crime in South Africa while considering, in depth, the nature of crime at the 
participating mine. This is done in chapter 3. 
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Chapter 3 
The nature and extent of theft at a South African mine 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the nature and the extent of asset theft at a participating mine are 
discussed to obtain a general understanding of asset theft with focused presentation and 
analysis of the collected data. Understanding this phenomenon is important not only 
when formulating a crime prevention approach applicable to the participating mine, but 
also when formulating strategies to address external factors that impact on the 
participating mine‟s efforts to curb asset theft. 
Although the purpose of the research undertaken is to obtain a better understanding of 
the extent of asset theft faced by a particular participating mine, a brief overview of the 
occurrence of theft in South Africa is given to contextualise this phenomenon in the 
timeframe corresponding with the asset theft incidents analysed at the participating 
mine, namely the five-year period 2006-2010. 
3.2  OVERVIEW OF THEFT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In the South African Police Service Annual Statistical Report of 2007 (SAPS 2007:2) it 
was stated that the government decided in January 2004 on a reduction target of 7% to 
10% per annum for each contact crime over the period 2004/05 to 2014/15 in order to 
bring South Africa in line with the crime figures of the majority of Interpol member 
countries. 
According to the Chamber of Mines, asset theft and illegal mining continue to threaten 
security personnel and employees at mines. Activities of illegal miners do not only impact 
on financial losses but, more importantly, pose a significant threat to the health and 
safety of employees. More and more homemade bombs are found and security personnel 
and the police members have come under fire. Criminal mining has become a serious 
problem and is now a major concern (Chamber of Mines 2010:125). 
3.2.1  Overview of crime levels in South Africa from April 2006 to March 2011  
According to Burger (2007:4-5) crime in South Africa remains a highly controversial and 
contested issue. In his review of the statistics released by the SAPS for the period 
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2006/07, he stated that the main message from the released crime figures was clear: 
“Whatever we as a country (not just the police) are doing to fight crime, is not working.” 
In 2006/07 the rate of aggravated robberies increased by 4.6% to 267.1 per 100,000 or, 
in real terms, 126,558 incidents and business robberies increased by 52.2% from 3,320 
incidents in 2004/05 to 6,689 in 2006/07. Burger (2007:5) stated that the figures clearly 
showed that there was something seriously wrong with the approach and the way in 
which the country‟s crime situation is presented, as the release of these statistics was 
once again overshadowed by explanations of why our crime is not as bad as it appears to 
be in an apparent attempt to underplay the gravity of the situation. 
In a review of statistics released by the SAPS for the period 2008/09 Burger (2009:3) 
stated that a major concern about these crime figures was the continued increase in the 
so-called trio crimes (house robberies, business robberies and hijackings). For the first 
time house robberies and business robberies had increased in all nine provinces, while 
car-hijackings had increased in seven provinces. Aggravated robbery remained at a level 
between 200 and 300 per 100,000 and the 2008/09 figure of 249.3 was up by 0.8% 
from the 2007/08 figure. Business robberies were increasing at an even faster rate than 
house robberies, however. In the 2008/09 financial year this type of crime increased by 
41.1% and by 54% since 2004/05. The hijacking of trucks, which has an obvious 
business connotation, increased at a faster rate than any other category. In the 2008/09 
financial year truck hijackings increased by 15.4% and overall by 319% since 2004/05 
(Burger 2009:7-10). 
Statistics released by the SAPS for the period 2009/10 showed an overall increase in 
crime at a national level that was mainly driven by increases in five categories of crime, 
namely shoplifting, commercial crime, residential and business burglaries, and theft from 
motor vehicles. Business burglaries increased by 14% or 8,778 cases compared to the 
previous year and business robberies increased by 295.3% between 2003/04 and 
2009/10 (Burger, Gould & Newham 2010:3-4).  
Statistics released by the SAPS for the period 2010/11 (1 April 2010 – 31 March 2011) 
reflected a total of 2,071,487 (approximately 2.1 million) serious crime cases reported 
nationally. Property-related crime comprised 26% (534,451 cases) of the serious crime 
categories and contact crime a further 31% (638,468 cases) including 156,346 robberies. 
The violence associated with property-related crimes remained a concern for the country 
(SAPS 2011:1-5). 
44 
 
3.2.2  Theft of non-ferrous metals in South Africa 
According to Participant 15 the international copper prices increased drastically over the last few 
years, resulting in a lucrative black market and consequent greater interest in copper and cable theft. 
“Currently copper and cable theft poses the biggest threat to the mining industry in terms of 
secondary impact including risk to live and production losses. Management subsequently classified 
copper and cable theft as one of the Top 5 priority crimes” at the participating mine. Theft of non-
ferrous metals will therefore be explored in this section, as it is one of the assets considered by the 
participating mine to be a priority asset at risk. 
At the 6th annual revenue protection conference of the South African Revenue Protection 
Association (SARPA) in July 2002, Leon van den Berg, the chairman (at the time) of the 
South African Non-Ferrous Metal Theft Combatting Committee (NFTCC), stated that an 
increase in copper and aluminium thefts in particular had become a serious problem in 
South Africa. In the decade 1992-2002 copper and cable theft had escalated to such an 
extent that losses ran into millions of rand annually. In the financial year 2001/02, 
Eskom, Telkom and Spoornet alone lost more than R300 million rand as a result of non-
ferrous metal theft. Johannesburg‟s City Power spent more than R25 million on the 
replacement of stolen cable in the year 2000. It was estimated that non-ferrous metal 
thefts, mainly copper cable thefts, in the year 2001 resulted in a total cost to these 
industries of more than R500 million and a cost of more than R1 billion to the economy of 
South Africa (Van den Berg 2002). 
Dawie Cronjé, vice-president of the Electrical Contractors' Association (ECA) in 2006, 
stated that while copper theft was an ongoing problem, “of broader concern is the fact 
that such organised, skilful and resourceful criminals are able to operate so effectively, 
not only in the commission of the robberies themselves, but also in the effective and 
profitable disposing of the stolen goods”. Cronjé added that "if these robberies are to 
become the benchmark of crime in the construction industry, the industry will be brought 
to its knees long before 2010" (Gifford 2006). Johannesburg police spokesperson in 
2006, Superintendent Chris Wilken, stated that the government was aware of ongoing 
copper theft and that the copper is mostly sold to scrapyards. The dealers who bought 
the stolen metal, however, are obliged to be registered as second-hand dealers and must 
be able to account for their goods or face criminal charges and the closure of their 
business. Wilken said that “it's not the small guys who are the major worry; it's the 
organised syndicates who pull kilometres of cable out of the ground and have a whole 
system in place. In those cases there are often industry insiders involved” (Gifford 2006). 
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The previous police commissioner, Jackie Selebi, made a startling claim at a meeting of 
the National Council of Provinces‟ (NCOP) select committee on security and constitutional 
affairs in 2007, stating that an organised crime syndicate was attempting to slow down 
the country‟s economic growth through massive cable theft and crippling power outages. 
Selebi said he had initially thought too that cable theft represented isolated incidents by 
individuals who wanted to make a quick buck. Selebi stated that Germiston in Gauteng 
had experienced the most cable theft and explained that “there‟s a reason for that. 
Germiston has a railway station where a lot of the country‟s industrial cargo passes 
through, especially cargo going to industrial areas of Gauteng. If you take that cable wire 
you are in fact stopping the economy from growing, you‟re slowing the economy.” Selebi 
further stated that he reached a conclusion that it was highly organised and had 
instructed his intelligence people to investigate the possibility of a major criminal 
organisation seeking to create “unnecessary problems” (Peters 2007). 
Councillor Pieter van Dalen, then chairperson of the City of Cape Town's task team, the 
Copperheads, said the unit had been instrumental in many copper theft arrests and had 
racked up almost 100 arrests in six months in the period 2007/08 (Booysen 2008). 
Copper cable theft cost Telkom about R863 million between April 2007 and the end of 
January 2008 alone. Telkom had and would continue to "fight back" by installing alarms 
on critical cable routes and by employing armed security firms. Since routes had been 
fitted with alarms, 1,043 people had been arrested resulting in 157 convictions (SAPA 
2008). 
According to the Transport Minister at the time, S'bu Ndebele, copper theft from railway 
lines of the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA) has cost the country nearly 
R14 million in the period 2006-2009 (Lund 2010). Transnet Freight Rail spent at least 
R30 million on replacement costs due to copper theft in 2009 and Eskom another R38 
million. The combined losses incurred by Transnet and Eskom due to copper theft 
increased by more than 38% in 2008/09 and replacement costs increased by 57%. The 
Democratic Alliance (DA) stated that it is estimated that South Africa lost approximately 
R7 billion per year to metal theft (Phakathi 2010). 
According to the Chamber of Mines (2010:56), cable theft continued to impact on the 
heavy-haul Sishen to Saldanha ore railway line and Transnet and the mining companies 
were attempting to address the various problems that continue to inhibit further growth. 
About R400 million was allocated to theft management on the Transnet Freight Rail and 
crime prevention (Chamber of Mines 2010:82). 
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Non-ferrous metal theft is a national problem that is faced not only by the participating 
mine, or even the mining industry, but is a serious problem that impacts on various 
industries. Therefore, in this case study, non-ferrous metal theft-related incidents will be 
highlighted during analysis of the data to establish the extent thereof at the participating 
mine. 
3.3  ANALYSIS OF ASSET THEFT AT A SOUTH AFRICAN MINE 
The participating mine records every asset theft incident at its mining sites in a 
standardised crime information system. The security manager of each mining site verifies 
the correctness of each electronically recorded incident before it is stored in an electronic 
database. For the purpose of this case study, the participating mine provided a general 
description for terms frequently used in the reporting of the participating mine‟s crime 
incidences (see Glossary of Terms). 
Owing to the sensitivity of prime product-related thefts, the participating mine excluded 
prime product-related incidents, but agreed to make all the required information 
available to the researcher for every other type of asset theft-related incident recorded at 
each of the eleven South African mining sites during the period under review. 
To establish the extent and nature of asset theft at the participating mine, every asset 
theft-related incident, excluding the prime mining product of the participating mine, that 
was recorded in the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010 was selected for 
analysis. In this period, a total of 6,045 asset theft-related incidences (excluding 
product-related thefts) were recorded at the participating mine and consequently the 
participating mine provided electronic datasets for 6,045 completed questionnaires (see 
Annexure B). 
3.3.1  Overview of the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2010 
Theft-related incidents of property belonging to the participating mine including any 
movable items such as tools, equipment, personal belongings of personnel and vehicles 
are grouped for the purpose of this analysis under “other property” and any copper or 
copper cable theft-related incidents are grouped under “copper related”. 
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In the five-year period under review, 
copper-related thefts (2,933 incidents) 
comprised nearly half of the asset thefts 
(6,045 incidents) recorded at the 
participating mine as indicated in Figure 3.1.  
With regard to the value involved in these 
recorded incidents, copper-related incidents 
comprised 46% of the total value involved 
(R44,836,598), while the losses the mine 
recorded due to copper-related incidents 
comprised 60% of the total losses recorded 
(R23,227,946) at the participating mine for 
asset thefts in this period. 
 
Looking at a year-on-year comparison of these incidents, copper-related incidents 
constitute consistently between 40% and 
60% of the total number of asset theft 
incidents recorded. During 2007, copper-
related incidents constituted 58% of the 
recorded asset theft incidents, but in 2008 
and 2009 less than 45% of the recorded 
asset theft incidents (see Figure 3.2). 
In 2007, copper-related incidents reached 
the highest recorded level during the five-
year period, with a total of 761 copper-related incidents (see Table 3.1). This is an 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
648 761 525 501 498
634 561
683 723
511
Figure 3.2 : Asset thefts per year
Copper related Property related
Category Year
Number of 
incidents
% Increase/ 
decrease
Copper related 2006 648
Copper related 2007 761 17.4%
Copper related 2008 525 -31.0%
Copper related 2009 501 -4.6%
Copper related 2010 498 -0.6%
Property related 2006 634
Property related 2007 561 -11.5%
Property related 2008 683 21.7%
Property related 2009 723 5.9%
Property related 2010 511 -29.3%
Table 3.1: Increase or decrease in 
number of incidents
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increase of 17% over 2006, while other property-related incidents decreased by 12% in 
2007 compared to 2006. During 2008, however, copper-related incidents decreased by 
31% compared to 2007 and in 2009 decreased a further 5% compared to 2008. Other 
property-related incidents increased by 22% during 2008 compared to 2007 and by a 
further 6% during 2009 compared to 2008. 
The participating mine explained that the increase in the international copper price and 
accessible black market in South Africa largely contributed towards the increases and 
decreases in copper-related incidents at the mine. According to Participant 15, during an 
internal crime analysis study conducted, a strong correlation was found between the 
international copper price and the threat of copper-related thefts at the mine, with a 
further “displacement” correlation between the threat of copper-related incidents and 
other property theft-related incidents. When the international copper price decreased, a 
corresponding decrease in copper-related incidents occurred while other property-related 
thefts showed an increase. 
Looking at the values involved in the 
recorded incidents, it was found that 
while the number of copper-related 
incidents decreased by 5% during 2009 
compared to 2008, the value involved in 
the incidents increased by 53% and by 
54% in 2010 compared to 2009 (see 
Table 3.2). Simultaneously, during 2009 
other property-related incidents 
increased by 6% while the value involved 
decreased by 13% compared to 2008. There was a further decrease of 12% during 2010 
compared to 2009. 
When examining the losses recorded 
during this period for copper-related 
incidents, it was found that there was a 
significant increase of 182% in 2007 over 
2006 (see Table 3.3). Analysing the 
dataset, it was established that one 
incident of theft of copper coolers at a 
smelter during 2007 represented a loss of 
R1 million which largely contributed 
towards this increase. It was also found that while the value involved in copper-related 
Category Year Value involved
% Increase/ 
decrease
Copper related 2006 2,208,465
Copper related 2007 4,660,320 111.0%
Copper related 2008 2,846,008 -38.9%
Copper related 2009 4,343,487 52.6%
Copper related 2010 6,696,811 54.2%
Property related 2006 5,741,242
Property related 2007 3,561,632 -38.0%
Property related 2008 5,616,851 57.7%
Property related 2009 4,871,133 -13.3%
Property related 2010 4,290,650 -11.9%
Table 3.2: Increase or decrease in value 
involved
Category Year Total losses
% Increase/ 
decrease
Copper related 2006 880,082
Copper related 2007 2,481,206 181.9%
Copper related 2008 1,076,758 -56.6%
Copper related 2009 2,343,032 117.6%
Copper related 2010 2,438,038 4.1%
Property related 2006 1,263,794
Property related 2007 2,369,472 87.5%
Property related 2008 2,140,254 -9.7%
Property related 2009 2,351,694 9.9%
Property related 2010 1,276,001 -45.7%
Table 3.3: Increase or decrease in loss to mine
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incidents increased by 53% during 2009 compared to 2008, recorded losses for this 
period increased by 118%. No single incidents with high losses were found in the dataset 
to explain the significant increase in losses found during 2009, however. 
The participating mine explained that during 2009, the criminal threat changed from 
opportunity crime to organised crime and the mine had to contend with trespassers 
accessing redundant underground mining areas to steal copper cable. According to 
Participant 14 this phenomenon was found to be highly organised. It was established 
from arrested offenders that the trespassers were mostly illegal immigrants recruited in 
informal settlements about 100 kilometres from the mining operations. They were 
dropped off by vehicles at redundant mining operations in groups of 12-18 persons and 
picked up after two to three weeks. The trespassers were provided with food, water and 
tools to remain underground for a prolonged period. Access to the redundant 
underground mining areas was mostly gained at night at old ventilation shafts in remote 
areas and the trespassers would exit again at night through these “holings”.  
While offenders who operate on the surface are limited in what they can conceal and 
carry, the underground thieves had weeks to strip the copper cable and were able to 
move vast amounts of stolen copper, thereby increasing the losses exponentially (see 
Figure 3.3). Analysing the dataset, it was found that losses recorded from underground 
copper-related thefts showed a significant increase (779%) during 2009 over 2008. It 
reflected the highest recorded loss due to underground copper-related thefts in all the 
other years in the dataset and comprised 63% of said losses. 
Figure 3.3: Photograph of redundant underground mining operation after copper cable theft
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In addition to the R9,219,115 losses that the participating mine recorded pertaining to 
copper-related incidents in this five-year period, an additional R4,607,616 in production 
losses was recorded as a result of copper-related thefts, mostly when cables that 
provided electricity to operations were cut and downtime in production was experienced 
(see Annexure D, Table 1). During this period only five incidences resulted in production 
downtime, yet more than R4 million was lost. Thefts itself is therefore not the only 
financial risk faced by the participating mine – the potential financial impact owing to 
production downtime is even more disconcerting.  
Participant 5 indicated that copper-related thefts pose the most significant threat to the 
participating mine as it could have a “huge financial impact, not only through direct loss 
but also through indirect loss through loss of production and very expensive preventive 
[security] measures”. The point was also made that copper and cable theft posed a 
significant safety risk as it may cause failure of ventilation to underground operations 
that could result in serious injuries and even deaths. 
Various additional preventive measures were therefore approved to address copper-
related thefts. These included the installation of alarms to identify power surges in cable, 
the erection of electric fences around high-risk areas such as cable yards, an increase in 
searches and patrols, as well as the installation of additional surveillance cameras. 
According to Participant 11 the “hardening of cable yards” and access points to cable 
yards had led to a decrease in copper-related thefts.  
Looking at the value involved per 
incident during the period under 
review, it was found that nearly 
80% of the incidents had a value of 
R5,000 or less (see Table 3.4). 
Only 1% of the incidents had a 
value of more than R100,000. It is 
therefore evident that asset theft 
poses a distinctive and strategic 
challenge to the mine as only a few incidents resulted in significant financial risk.  
During a study conducted by the ISS into the mining industry in South Africa it was found 
in the dataset that 76% of participants believed that good salaries could prevent theft 
from mine premises. Furthermore, 81% of the participants were of the opinion that 
positive rewards for reporting crime are an important method to prevent theft from 
mines. Participants were also asked to choose which action mine management should 
Value per incident Copper related Property related
R0 - R1,000 1,305 1,704
R1,001 - R5,000 967 822
R5,001 - R10,000 296 255
R10,001 - R25,000 213 191
R25,001 - R50,000 75 75
R50,001 - R100,000 50 33
R100,001 - R250,000 20 19
R250,001 - R500,000 6 7
R500,001 - R1,000,000 1 4
R1,000,001 - R1,250,000 0 2
Table 3.4: Value involved per incident
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take against perpetrators of mine-related theft. The categories included „dismissal and/or 
a criminal charge‟; „transfer to a lower-risk area‟ and „nothing‟. It was found that 91% of 
the participants suggested that mine management favoured „dismissal and/or criminal 
charges‟ to deal with offenders. Participants‟ opinions and attitudes regarding the 
imprisonment of convicted offenders for mine-related theft were also tested. Sixty-four 
per cent of participants thought that instituting a minimum prison sentence for convicted 
offenders of mine-related theft would prevent theft. Participants also reacted to possible 
prison sentences for certain crime categories, and 72% suggested a prison sentence of 
more than five years for convicted offenders of theft from mine premises (Coetzee & 
Horn 2007:53-56). 
The security division of the participating mine investigates all asset theft-related 
incidents and also report them to the police. This division is also responsible for 
presenting the incident (case) at disciplinary proceedings if the offender was employed 
by the mine. The participating mine has a strict policy against crime that stipulates that 
employment contracts can be terminated should an employee be found guilty of a theft 
during a disciplinary proceeding. The participating mine also has a “whistleblower” 
initiative in place to encourage reporting of crimes and cultivate crime awareness among 
its employees. In addition, the participating mine uses crime prevention campaigns to 
advocate “zero tolerance” for crime. 
This comprehensive approach of the 
participating mine in creating crime 
awareness becomes clear when the 
outcome of the recorded asset theft 
incidents is analysed.  
The „resolved‟ category in Figure 3.4 
refers to all incidents where an 
offender had been identified and was 
found guilty at either a disciplinary 
proceeding and/or a criminal court 
proceeding.  
The participating mine has a fairly 
good „resolve‟ rate of 20% in copper-
related incidents and 28% in other 
property-related incidents. Only 25% 
of the finalised copper incidents and 
4%
8%
23%
28%
31%
2% 4%
Other property-related incidents
Not guilty
Pending
Recovery only
Resolved
Undetected
Warrant
Withdrawn
1%
9%
39%
20%
25%
4% 2%
Copper-related incidents
Not guilty
Pending
Recovery only
Resolved
Undetected
Warrant
Withdrawn
Figure 3.4: Outcome of asset theft related incidents
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31% of the other property-related incidents were closed as undetected without any 
recovery. Of all the copper and other property-related theft incidents that were finalised, 
a notable 60% were closed successfully, with either a guilty finding and/or a recovery 
made. 
3.3.2  Assets at risk 
As mentioned above, copper-related incidents represented nearly half of the asset thefts 
recorded during the period analysed.  
Looking at other property theft-related incidents, more than half (58%) of the incidents 
involved items that are easily disposed of, for example equipment or tools, cell phones, 
laptops, computers or computer parts, cameras, radios, and appliances such as television 
sets. A further 17% of the incidents involved items that the offenders could use 
themselves, such as cash, clothing, consumables, petrol or diesel, batteries and furniture 
(see Annexure D, Table 2). 
The most significant assets at risk in the dataset included equipment or tools (36%); 
aluminium, corrugated iron or steel (9%); laptops, computers or computer parts (9%); 
and cell phones (7%). 
A review of the type of asset involved per year indicated that aluminium, corrugated iron 
and steel only become a problem in 2009 when it comprised 16% of thefts. This type of 
theft continued to be a problem in 2010 when it comprised 13% of incidents. With the 
increased focus on copper-related thefts that includes target hardening at cable yards 
and increased access control at the participating mine, it can be argued that other types 
of non-ferrous metal (like aluminium) are increasingly targeted as it becomes more 
difficult to steal copper cable. 
Other asset thefts that can be highlighted include the theft of paint, which was a problem 
during 2006 (7%) and 2008 (8%); the theft of building material or furniture, which was a 
problem in 2006 (6%) and 2007 (6%); and theft of consumables, which was a problem 
during 2007 (8%) and 2009 (6%) as well as during 2010 (8%). These types of assets 
can be used by the offenders themselves or sold to other individuals. Unlike stolen 
copper, disposing of these types of assets does not require an organised “black market”. 
From the sporadic patterns in the dataset it can be deduced that certain types of assets 
are targeted at times when there is less demand for copper in the “black market”. As 
mentioned above, during an internal review the participating mine found a strong 
correlation between international copper prices and increases and decreases in copper-
related thefts. 
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Trends over the five years of the period reviewed have indicated a fairly constant pattern 
(see Figure 3.5). There is a gradual increase in incidents to June, just before the school 
holidays. The number of incidents decreases during the school holidays in July with a 
peak in August just after the holidays. A consistent gradual decrease is then seen 
towards the end of the year with a small increase in November just before the beginning 
of the school holidays in December. 
The month August featured the most prominently (10% of the total incidents), followed 
by September (9%). The lowest number of incidents were recorded in July (7.5%) and 
December (7%). This could be ascribed to fewer security operations since security 
members are on leave during school holidays and/or to employees only noticing or 
reporting missing property after 
they return from leave. 
Looking at the type of place 
where other property-related 
incidents took place in the period 
under review, it was found that 
most incidents (66%) occurred 
at mining operations (see Figure 
3.6). This is not surprising, as it 
is the lowest prime product 
sector and since the risk of 
product theft is low, security measures are not biometrically or technologically enhanced. 
The mining operations also have vast areas (up to 250 square kilometres) to protect. 
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
2010 47 43 58 40 44 29 33 63 55 35 37 27
2009 52 55 67 72 71 69 59 60 55 54 52 57
2008 43 61 48 53 52 75 49 69 71 63 49 50
2007 42 44 41 50 49 42 41 59 49 44 56 44
2006 57 46 53 49 48 53 52 66 50 53 68 39
Figure 3.5: Other property-related asset thefts per month
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Figure 3.6: Other property-related incidents per type of place
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These are not only located near informal settlements but also have the highest number of 
employees and contractors to manage during access control (up to 5,000 employees are 
on duty per shift).  
Looking at “on-site” incidents (thus 
excluding incidents that occurred 
off site or at hostels and residential 
villages) the refinery, which is the 
highest risk sector, only accounted 
for 1.4% of the incidents. This is 
understandable as such areas have 
state-of-the-art security measures 
in place, including X-rays when 
employees exit the highest risk 
levels (see Annexure D, Table 3). 
The smelters, which represent the 
area with the second highest risk, accounted for 3.1% of the “on-site” incidents while the 
concentrators – the third-highest risk area – accounted for 11.1% of “on-site” incidents. 
During 2007, there was a notable increase at all three the high-risk areas, while there 
was a significant decrease at the low-risk mining operations (see Figure 3.7). In 2008 
and 2009 there was a slight increase in the categories “mining operations” and 
“concentrators”, while the two highest-risk areas (refineries and smelters) showed a 
gradual decrease. In 2010 there was a significant decrease at the mining sites and a 
significant increase at the refineries. The highest-risk areas accounted for nearly 3% of 
“on-site” incidents, the highest recorded during the five years.  
The participating mine explained that in 2010 various physical security measures had 
been increased at the smelters in particular as part of a long-term strategic plan. In 
addition, a more proactive security strategy was implemented during 2010 which focused 
on more disruptive security operations at the mining operations and the concentrators in 
particular.  
Changes in the strategic security plan could have contributed towards a crime 
displacement phenomenon whereby offenders targeted higher risk areas more often 
during the security clampdown at lower risk areas. Participant 6 mentioned a similar 
pattern found when new physical security measures were implemented at high risk areas 
on the refinery and pointed out that “as target-hardening techniques and other crime 
prevention measures were implemented in the high risk area, the threat just moved to 
our low-risk area”. 
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Figure 3.7: Other property-related incidents recorded on site
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A few tendencies could be 
identified in the dataset (see 
Annexure D, Table 4). For 
example, robberies occurred 
mostly (67%) off site and the 
suspects were commonly armed 
with firearms or knives. Most of 
the housebreaking incidences 
(55%) occurred off site at the 
residences of employees living in 
mine accommodation, or on site 
at training facilities or offices. 
Security searches or patrols 
accounted for nearly 60% of detections of property-related incidents (see Figure 3.8). 
Items were mostly concealed on the person (32%), recovered in vehicles exiting the 
mine premises (4%), or recovered at the residences of identified suspects (2%). A 
further 21% were recovered during patrols. Only 21% of the incidents – of which 16% 
occurred off site – were reported to the security division. 
Looking at the number of 
copper-related thefts per 
month, a similar, consistent 
pattern is apparent in the five 
years under review (see 
Figure 3.9). There was a 
gradual decrease towards July 
followed by an increase in 
August to October and 
another decrease towards 
December. It can be assumed 
that owing to the available black market and fluctuation in the international copper price, 
copper always poses a risk and incidences occur as the opportunity arises. 
During the five-year period more than 70% of copper-related incidents were detected by 
the security division of the participating mine with either suspect searches (26%), vehicle 
searches (3%), or searches conducted in collaboration with the police at the residences 
or business premises of identified suspects (1%). A further 40% of the incidents 
represented recoveries made during routine patrols or were responses to alarms or 
camera surveillance (2%) as reflected in Figure 3.10. Most incidents occurred at lower-
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Figure 3.9: Copper-related incidents
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risk mining operations, namely at shafts (49%) and at pump stations or sub-stations 
(11%). Other significant areas 
where copper-related incidents 
occurred included cable racks 
(6%), cable yards (6%) and 
waste dumps (4%). Only 1% 
of the incidents occurred at 
the high-risk smelters while 
less than a half per cent 
occurred at the highest-risk 
mining areas, namely the 
refineries (see Annexure D, 
Table 5).  
Cable theft creates a unique challenge for the mining industry, as some of the exposed 
surface cable is used for ventilation fans servicing underground mining operations. 
Should the “wrong” cable be cut, thousands of underground workers could be exposed to 
a life-threatening situation that could result in fatalities.  
Of great concern is the fact that 5% of the incidents in the period under review occurred 
underground, posing another significant safety risk to the mine. Since illegal mining is 
conducted without supervision and no mining safety procedures are adhered to, the 
significant increase in illegal underground mining activities in South Africa is cause for 
serious concern. Illegal mining is not only regarded as a security issue but also a safety 
issue that has a serious impact on the physical structure and layout of mines, with 
potentially disastrous consequences. Illegal miners minimise the risk of discovery by 
restricting the number of times they enter the mining operations and exit the mineshafts. 
Such miners have been found to stay underground for extended periods of time. They 
travel several kilometres underground to reach a safe remote area where they set up a 
base camp for the duration of the illegal mining operation. Redundant sites, closed off 
areas, tunnels that are not being mined at present, and areas considered unsafe for 
commercial mining are the most common places where illegal mining occurs. Arresting 
illegal miners has also become more dangerous in the past few years as violent 
resistance with firearms and explosives occurs more frequently. Since it is extremely 
dangerous to discharge a firearm in some underground places owing to the presence of 
explosive gases such as methane, mine security personnel do not as a rule carry firearms 
underground. They are consequently unable to defend themselves effectively in a 
confrontation where firearms and explosives are used by illegal miners (Coetzee & Horn 
2007:72-74). 
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To address the underground threat, the participating mine started implementing special 
engineering projects to seal access “holings” to redundant underground mining 
operations with concrete. When possible, copper cable was recovered and removed from 
these redundant sites in collaboration with proto-teams as part of proactive operations 
(some of the redundant sites are no longer safe for employees to enter).  
In addition to managing the risk of trespassers entering underground operations, the 
participating mine also continued to face difficult challenges to detect copper theft at the 
lower-risk mining operations as these areas have perimeter fencing of hundreds of 
kilometres to patrol.  
To complicate matters, many suspects pose as employees and wear stolen company 
clothing to gain access to mining areas during large shift changes (which can involve up 
to 5,000 employees per shift). It was found that suspects can easily conceal up to 50 
kilograms of stolen copper (as illustrated in Figure 3.11).  
Figure 3.11: Photograph of suspect arrested posing as an employee at a mining operation
 
To address this security risk, the participating mine hosted various awareness events. 
Role-players such as the local police, state prosecutors and magistrates were invited to 
the mining operations for site and even underground visits to familiarise themselves with 
the unique environment and challenges faced by the mining industry. Awareness and 
safety campaigns were also held for employees to make them aware of the dangers 
posed by trespassers on mining operations. The importance of reporting strangers to 
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security personnel when identified was also highlighted. Participant 15 was of the opinion 
that there is only one way to successfully address copper-related theft: “[The] black 
market needs to be addressed with intelligence driven operations and the legislation 
available in terms of the Precious Metals Act, Second-hand Goods Act, Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act should be utilised to its full potential. In order to succeed, the 
criminal justice system, police and mining industry need to address the threat in a 
collaborative approach.” 
According to Participant 11, despite all efforts, illegal access to underground operations 
and “theft underground of copper cable remain a major concern” and one of the greatest 
challenges the participating mine faces. It consequently continues to be classified as one 
of the top risks the security division focus on in terms of preventive strategies applied. 
3.3.3  Offender profile 
A total of 2,735 offenders were identified in the asset theft-related incidents recorded in 
the period January 2006 to 
December 2010. Forty-three per 
cent (1,165) were arrested for 
copper-related thefts and 57% 
(1,570) for other property-
related thefts. African males 
accounted for 94% of the 
identified offenders in copper-
related incidents and 80% in 
property-related incidents (see 
Figure 3.12). With regard to the 
age of the offenders identified in 
the dataset, 31% were between 
the ages of 21 to 30 when the 
crimes were committed, 27% 
were between 31 and 40, and 
22% were between 41 and 50 
(see Annexure D, Table 6). More 
than half of the identified offenders were African males between the ages of 21 and 40. 
According to the 1996 Census, Africans between the ages of 15 and 34 in South Africa 
comprised 78% of the total population (Braehmer et al 2000:1).  
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As illustrated in Figure 3.13, it was found that 27% of the identified offenders were 
unemployed trespassers on the 
mine. It was disconcerting to find, 
however, that 71% (1,946) of the 
identified offenders were granted 
access by the mine, either as 
permanent employees or employees 
of contracting companies. According 
to Participant 10, one of the most 
important factors contributing 
towards the efforts of the security 
division in preventing crime is consistency in action taken against employees who are 
involved in crime. 
In the dataset, nearly 60% of the identified offenders were found guilty in either a 
departmental disciplinary 
hearing and/or a criminal 
court hearing (see Table 
3.5). Only 10% of the 
cases in the dataset were 
still pending at the time of 
the analysis. Of the identified offenders that were found guilty, 57% were contractors, 
29% were mine employees and 13% were unemployed trespassers on the mine. In 14% 
of cases a warrant of arrest was issued. It was further found that 47% of offenders with 
outstanding warrants of arrest were unemployed trespassers. 
Figure 3.14 represents the 
outcome of departmental 
disciplinary hearings held for 1,946 
offenders identified in asset theft 
employed by the mine when the 
crimes were committed. 
Employees whose employment 
was terminated included personnel 
that resigned before the hearings 
were finalised, deserted or were 
dismissed. They accounted for 
81% of the identified offenders 
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Figure 3.14: Outcome of disciplinary hearings held
Outcome of case Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Not guilty 50 83 8 36
Pending 70 65 8 118
Recovery only 12 15 0 33
Resolved 918 467 22 211
Warrant 160 33 9 177
Withdrawn 44 29 10 157
Table 3.5: Outcome of case per employment type
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that were employed by the mine either as permanent or contracted personnel and were 
found guilty during the internal hearing. The participating mine‟s strict policy against 
theft and “zero tolerance” towards crime was reflected in the outcome of disciplinary 
proceedings where offenders had been identified. Criminal action was taken against 
1,814 of the 2,735 identified offenders (66%). Only departmental disciplinary action was 
taken against the other 921 identified offenders (34%) employed by the participating 
mine.  
The outcome of the criminal cases is reflected in Figure 3.15. There were criminal 
investigations pending against 12% of the identified offenders at the time of the analysis. 
In the 1,603 (88%) of criminal cases 
finalised, warrants for arrest were 
issued against 24% of the identified 
offenders after they failed to appear in 
court. An impressive 41% of the 
identified offenders were convicted, of 
which 65% were employed by the mine 
and 32% were unemployed 
trespassers. It is evident that the 
support the participating mine gives to 
the police and prosecutors through 
internal investigations of asset theft cases yields exceptional results. 
Table 3.6 reflects the sentences given to 656 offenders convicted for asset theft 
(including offenders who were 
allowed to pay admission of guilt 
fines). With a remarkable 
conviction rate of 41% it was 
disappointing to find that 39% of 
the convicted offenders – of 
which 29% were unemployed 
trespassers on the mine – paid a 
fine of R500 or less. A further 
17% paid a fine of between 
R500 and R1,000. Another 19% of the convicted offenders – of which 35% were 
unemployed trespassers – received suspended sentences or were released with a 
warning. Only 5% of the convicted offenders were effectively imprisoned. 
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Figure 3.15: Outcome of criminal cases
Sentence for convictions Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Fine - R500 or less 135 40 6 75
Fine - R501 to R1,000 55 34 6 19
Fine - R1,001 to R2,500 34 10 1 27
Fine - R2,501 to R5,000 14 7 0 14
Fine - R5,001 to R10,000 0 0 0 7
Imprisonment 15 3 2 12
Deported 0 0 0 4
Correctional service 1 1 0 0
Suspended fine 31 8 2 20
Suspended prison 13 7 5 16
Warned and released 7 4 0 7
Not specified 4 0 0 10
Table 3.6: Sentences for asset thefts
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South African courts in principle use a discretionary sentencing system (Terblanche & 
Roberts 2005:187-202). Within the boundaries set by the legislature, the courts have to 
employ judicial discretion to determine an appropriate sentence, based on a balancing of 
the facts of that particular case. As the trial court is generally involved in the trial from 
start to finish, it is considered the best placed to impose an appropriate sentence. This 
judicial discretion is coupled with a well-established system of appeal against sentences 
imposed in all the trial courts, as well as a judicial review of sentences imposed in the 
lowest courts. The state is further permitted, in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act, to 
appeal against a patently lenient sentence. The legislature has not only established a 
ceiling to the courts‟ sentences, but has also provided a floor in the form of minimum 
sentences applicable to certain crimes. This was amended in 1998 when the Criminal Law 
Amendment Act 19 was passed.  
3.3.4  Offender modus operandi 
In the dataset, of the 2,735 offenders identified, 43% (1,165) had been involved in 
copper-related incidents and 57% 
(1,570) in other property-related 
incidents. The employment type of the 
identified offenders in these two 
categories shows the difference in the 
type of asset at risk from an outside 
threat (trespassers) and an internal 
threat (persons who have access to the 
mine through permanent employment 
or employment by contracting 
companies working on the mine). Of the 
identified offenders involved in copper-
related incidents, 39% were 
unemployed or non-mine personnel 
compared to 21% involved in other 
property-related incidents (see Figure 
3.16). Permanently employed mine 
workers comprised 14% of the 
identified offenders in copper-related 
incidents and 34% of other property-
related incidents. Employees of contracting companies comprise nearly half (46%) of the 
identified offenders in the dataset. 
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In terms of the employment type of identified offenders, a difference was also found 
pertaining to the type of 
place or area where the 
incidents took place 
(see Table 3.7). Of the 
111 offenders identified 
for property thefts that 
occurred at hostels or 
residential villages (mine accommodation), 35% were trespassers. At the high-risk areas, 
namely the smelters and refineries, contractors comprised 70% of the identified 
offenders and permanently employed mine employees 30%. No trespassers were 
involved in any of the property thefts at the higher-risk areas. It was found that in 
property-related incidents that occurred at concentrators, 41% were trespassers while 
only 18% of the identified offenders at the lower-risk mining operations were 
trespassers. However, the fact that 54% of the property-related incidents that were 
closed as undetected occurred at the lower-risk mining operations (see Annexure D, table 
7) could be explained by a failure to apprehend the trespassers. 
Table 3.8 illustrates the place or area where copper-related incidents occurred and 
offenders were 
identified. Forty-three 
per cent of offenders 
identified for 
underground copper or 
cable theft were 
contractors, an alarming 
37% were trespassers, 
and 20% were mine 
employees. Eighty-six 
per cent of offenders 
detected or caught at 
salvage yards were 
contractors, while 73% of offenders detected at access control points or gates were 
contractors. Trespassers were mostly found in areas such as waste dumps, pump 
stations, sub-stations, ventilation fans, cable racks, cable yards and concentrators. 
Type of place Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Off site 36 28 3 43
Hostel/residential vil lage 38 34 3 36
Business premises/offices 21 12 1 4
Mining operation 502 409 24 172
Concentrator 54 23 1 53
Smelter 38 13 0 0
Refinery 13 9 0 0
Table 3.7: Area of property-related incidents per employment
Type of place or area Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Access gate 50 11 1 7
Cable racks 3 3 0 15
Cable yards 22 5 0 54
Change house 2 2 0 0
Concentrator 4 0 0 7
Hostel/residential vil lage 21 8 2 26
Off site 11 7 5 20
Office/store /workshop 4 4 0 7
Pump/vent fan/sub-station 10 0 2 45
Salvage yard 6 0 0 1
Shaft 358 99 11 135
Smelter 1 2 0 1
Surface 19 4 4 58
Underground 40 19 0 34
Waste dump 1 0 0 14
Table 3.8: Place of copper-related incidents per employment
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Where trespassers were apprehended, it was found that 75% were detected during 
suspect searches. A further 12% were detected with vehicle searches conducted by the 
security division of the participating mine (see Table 3.9). Thirty-five per cent of 
offenders identified and 
caught during vehicle 
searches were contractors 
and 32% were mine 
employees. Where 
offenders attempted to 
conceal the stolen 
property or copper in bags 
or containers they had with them and were identified during routine area patrols, 54% 
were contractors and 44% were mine employees. Sixty-three per cent of offenders 
caught after the security division responded to alarms or through surveillance cameras 
were trespassers and 31% were contractors. Of the incidents reported to the security 
division and where offenders were identified, 54% were mine employees and 35% were 
contractors. 
The types of assets involved where offenders had been identified are given in Table 3.10. 
It was found that 
57% of the 
trespassers identified 
had stolen copper or 
copper cable in their 
possession while 
another 20% of 
trespassers had 
stolen aluminium, 
corrugated iron or 
steel. Other items stolen by trespassers included equipment or tools (9%) and building 
material or furniture (5%). It can be argued that trespassers mostly access mining 
premises illegally to steal non-ferrous metals and that other property is taken should the 
opportunity arise.  
Contractors identified in property-related incidents mostly stole equipment or tools 
(46%). The same pattern was found where employees were identified (52%). Where 
laptops, computers, computer parts, cameras, radios or cell phones were stolen, the 
identified offenders were mostly employees (57%) or contractors (33%), whereas cash, 
Detection method Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Alarm/camera 5 1 0 10
Concealed in bag 156 126 7 4
Housebreak 13 10 4 40
Off site/residence/SAPS 24 17 3 30
Reported to security 22 34 3 4
Robbery 5 4 0 7
Suspect search 937 415 35 556
Vehicle search 92 85 12 78
Table 3.9: Detection method where offenders were identified
Type of asset Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
Equipment/tools 321 271 4 64
Building material/furniture 22 14 4 36
Paint 67 35 2 5
Petrol/diesel/oil 26 20 5 9
Safety equipment/medical supplies 18 19 9
Computer/cellphone/camera/radio 17 29 1 4
Cash, clothing or consumables 117 93 4 7
Aluminium/corrugated iron/steel 43 11 8 147
Brass/solar panels 18 6 1 3
Cable - electrical/other 34 12 4
Copper/cable 552 164 25 424
Other 19 18 3 20
Table 3.10: Type of asset involved where offenders were identified
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clothing and consumables were most often stolen by contractors (53%) or employees 
(42%). 
In the dataset, where offenders had been identified and the value per incident exceeded 
R10,000, it was found 
that 63% of the 
offenders were 
trespassers, 21% were 
contractors and 16% 
were employees (see 
Table 3.11). However, it 
was found that among 
the trespassers 
identified, 77% of the 
assets involved per incident had a value of less than R10,000 while 23% had a value of 
more than R10,000. As mentioned above, five incidences resulted in the participating 
mine experiencing downtime because of cable theft. Four suspects involved in these 
incidences were apprehended and it was established that they were all trespassers. It is 
therefore evident that the mine can suffer big losses through small numbers of 
trespassers gaining access to mining operations. 
It is obvious from the analysed dataset that although the crime prevention strategy 
implemented at the participating mine had positive results and various successes, the 
mining company has to contend with a significant challenge to its assets and employees 
from the criminal threat faced by the country in general. 
3.4  SUMMARY 
This chapter primarily focused on an analysis of asset theft-related incidents (excluding 
prime product) recorded by the participating mine for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 
December 2010. The analysis of this dataset gave rise to some issues to consider when 
formulating a preventive strategy designed to curb asset theft at the participating mine. 
The most significant findings are summarised below. 
It was found that in the five-year period copper-related thefts remained an immense 
challenge for the participating mine and comprised nearly half (2,933 incidents) of the 
total asset thefts (6,045 incidents) recorded at the mine.  
 More than 70% of the copper-related incidents were detected by the security 
division of the mine through, among others, suspect searches (26%); vehicle 
Value per incident Contractor Mine Non-mine Unemployed
R0 - R500 828 468 21 168
R501 - R1,000 167 64 8 96
R1,001 - R2,500 104 50 6 128
R2,501 - R5,000 61 40 9 78
R5,001 - R10,000 30 19 1 81
R10,001 - R25,000 47 27 6 95
R25,001 - R50,000 12 7 4 31
R50,001 - R100,000 1 9 1 40
R100,001 - R250,000 2 7 0 12
R250,001 - R500,000 1 0 1 2
R500,001 - R1,000,000 1 1 0 1
Table 3.11: Value per incident where offenders were identified
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searches (3%); searches conducted in collaboration with the police at the 
residences or business premises of identified suspects (1%); recoveries made 
during routine patrols (40%); or responses to alarms or camera surveillance 
(2%).  
 Most of the copper-related incidents occurred at the lower risk mining operations: 
at the shafts (49%); pump stations or sub-stations (11%); cable racks (6%), 
cable yards (6%); and waste dumps (4%). A further 5% occurred underground. 
Only 1% of the incidents occurred at the high-risk smelters and less than a half 
per cent of the incidents occurred at the highest-risk areas, namely the refineries. 
In the other property theft-related incidents dataset, it was found that more than half 
(58%) of the incidences involved items that are easily disposed of and a further 17% 
involved items that the offenders could use themselves.  
 The most significant assets at risk found in this dataset included equipment or 
tools (36%); aluminium, corrugated iron or steel (9%); laptops, computers or 
computer parts (9%); and cell phones (7%). 
Despite the complex challenges, it was found that the participating mine has a fairly good 
“guilty” rate of 20% in copper-related incidents and 28% in other property-related 
incidents. Only 30% of the finalised incidents were closed as undetected without 
recovery. A notable 60% of the finalised incidents were closed successfully, with either a 
guilty finding and/or a recovery made. 
A total of 2,735 offenders were identified in asset theft-related incidents recorded in the 
period under review, of which 43% (1,165) were arrested for copper-related thefts and 
57% (1,570) for other property-related thefts. 
 Twenty-seven per cent of the identified offenders were unemployed trespassers 
on the mine. 
 Seventy-one per cent of the identified offenders had legal access to the mine, 
either as permanent employees or employees of contracting companies.  
 Employees of contracting companies comprised nearly half (46%) of all the 
identified offenders in the dataset. 
 Where offenders were identified for underground copper or cable thefts, 43% 
were contractors, 37% were trespassers and 20% were mine employees. 
 Where trespassers were caught, 75% were detected with suspect searches and a 
further 12% were detected with vehicle searches conducted by the security 
division.  
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 Fifty-seven per cent of the trespassers identified stole copper or copper cable and 
a further 20% stole aluminium, corrugated iron or steel. 
 Nearly 60% of the identified offenders were found guilty at either a departmental 
disciplinary hearing and/or a criminal court hearing. 
 Eighty-one per cent of the identified offenders employed by the mine either as 
permanent or contracted personnel who were found guilty during internal 
disciplinary hearings had their employment terminated.  
Of the 1,603 criminal cases finalised, warrants for arrest were issued against 24% of 
the identified offenders after they had failed to appear in court. A notable 41% (656) 
of the identified offenders were convicted of which 65% were employed by the mine 
and 32% were trespassers. The sentences imposed on these offenders included the 
following: 
 Thirty-nine percent of the convicted offenders, of which 29% were trespassers on 
the mine, paid a fine of R500 or less.  
 Seventeen per cent paid a fine of between R500 and R1,000. 
 Nineteen per cent, of which 35% were trespassers on the mine, received a 
suspended sentence or were only warned and released.  
 Five per cent of the convicted offenders were effectively imprisoned. 
Despite the security measures implemented, the participating mine still faces a 
considerable challenge in order to address asset theft. Chapter 4 gives an overview of 
crime prevention approaches that could be considered for a holistic and integrated crime 
prevention strategy at the participating mine in order to address asset theft. 
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Chapter 4 
Discussion on crime prevention strategies  
“However beautiful the strategy, you should occasionally look at the results.” (Sir 
Winston Churchill, British politician 1874-1965) 
4.1  INTRODUCTION  
The complex nature of crime prevention models derives from the complicated nature and 
character of the crime phenomenon itself. The notion of crime may seem uncontested 
and obvious, but it applies to a range of different behaviours that vary according to 
method, place and time, and may have different causes and consequences. It is therefore 
a complex and moving target, on a complex and shifting landscape (Frank 2006:1). 
Chapter 2 reflected on some of the factors that could contribute towards crime at the 
participating mine while Chapter 3 offered a more in-depth discussion of the nature and 
extent of asset theft at the mine. This chapter will focus on a review of some of the crime 
prevention strategies and approaches that can be used in the South African mining 
industry, and in particular at the participating mining company.  
For the purpose of this case study “crime prevention” (the proactive approach) will be 
considered to include all three focus areas of crime reduction defined by the South 
African Government, namely altering the environment in which crime occurs 
(situational); changing the conditions which are considered to cause crime (social); and 
using an effective criminal justice system as a strong deterrent against crime (law 
enforcement). 
Crime prevention is a complex and extensive research field and it should be reiterated 
that this chapter is not intended to serve as an all-inclusive review of all the crime 
prevention strategies, approaches and models available. It features a discussion of some 
of the crime prevention models identified during the literature review that are practicable 
at the participating mine. These models are regarded as proactive approaches that could 
be considered in formulating a holistic and integrated crime prevention strategy to 
address asset theft at the participating mining company in particular. The main focus of 
this chapter will consequently be the integrated relationship between the different crime 
prevention approaches and crime prevention models applicable to the South African 
68 
 
mining industry, and the participating mine in particular, seen in the context of factors 
and trends identified in the previous chapters. 
4.2  OVERVIEW OF CRIME PREVENTION MODELS  
When the crime phenomenon is examined in its full complexity, crime prevention models 
can address prevention at a general level, including programmes focused on the more 
vulnerable contexts by reducing the attractiveness of crime or the generators of crime; 
or address the immediate needs of existing crime problems by reducing reoccurrence 
(Brantingham, Brantingham & Taylor 2005:273). There are three categories of crime 
prevention approaches, namely “primary, secondary and tertiary” approaches. 
The definition, orientation and strategic objectives of the different crime prevention 
models are however inherently and intractably political in nature (White & Haines 
1996:111). It is important to acknowledge that there are competing perspectives, 
namely “conservative, liberal and radical”, and consequently diverse forms of 
intervention (some of which are mutually exclusive, others that reinforce each other). It 
is therefore important to expose the vested interests behind specific approaches to crime 
prevention. 
Primary crime prevention focuses on reducing crime by addressing underlying factors 
that have a basic influence on people, sites and situations that are amenable to criminal 
events. This approach is directed towards physical, socio-psychological and economic 
conditions that promote crime in general (Brantingham et al 2005:274). 
”Conservative crime prevention” is based on the premise that crime control is the basic 
issue at stake. It is founded upon the notion that the key issue is adherence to the law 
and that law enforcement and crime prevention should therefore be focused on 
addressing potential and current violations of the law. Crime is consequently mostly seen 
as a matter of incentives and deterrents. Basically, this approach combines the elements 
of the classical criminological theory (with an emphasis on voluntarism and personal 
responsibility) with the rational choice theory (which sees human behaviour primarily in 
terms of calculated assessments of the costs and benefits of particular courses of action). 
The solution to crime would therefore be to increase the costs and reduce the 
opportunities for the commission of crime and to increase the likelihood of detection 
(White & Haines 1996:101-102).  
Secondary crime prevention focuses more specifically on individuals, groups, social 
conditions or physical settings known to be at high-risk of becoming involved in criminal 
events. Secondary prevention includes education programmes specifically designed for 
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groups at-risk, for example children of parents with criminal records (Brantingham et al 
2005:274). 
“Liberal crime prevention” is based on the views that crime is in general a social problem 
linked to particular individual deficits and group disadvantages. It is founded upon the 
notion that people rather than crime control should be the starting point for change and 
that reform is needed at the level of the individual and collective circumstance. Basically, 
this perspective views the issue as one of opportunity enhancement for those people who 
have been in some way dissociated from adequate or appropriate work and school 
opportunities. The main focus in this perspective is therefore on "at-risk" individuals and 
groups who display some sign of propensity to engage in conventional crime. This 
approach is based on some of the elements from theories such as biological and 
psychological explanations (generally oriented towards a range of attributes of the 
individual), the strain theory (with an emphasis on the disjuncture between the cultural 
goals and structural means to attain these), the labelling theory (where positive self-
esteem is linked to personal resources and the nature of state intervention), as well as 
some forms of the later left realism theories (which emphasise on multi-agency 
approaches at a local level). The difference between the criminal and the non-criminal is 
considered to be dictated by biological, psychological and social circumstances (White & 
Haines 1996:102-104). 
Tertiary crime prevention is directed towards the prevention of criminal event recurrence. 
Tertiary prevention includes physical modification of repeatedly victimised buildings, 
offender rehabilitation programmes, restorative justice, site-specific law enforcement, 
and hotspot deterrence programmes (Brantingham et al 2005:274). 
“Radical crime prevention” considers law and order as an arena of political struggle. 
Crime and criminality is considered to be historically and socially constructed, and is best 
understood as reflecting structural social divisions and inequalities. This theory is most 
closely associated with the Marxist criminological theory (which perceives class analysis 
as central to an understanding of crime under capitalism), the feminist criminological 
theory (with gender relations and power differentials as the major focus), and critical 
criminology (referring to perspectives that examine the oppression and marginalisation of 
groups on the basis of class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality and race). The key concept of 
this approach is that of fundamental social change, which should be directed at 
enhancing the material well-being, social rights and decision-making power of the 
majority in a society. The biggest crime is seen to be that of economic inequality and 
social and economic marginalisation or discrimination. Instead of focusing on aspects of 
crime control, or individual or group adjustment to existing structural conditions, this 
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approach challenges the basis of marginalisation, social alienation and market-driven 
competition (White & Haines 1996:104-106). 
For the purpose of this case study, the crime prevention models discussed in this chapter 
include situational crime prevention, social crime prevention, and crime prevention 
through law enforcement. In formulating a holistic and integrated crime prevention 
strategy that could be considered to address asset theft at the participating mining 
company in particular, these crime prevention models will be discussed in the context of 
all three crime prevention approaches (primary, secondary and tertiary). 
 
Table 4.1 illustrates how selected crime prevention models are integrated into the crime 
prevention approaches discussed in this chapter.   
4.2.1  The situational crime prevention model 
According to Participant 15, “at our mining sites and processing plants, situational crime prevention 
measures and methods are mainly used”. In response to the question “What do you think is the best 
and most effective way to deal with causative factors or general factors contributing towards crime in 
the mining industry?” all the participants held the opinion that increased physical security measures 
and controls contribute towards an effective crime prevention strategy. 
Situational crime prevention (SCP) distinctly varies in its theoretical orientation from the 
mainstream criminological approaches, as SCP has a noticeable practical focus on ways 
to reduce crime. It was initially developed as a concept in the 1980s by Ronald Clarke 
(Clarke 1980:136-147). Situational prevention and its table of strategies and techniques 
continued to evolve on the basis of new research findings and through the exchange of 
ideas with other criminologists (Brantingham et al 2005:275).  
Primary/conservative Secondary/liberal Tertiary/radical
S
it
u
a
ti
o
n
a
l
Target hardening, surveillance, 
opportunity reduction or removal, 
environmental design and general 
deterrence
Target hardening and design 
measures based on risk predication, 
vulnerability assessments and 
deterrence models
Individual deterrence, incapacitation, 
assessment of "dangerousness" and 
risk. Directed tow ards prevention of 
recurrence, for example hotspot 
deterrence programmes
S
o
c
ia
l Education and socialisation, public 
aw areness and advertising 
campaigns
Working w ith those at higher risk of 
offending: poor, youth, unemployed 
etc 
Rehabilitation, confronting offending 
behaviour, diversion, as w ell as 
community regeneration
L
a
w
 
e
n
fo
rc
e
m
e
n
t
Targeted visible policing and security 
at crime hotspots
Establishing community policing 
forums to create aw areness in "at-
risk" communities
Site-specif ic law  enforcement 
initiatives, for example the training of 
response units for CCTV systems in 
high-risk areas
Table 4.1: Crime prevention approaches and models
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The private sector tends to seek for measures that could immediately deliver the results 
and look for ways and means capable of visibly discouraging criminals‟ movements. The 
emergence of closed-circuit television (CCTV), electronic alarms, swipe cards, computer 
chips for identification, passwords, screening devices, secured parking systems and 
hidden cameras is the product of the growing concern to respond to the crime problem 
promptly. The focal point of SCP is therefore on the setting and context of crime rather 
than on criminals. It makes the criminal action difficult by constructing the target 
inaccessible through several techniques based on the manipulation of environment and 
applications of technology. SCP is applied on the assumption that crime reduction is 
possible if the opportunities for crime are significantly reduced. This objective can be 
achieved by making the target less accessible and less vulnerable („target hardening‟), by 
increasing natural and techno-surveillance, or by making criminal activity more risky and 
benefits less rewarding (Bajpai 2004:5).  
During a study conducted by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in the South African 
mining industry, participants‟ opinions and attitudes regarding crime prevention methods 
were tested. Coetzee and Horn (2007:53-55) found in the dataset that the following 
perceptions were recognised regarding the effectiveness of security measures 
implemented to prevent theft from mine premises: 
 Seventy-three per cent of the participants replied that random security searches 
were successful. 
 Seventy-nine per cent of the participants thought that security access control was 
successful. 
 Seventy-eight per cent of the participants believed that surveillance cameras were 
successful.  
With regard to situational crime prevention measures considered to be effective at the participating 
mine, most of the participants cited effective surveillance, effective access control, effective perimeter 
fencing and security patrols. 
Participant 1 commented on SCP at the participating mine as the use of “strengthened barriers and 
access control” in order to “create distance between criminal intent and loot”. According to Participant 
12, it is important to “remove opportunity” with target hardening that includes electrical fencing, 
increase in searches of people and vehicles at shafts and gates, and an increase in security patrols 
and surveillance cameras in high-risk areas. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, it was found in the dataset that during the five years under 
review more than 70% of the copper-related incidents recorded at the participating mine 
were detected by the security division with either suspect searches (26%), vehicle 
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searches (3%), or searches conducted in collaboration with the police at the residences 
or business premises of identified suspects (1%). A further 40% of the incidents were 
recoveries made during routine patrols or responses to alarms or camera surveillance 
(2%), as reflected in Figure 3.10. It was found that security searches or patrols 
comprised nearly 60% of the detection method of all other property-related incidents as 
well (see Figure 3.8). 
Cornish and Clarke (2003:90) presented the situational crime prevention model by 
describing five strategic phases that have to be considered when situational preventative 
strategies are formulated: 
 Techniques that increase the effort required to commit a crime: The theories on 
which situational prevention approaches are grounded assume that most crime, 
particularly property crime, is committed because it is easy to do. Interventions 
that increase the effort needed to commit a crime will therefore deflect many 
potential offenders. Effort can be increased by target hardening, access control, 
screening exits, and controlling tools or weapons. 
 
 Techniques that increase the risks of committing a crime: Most intervention 
techniques that focus on increasing the risks of criminal activity begin as 
secondary or tertiary approaches, but can be broadened into primary-level 
approaches. For example, risks can be increased by extending guardianship, that 
is, by situating people to be watchers (security personnel for instance). An 
increase in the risks or perceived risks of offending could also come from natural 
surveillance or artificial surveillance such as CCTV. 
 
 Techniques that reduce the reward derived from crime: Reducing rewards is a 
category closely linked to effort and risks. For object-oriented (property or asset) 
crimes, effort is tied to a high perceived likelihood of success. When potential 
targets are less visible and are of unknown quantity before a crime is initiated, the 
crime has less value. Intervention techniques range from concealing or removing 
property from areas potential offenders might frequent to making them unusable 
if stolen; from disruption of illegal markets to denying benefits. 
 
 Techniques that reduce provocation: Understanding the immediate triggers for 
criminal events is another important component of situational crime prevention 
analysis. This component includes techniques that reduce the provocative 
elements in situations below trigger thresholds and thereby prevent crimes from 
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happening. These techniques include the reduction of stress and frustration, 
emotional arousal, and peer pressure. 
 
 Techniques that remove excuses for doing crime: Removing excuses is an 
intricate component of situational prevention common to many crime prevention 
programmes. It can include, for example, security and safety information boards, 
roadside speed displays, and visitor registration. This set of techniques makes it 
difficult for a person to use “but I didn‟t know” or “but I couldn‟t find” as an 
excuse for criminal behaviour. Removing excuses also includes making it 
especially easy to comply with laws and regulations so that the law-compliant 
action is also the least-effort action. 
 
Although situational prevention is probable at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, 
it considers crime within a crime analysis framework where criminal incidences are 
analysed in context and are considered to be the results of a sequence of decisions 
(some routine, some more conscious) and are therefore considered to be the underlying 
key component in embedded crime prevention (Brantingham et al 2005:275).  
SCP is normally regarded as a crime control method that does not rely on “improving 
society” but rather on reducing the opportunities for crime to occur, usually through 
changes in the physical environment. By intensifying the effort required to commit a 
crime, increasing the likelihood of detection, or reducing the rewards associated with 
offending, situational crime prevention aims to modify an offender's cost-benefit analysis 
to make the crime seem not worth committing (Barnes 1995:95-96). 
Twenty-five techniques were developed by Clarke and Eck (2003:33-34) in response to 
changes in how to understand crime, theories on reducing crime, and the changes in 
crime itself. These techniques were tabulated into the five strategic phases of situational 
crime prevention models (see Table 4.2).  
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Most participants pointed out that continuous audits and assessments of physical security measures 
implemented at mining sites and processing plants were important to ensure the most effective crime 
prevention strategies were in place. The importance of conducting risk assessments was stressed by 
most of the participants, who also referred to the importance of a proper cost-to-cost and return-on-
investment assessment. 
Participant 15 indicated that a risk assessment should identify the most common modus operandi of 
offenders, crime hotspots, and the type of asset that is at-risk and added that “it is important to have a 
proper risk assessment prior to the implementation or upgrade of security measures. It also 
contributes to an evaluation of what security measures are effective.” Participant 2 considered the 
process of effective risk management strategy to include the identification of the assets, risks, 
weaknesses, vulnerabilities, threats and to “identify countermeasures, implement, test and manage”. 
Participant 13 stressed that it is important to “build your strategy around the five pillars of security: 
technical equipment, surveillance, crime combating, investigation and intelligence strategy”. 
In addition to the approach of dealing with crime by only implementing visually affronting 
security or target-hardening measures such as locks, physical barriers, security gates 
and security patrols based on SCP strategies, crime prevention through environmental 
design (CPTED) promotes high-quality and visually agreeable solutions as first responses 
to crime with the aim of improving the legitimate use of space that can be applied in 
context to further target hardening (Fok, Ting, Jin, Man, Kei & Chyi 2004:3). 
As part of the “situational” prevention model illustrated in Table 4.1 which is discussed 
for the purpose of this case study, the CPTED principles will be explored further to 
Increase the effort Increase the risks
Reduce the 
rewards Reduce provocation
Remove the 
excuses
Harden targets 
(perimeters/buildings)
Extend guardianship 
(improve communications)
Conceal targets 
(reflective f ilm, blinds)
Reduce frustration (staff 
training)
Set rules (clear 
agreements/policy)
Control access 
(gates/entry points)
Assist natural surveillance 
(control grow th and 
improve lighting)
Remove targets 
(secure stock)
Avoid disputes (reduce 
crow ding)
Post instructions 
(signs)
Screen exits 
(electronic tags)
Reduce anonymity 
(staff/visitors IDs)
Identify property 
(marking)
Reduce emotional 
arousal (controls on 
sexual and violent 
imagery)
Alert conscience 
(signs)
Deflect offenders 
(secure access 
roads)
Utilise place managers 
(w histleblow ers)
Disrupt markets 
(identify stock and 
assets)
Neutralise peer pressure 
(prosecute)
Assist compliance
Control tools (gear)
Strengthen format 
surveillance (guards, 
CCTV)
Deny benefits (PIN 
codes)
Discourage imitation 
(repair)
Control drugs and 
alcohol
From Clarke and Eck (2003:33).
Table 4.2: Clarke and Eck's 25 techniques table
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elaborate on methods that can be used in context to the situational crime prevention 
strategies that can be applicable to the participating mine. 
4.2.2  The crime prevention through environmental design model 
The claim that property crime can be prevented through manipulating the design of 
individual dwellings and their relationship to one another and to the surrounding 
neighbourhoods is called crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) 
(Geason & Wilson 1989:2). 
CPTED is a concept that has been researched extensively for decades and many 
researchers from countries across the world contributed towards the understanding and 
development of the methodologies. They include Jeffery (1971), Brantingham (1981), 
Plaster and Carter (1993), Crowe (2000) and Parnaby (2006) to mention a few. Although 
CPTED is not a new concept, South Africa only started to make use of CPTED in the late 
1990s and is therefore fairly new to the concept. South Africa joined the international 
arena by introducing CPTED principles as part of its National Crime Prevention Strategy. 
Being a relative latecomer to the field can be considered to be an advantage, however, 
as the country can now apply the best of all the research findings and does not need to 
work through thirty years of trial and error as other countries had to do (Coetzer 
2003:204). 
The four key principles of CPTED are as follows (Fok et al 2003:3-5): 
 Natural surveillance: can be achieved by a number of techniques such as 
windows, lighting, and the removal of obstructions to improve sight lines from 
within buildings. The fundamental hypothesis is that criminals do not wish to be 
observed. Surveillance therefore increases the perceived risk to offenders. This 
may increase the actual risk to offenders if those observing are willing and 
capable to act when potentially threatening situations arise. The primary aim of 
surveillance is therefore not to keep intruders out (although it may have that 
effect) but rather to keep intruders under observation. 
 Natural access control: relies on doors, fences, shrubs, and other physical 
elements to keep unauthorised persons out. In its most elementary form, access 
control can be accomplished in individual dwellings or commercial establishments 
by using adequate locks, doors and window barriers. 
 Territorial reinforcement: can be seen to work when a space, by its clear legibility, 
transparency and directness, discourages potential offenders because of owners‟ 
familiarity with each other and the surroundings. People instinctively protect a 
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territory that they feel is their own. Clear boundaries established between public 
and private areas by using physical elements such as fences, pavement 
treatment, art, signs, good maintenance and landscaping are ways to express 
ownership. Identifying intruders is also much easier in such well-defined spaces. 
 Maintenance and management: are related to the area‟s sense of „pride of place‟ 
and consequential territorial reinforcement. The more decrepit an area is, the 
more likely it is to attract unwanted activities. The maintenance and the „image‟ of 
an area can have a primary impact on whether it will be targeted. 
During interviews conducted at the participating mine, it became evident that although not practical or 
implemented at all the mining sites and processing plants, some of the security managers use CPTED 
principles to enhance their current prevention strategies. Participant 4 relies extensively on the 
remoteness of the mining site to prevent and control asset theft in the area, as the mining site “is 
situated in a remote and primitive area where businesses like scrap yards and pawn shops for 
example are not available. This is an advantage for me in terms of theft of copper and the like … 
People in the area know each other [and] strangers are easy to identify.” Participant 4 started a 
“natural surveillance” initiative whereby the traditional authorities were encouraged to “keep record of 
every citizen of each village and to any new developments in terms of business” and to inform the 
security members of the mine if any strangers are noticed in the area. This “intelligence initiative turns 
out to function very well.” 
Participant 12 specifically makes use of the surrounding environment as part of the preventive 
strategy. The surrounding high hillocks are used for observation, which the participant acknowledges 
is good “for and against us” as criminals may also use the advantage. Furthermore, a thick aloe 
plantation forms part of the perimeter and is quite effective to prevent access. The rivers in the area 
also contribute making “the area smaller to patrol and concentrate on”. 
Research conducted by the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)  in South 
Africa‟s major cities shows that different types of environments contribute to the 
occurrence of different types of crime (Landman & Liebermann 2005:21). CPTED 
presents a clear opportunity for municipalities to respond to the needs of their 
constituencies in terms of the high crime rate. CPTED addresses the link between crime 
and place diametrically and aims to reduce the causes of and opportunities for criminal 
events by applying sound planning, design and management principles to the built 
environment. Internationally, CPTED embraces approaches as diverse as those favouring 
mixed land uses and an integrated approach to urban development to those that 
separate and exclude through an over-emphasis on target hardening (ibid:22). 
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According to Participant 9, CPTED plays a crucial role when a new mine structure is being built and 
stated “with security involved, it is easier to integrate security measures whilst the structure is being 
built to avoid the pitfalls of introducing security measures at a later stage with considerable costs”. 
Participant 10 was of the opinion that a proper assessment of the natural surroundings should form 
part of every risk assessment where “high-tech” security technology is implemented as part of the 
crime prevention strategy for those sites. The participant stressed the point with the following 
example: “In some cases high-tech security systems or fences are installed. Alarms are installed 
around the operations to prevent criminals from entering the sites. Movement detectors and electrical 
fences get installed between fences, but the drain water systems are unprotected giving the criminal 
element direct access to the site”, which circumvents all the high priced physical measures 
implemented. 
Crime reduction through product design (CRPD) was described by the Australian Institute 
of Criminology in a report which highlighted a number of ways in which technology is 
increasingly being used to reduce or prevent crime. CRPD  involves integrating protective 
features and security measures into products in order to reduce their potential to become 
targets of criminal activity, as well as preventing their use as instruments of crime 
(Lester 2001:13). In this regard, the term “product” encompasses any physical property 
and forms of currency, as well as electronic information and computer software. 
Examples of CRPD are: 
 Deterring theft:  
o Electronic or ink tags on retail merchandise  
o Motor vehicle alarms or engine immobilisers  
o Notebook or laptop computer tracking devices  
o “Smart guns” using biometric technology to identify authorised users  
 
 Limiting fraud, counterfeiting and copyright infringement:  
o Use of holographic images (for example on credit cards, vehicle parts and 
computer software) 
o Use of digital watermarking to protect electronic data 
o Use of micro-printing or water marking personal cheques 
o Development of polymer bank notes  
Another example of the application of CRDP in the mining industry is a product from 
Holomatrix presented at the 2007 National Combating Non-ferrous Metal Theft 
Conference, namely a “micro-dot” solution for the non-ferrous metal environment. The 
“veri-dot” product is made of nickel which can withstand temperatures as high as 1 455 
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degrees Celsius. It is available from 150 microns to 1 millimetre in size. These “veri-dots” 
are embedded with full holographic images to provide unique identification (Peterson 
2007:10-16). 
At the participating mine, various state-of-the-art security technology aids are used to 
protect high-risk areas, especially at the processing plants. According to Participant 5 “No 
system and/or procedure is successful on its own. The most successful usually is a 
combination of effective systems, strictly applied procedures and professional and 
dedicated human intervention.” Security technology used at the participating mine 
includes the following: 
 Biometric access control units 
 X-ray machines and body scanners at high-risk exits 
 Surveillance cameras with a centralised surveillance control unit 
 Double perimeter fences with large clearance areas 
 Electrical internal perimeter fences equipped with alarms 
 Double airlock gate system with delivery vehicles 
The participating mine makes use of not only SCP principles, but also incorporate CPTED 
principles utilising the surrounding natural areas as part of the security strategy, as well 
as CRDP principles pertaining to the use of security technology and to ensure effective 
implementation, maintenance and continuous monitoring. The mine also uses statistical 
data relating to crime trends and offender profiles in conjunction with police crime 
statistics of proximal areas to assist the mining sites with their physical crime prevention 
strategies. In addition, on an annual basis each of the mining sites and processing plants 
are reviewed by an internal security audit team to evaluate if the physical security 
measures implemented are effective and up to standard in terms of the company‟s risk 
reduction and safety policies. 
As part of the crime prevention strategy of the participating mine, discussed in context 
with Table  4.1, the situational crime prevention model is utilised with a primary 
approach, including target hardening, surveillance, risk reduction, environmental design, 
and the use of security technology. As a secondary approach, the participating mine 
makes use of risk and vulnerability assessments as part of the situational crime 
prevention model, and with a tertiary approach focussing on the identification and 
addressing of hotspots and weaknesses with the use of integrated security audits to 
prevent recurrence.  
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Since 71% of the identified offenders had legal access to the participating mine (see Figure 3.13), 
crime prevention measures directed only towards prohibiting prospecting offenders access to the 
mining operations with target hardening – such as perimeter fences, area patrols and access control – 
will not be effective in itself to address asset theft. Many of the participants considered the low socio-
economic factors, especially pertaining to informal settlements situated close to the mining operations, 
to be contributing towards crime at the participating mine. Nearly half of the participants held the 
opinion that uplifting poverty in communities situated close to the mining operations will reduce crime. 
Participant 10 stated that: “If government and mining houses in the area cannot manage to sort 
poverty out, then the fight against crime will never be won.” 
According to Frank (2003:21) crime prevention requires engagement with questions 
relating not only to the perpetual prevention, but also with regard to how social justice, 
human rights, and democracy contribute to this effort, as it could be argued that many 
crimes may be practical responses to challenging social, economic and cultural 
conditions. 
In formulating a holistic crime prevention approach at the participating mine, the 
conditions that may contribute to crime will consequently require some consideration as 
well. 
4.2.3  The social crime prevention model 
Social crime prevention can be described as an action to prevent crime and violence and 
to reduce public fear of crime. It is a tool to bring together different role-players involved 
in crime prevention and a means of developing local crime prevention partnerships. It 
can be regarded as a method to ensure coordination and management of crime 
prevention initiatives and an effective way to identify priority areas and tasks (Nel, 
Liebermann, Landman, Louw & Robertshaw 2000:1).  
The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime defined social crime prevention as 
anything that reduces delinquency, violence, and insecurity by successfully tackling the 
scientifically identified causal factors of crime. By definition, social crime prevention is a 
multi-disciplinary approach which requires the collaboration of a range of sectors, 
including health, housing, education, and civil society groups. It is sharply differentiated 
from the state-centred approaches to crime reduction which has traditionally shaped 
criminal justice systems. Correspondingly, the 1998 White Paper on Safety and Security 
of the South African Government stated that social crime prevention aims to reduce the 
social, economic and environmental factors contributing to particular types of crime 
(Palmary 2001:3-4). 
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Pelser and Louw (2002:3) suggested that the concepts of safety and crime prevention 
should rather be considered to be „social health‟ issues. This perspective allows the crime 
prevention burden to be shared and addressed across a range of role-players in 
government and civil society. Such a focus will also create political space for the longer-
term interventions that, ultimately, are most important in ensuring the prevention of 
criminal behaviour. 
There is a significant body of research on the role the media plays in influencing and 
affecting public perceptions and awareness about crime (Barak 1999:480-482). While the 
public largely depend on media such as newspapers and television to provide them with 
information about crime and the criminal justice system, the information they receive can 
be pretentious because of the limited sources used by journalists to create news stories. 
In fact, sensationalist reporting of violent crime by the media can often contribute to 
increased feelings of insecurity among the public and, in turn, may affect their overall 
quality of life. The media can therefore be used as a tool to play a significant role in 
social crime prevention strategies.  
Early intervention that is aimed at reducing  risk factors and enhancing protective factors 
that impact on the likelihood that a young person will engage in offending behaviour as a 
crime prevention strategy has proved very successful (Homel 2005:71). This social 
prevention strategy is based on the principle that intervening early in a young person‟s 
development can construct significant long-term personal, social and economic benefits. 
There is increasing evidence that early intervention is a more cost-effective strategy than 
more conventional approaches to prevention strategies aimed at reducing crime. 
According to Govender (2001:3) from a social sciences perspective, it is important to 
understand that specific characteristics of society or of communities influence both the 
occurrence and the spatial distribution of crime. These characteristics include aspects 
such as existing policies, demographics, economics, and the current criminal justice 
system, institutions and structures. Some of the more commonly accepted causal factors 
of crime in South Africa are the moral breakdown of family structures, rapid urbanisation, 
relative deprivation, an inadequate criminal justice system and political instability. In 
addition the poor socio-economic status, high unemployment, a continued increase in the 
loss of jobs and an associated increase in poverty are considered to be some of the 
reasons for the high crime levels in South Africa. 
The participating mine considers its social responsibility to the surrounding communities in a serious 
light and integrated social upliftment programmes into their crime prevention strategy. Participant 15 
stated that “as part of the mining company’s social responsibility, the socio-economic conditions in the 
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communities close to the mining operations” are focused on in particular as “many of the mining areas 
are surrounded by residential areas that experience poverty. By addressing these factors in the 
communities with social programmes, could result in a positive effect on crime reduction.” Participant 
11 makes use of “self-help employment programmes” that are facilitated in the communities 
surrounding the mining operations which includes “skills training programmes” for community 
members hosted at mine training facilities encompassing community involvement and employee co-
operation”. Participant 4 facilitates a community education and positive “interpersonal peer drive 
programme” with entertainment facilities for the youth in the neighbouring community. Participant 4 
stated that “statistics proved beyond doubt that crime in SA is caused by youth” and believes that 
programmes “focused on youth will reduce crime. The increase in sports facilities creation in all sports 
code will psychologically have a positive impact in the behavioural change of our youth”. Participant 7 
explained that “the establishment of an integrated coordinated comprehensive approach which draws 
on the resources of the business as well as civil society (trade unions)” has worked well thus far. 
Participant 7 holds the opinion that by “promoting a shared vision and common understanding of how 
are we going to tackle crime issues, developing a set of programmes which serves to kick-start and 
focus on the efforts of the Protection Services in delivering quality service at solving the problems 
leading to a high incidence of crime” is effective when “maximising the involvement of trade unions in 
mobilising and sustaining crime initiatives and by creating a dedicated and integrated crime fighting 
capacity within the boundaries of a business unit”. The security division of the participating mine work 
closely with other departments in order to utilise social responsibility initiatives as part of their crime 
reduction initiatives, which is a very effective approach if there are limited resources available within 
security divisions. 
During the ISS study into the local mining industry referred to above, participants‟ 
opinions and attitudes were also tested about the importance of the various role-players 
regarding the prevention, reporting and investigation of precious metals theft and theft of 
mine equipment and property. It was found that only 54% of participating mineworkers 
thought they played an important role in the reporting of theft from mine premises. They 
stated they would report it if approached by a syndicate to commit a crime, but regarded 
the reporting of theft less important and appeared reluctant to come forward with 
information pertaining to these incidents. Participants also had the opportunity to indicate 
if they had ever been exposed to crime at the workplace. There were 274 positive replies 
in the dataset pertaining to the exposure to crime at the workplace. It is evident that 
employees are exposed to crime incidents and it is therefore essential that all mine 
employees be thoroughly educated on what acts constitute crime, as well as the 
responsibility of each employee to report crime (Coetzee & Horn 2007:58-60). 
During interviews with the security managers of the participating mine, creating awareness among 
employees was the most often suggestion advanced to address crime levels in the mining company. 
According to Participant 5 “crime prevention is not just a security function but a general duty and 
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should be a mindset of all employees”. Participant 10 elaborated by stating that “if we don‟t tell 
employees that we have a problem within the company and that it affects them as well, they will not 
get involved. If you tell employees about the problem and what they can do to assist in fighting the 
problem, you will find that some of them assist. The message should be concise in that if someone 
steals from the company, they are stealing from you, as it directly affects your bonuses and salary 
increases.” Participant 15 pointed out that the participating mine adopted awareness campaigns and 
training of employees with a “zero tolerance for crime” policy. 
The participating mine‟s strict policy against theft and zero tolerance towards crime has been reflected 
in reviewing the outcome of disciplinary proceedings where offenders had been identified. Termination 
of employment comprised 81% of all the identified offenders that were employed by the mine either 
as permanent or contracted personnel and found guilty during the internal hearing (see Figure 3.14).   
The police see traditional leaders as indispensable role-players in the fight against crime   
and believe they play a vital role in crime prevention (Tshehla 2005:17). Moreover, it 
was found that the police believe traditional leaders should be empowered to administer 
justice and help prevent crime. 
According to Camerer (1996:2-3) social crime prevention should be considered as a long-
term project, for it involves addressing the root causes of crime, thus eliminating motive 
from the equation. In the long term, social crime prevention proposals must address the 
uneven development factors that underlie the correlation between inequality and crime 
and need comprehensive employment policies to cope with the overwhelming 
consequences of structural unemployment as well as underemployment or extremely 
low-waged work.  Employment programmes that expand and upgrade the labour force, 
producing adequate housing, health care services, educational programmes and so on, 
have special significance for effective crime prevention beyond simply providing jobs or 
income to buy these services.  
Camerer (ibid) supposed that the years of apartheid in South Africa have led to huge 
discrepancies and inequality in living conditions and social development, making many 
South Africans more susceptible to motives for committing crime. Long-term social crime 
prevention measures should therefore focus on socio-economic development as a 
comprehensive strategy to transform the socio-economic risk factors that may contribute 
to crime. Such a strategy can include themes of family-based and school-based 
prevention, as well as community-based prevention models. 
From the discussions thus far, it is evident that the participating mine is not only utilising 
physical situational crime prevention methods, but has recognised the importance of 
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incorporating social crime prevention methods to address crime challenges the 
participating mine experience. Generally the social crime prevention methods are 
implemented with a primary approach, which includes training and awareness 
programmes. Social crime prevention methods are also implemented with a secondary 
approach at many of the sites, whereby social responsibility programmes within low-socio 
economic communities close to the mining operations focus on addressing poverty, 
unemployment and youth delinquency. Although not practicable at all the mining sites of 
the participating mine, it was found that social crime prevention methods are also 
implemented at some of the mining sites with a tertiary approach focusing on community 
regeneration, by recognising and incorporating tribal authorities within communities 
situated close to the mining operations.  
As illustrated in Table 4.1 the crime prevention models and approaches that can be 
considered for a holistic crime prevention strategy for the participating mine include the 
“law enforcement” approach. Participant 10 explained that the participating mine also 
engaged in “collaborative projects with the police, prosecutors and other law enforcement 
agencies” which the participant found resulted in “better arrests and sentencing”. 
Over the years, with the growth in crime levels and associated increase in public fears 
about safety and declining service delivery from the police (who in turn were battling 
with cuts in funding, manpower shortages and lack of resources), many people and 
organisations in South Africa – private security industry, municipal authorities, 
businesses, the public and even the police themselves in some form or other started 
making use of the resources offered by the private security industry in the fight against 
crime (Minnaar 2007:175). 
4.2.4  The crime prevention through effective criminal justice and law 
enforcement model  
The crime prevention through effective criminal justice and law enforcement model is 
part of the general crime prevention strategy of the South African Government as stated 
in the White Paper on Safety and Security (South African Government 1998b:27-29). The 
involvement of the following different levels of government is the key to making this 
happen: 
 National government will provide leadership, guidelines, coordination and, where 
possible, funding on an incentive basis to ensure effective local implementation. 
 Provincial government will coordinate social crime prevention initiatives in the 
province. 
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 Local government will actively participate by planning programmes and 
coordinating a range of local actors to ensure that these are carried out. 
According to Pelser (2002:137) the success of any policy should be measured by how it is 
implemented and its effect. Given this, it can be argued that the implementation of crime 
prevention policy in South Africa has had an inauspicious start. The White Paper on 
Safety and Security which was approved by Cabinet and launched with some fanfare in 
1998, was not initially implemented in any systematic way, and in fact, many of its 
provisions have simply been ignored. Also, with the exception of a victim empowerment 
programme, the implementation of the 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy initially 
focused on criminal justice and policing projects as opposed to prevention projects aimed 
at impacting on the causes of crime.  
4.2.4.1  Community policing 
Community policing represents a fundamental shift from the traditional reactive policing 
approach. It stresses the prevention of crime before it occurs and requires a partnership 
between the government and citizens to join together in identifying and effectively 
addressing the underlying conditions that give rise to crime and violence (Rauch 
2003:43-46). 
Community safety forums (CSFs) were developed in response to the requirements 
outlined in two documents that have steered the government's crime prevention policy in 
South Africa, namely the National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) of 1996 and the 
1998 White Paper on Safety and Security (Tait & Usher 2002:58). Both sought to 
improve the functioning of the criminal justice system (and in the case of the white 
paper, the police in particular) and to enhance the envisaged crime prevention activities.  
The NCPS and the white paper recommended adopting integrated and holistic approaches 
to preventing crime and increasing the efficiency of law enforcement. CSFs are based on 
the notion, articulated in the policy, that increased co-operation and interaction would 
ultimately improve the functioning of the criminal justice system and the delivery of 
crime prevention projects in South Africa. To this end the CSF project has created a 
replicable structure for integrated problem-solving at local governmental level. As such, 
CSFs provide a baseline for sharing information and coordinating an inter-disciplinary 
approach to crime prevention (Tait & Usher 2002:58). 
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Some of the concepts which highlight the benefits of the CSF approach are the following 
(ibid:64): 
 There is an emphasis on a sustainable, multi-disciplinary approach to crime 
prevention and a holistic approach to community development on a local basis 
involving a range of role-players. 
 Co-operation by local agencies on a range of problems deepens their 
understanding of one another's work and enhances collaboration. This increases 
the possibility for better co-operation and mutual support, which should enable 
further efficiencies in service delivery. The role-players involved can learn about 
the pressing issues first hand, rather than through a memorandum from an 
unknown official in another department or at another level of government. 
 CSFs provide the opportunity to obtain feedback on the efficacy of policy. 
 Multi-disciplinary forums create a better flow of information between government 
departments and between government and civil society in a way that single 
department forums cannot achieve. 
 The CSF presents a forum where several levels of government interconnect. Local 
representatives of a national department are presented with an opportunity to 
bring their own unique circumstances to bear on questions of better service 
delivery and crime prevention. In turn, the CSF provides a vehicle for 
implementing policy more effectively to officials at national level. 
 The CSF methodology brings role-players together to plan and develop a common 
vision for a particular area. The CSFs improve accountability as the responsibility 
for implementing projects rests with those who introduce them. Projects identified 
on the basis of national policy are generally better received.  
The community policing philosophy is achievable and can be implemented successfully if 
established holistically (Scheider, Chapman & Seelman 2004:158-159). Scheider et al 
outlined three inter-related elements that should be implemented, namely organisational, 
tactical and external elements.  
There are a variety of organisational practices that can support community policing and 
in turn facilitate efforts to improve security and reduce crime. These include: 
 Adopting the community policing philosophy organisation-wide: In the ideal case, 
the community policing philosophy should be adopted organisation-wide in the 
police and be reflected through department participation at all levels, as well as 
through the  mission, goals, objectives, policies and procedures, performance 
evaluations, training programmes, and hiring and promotion practices. Adoption 
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of the community policing philosophy partly involves re-engineering departmental 
processes and resources away from randomness and reactivity towards 
information and service-driven approaches. 
 Decentralising decision-making and accountability: In community policing, officers 
are given the authority to solve problems and make operational decisions suitable 
to their roles. Leadership and initiative is required and should be rewarded at 
every level, with managers, supervisors and line officers held accountable for 
decisions and the effects of their efforts at solving problems and reducing crime 
and disorder within the community. 
 Fixing geographic accountability and generalist responsibilities: In community 
policing, the majority of police deployment and tactical decision-making need to 
be geographically based. Appropriate personnel should be assigned to fixed 
geographic areas for extended periods of time in order to cultivate communication 
and partnerships between the police and their community, and are accountable 
for reducing crime and disorder within their assigned area. The geographic 
boundaries should be established based on the communities rather than statistical 
divisions. 
 Utilising volunteer resources: Community policing promotes the use of non-law 
enforcement resources within a law enforcement agency. The government needs 
to educate the public about ways they can partner with the police to further the 
ends of community policing and needs to provide effective means for citizen input. 
Volunteer efforts can help free up officer time and allow police personnel to be 
more proactive and prevention oriented. Examples of such resources include 
police reserves, volunteers, organisations and company security divisions. 
 Employing enhancers: A number of enhancers and facilitators may assist police 
departments in their transition to community policing. For example, updated 
technology and information management systems can facilitate community 
policing and, in turn, promote prevention and response by providing officers 
access to crime and incident data that supports problem analysis by reducing time 
spent on unnecessary administrative duties. 
The tactical elements of community policing involve enforcing existing laws of the 
country, and include the following: 
 Informing about the development of new laws and enforcing laws: Police 
departments should be active partners in networking with lawmakers and 
members of the community to discuss improved means to enforce existing laws 
and to identify laws that need to be amended or endorsed. These activities allow 
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the police to assist in the development of more effective laws and in the more 
strategic enforcement thereof. 
 Being proactive and crime prevention-oriented: Under the traditional model of 
policing, police departments are highly reactive. The police mostly respond to calls 
from citizens and focus primarily on arresting offenders after crimes have been 
committed. Under community policing, police departments focus not only on 
enforcement, but also on crime prevention and proactively addressing the 
underlying conditions that cause crime and disorder. The community actively 
engages in collaborating on prevention and problem-solving activities with a goal 
of reducing crime. 
 Using problem-solving strategies: While enforcement is an integral part of 
policing, problem-solving relies more on preventing crime through a collaborative 
approach. This can be accomplished through the identification and analysis of 
problems and by developing focused strategies that may include both traditional 
and non-traditional responses. These responses focus on deterring offenders, 
protecting high-risk victims, and making locations less conducive to crime and 
disorder (Scheider et al 2004:161). External community policing elements 
recognise that the police cannot solve community crime and disorder alone. Police 
are encouraged to develop working partnerships to accurately establish 
community needs and priorities, to use the public as a resource in problem-
solving efforts and in developing and implementing interventions. 
 Involving the public and fostering community partnerships: In community 
policing, citizens should be viewed by the police as partners who share 
responsibility for identifying priorities, as well as developing and implementing 
responses. The police can engage citizen groups as partners in problem-solving, 
employ citizen volunteers in public safety activities and dialog with citizens about 
a comprehensive communication strategy. 
 Establishing government and other agency partnerships: The police are only one 
of a host of other local government agencies with responsibility for responding to 
community problems and dealing with crime related issues. Under community 
policing, other government agencies are called upon and recognized for their 
abilities to respond to and address crime and underlying social disorder issues. 
The support and leadership of the government, as well as the co-ordination of the 
police department at all levels, are vital to the success transforming to a 
community-policing-based approach (Scheider et al 2004:161-162). 
Community policing, like so many popular government reforms, reflects the role of 
citizens in helping the police to improve neighbourhood safety (Thacher 2001:3-4). The 
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trouble the government faces, however, is that the ideal of being responsive to individual 
community groups often conflicts with the equally important ideal of equity, which directs 
the police to provide a fair service to all segments of the public. The source of this 
dilemma is that police-community meetings are not attended by the whole community 
and that it is often difficult to find neighbourhood groups and other willing partners in 
poor neighbourhoods compared with wealthier ones. As a result, if police are responsive 
to the community groups that do organise, they run the risk of instituting biased 
priorities that benefit the better-off at the expense of the poor. Whether there is an 
effective way to mitigate this dilemma is a centrally important question for community 
policing. In an area with ten communities, is it improvement or retrogression when the 
police develop partnerships with five? 
According to Liebermann and Coulson (2004:125) community policing and social crime 
prevention remains more a talked-about concept than a practice really taking place in 
South Africa currently. In spite of much legislation and various literature available 
pointing to the need for people‟s participation, there is limited understanding of how this 
should be done.  
Although South Africans seem to complain incessantly about the government‟s 
effectiveness in addressing crime, it was found that almost two-thirds (63%) of South 
Africans indicated in a  Markinor opinion poll (April/May 2007) that they had done 
“nothing” to address crime in their communities (Harris & Radaelli 2007:1-4). Results 
from the Ipsos Markinor public opinion survey of 3,558 South Africans conducted in 
November 2010 indicated that between 51% and 74% of respondents rated the 
government‟s performance on “bringing the police closer to the community” between 
“very well and fairly well” (Harris & Greyling 2011:3). 
Despite difficulties the government faces in cultivating an interest in some of the localised community 
policing initiatives, various large public sector initiatives have been implemented successfully. 
According to Participant 15, the foremost important method to curb theft is to address the “black 
market” with intelligence-driven operations and “that the legislation available in terms of the precious 
metals act, second-hand goods act, prevention of organized crime act, should be utilised to its full 
potential. In order to succeed the criminal justice system, police and mining industry must address the 
threat in a collaborative approach”. 
The participating mine has been supporting two such successful community-based policing initiatives 
for many years, namely an initiative against copper theft and an initiative against theft of precious 
metals, which will be discussed briefly below.  
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The Non-ferrous Metal Theft Combatting Committee (NFTCC) under the management of Business 
Against Crime South Africa (BACSA) was formally established in 1993 as an integrated body of role-
players that provides strategic guidance and direction for the process of preventing and eradicating 
theft of non-ferrous metals, copper cable, in particular. The NFTCC has one national committee and 
28 regional committees which are strongly supported by government (Van den Berg 2007). In 
conjunction with partner organisations and government departments, the NFTCC developed a revised 
strategy addressing areas such as the illegal export market, which placed a great emphasis on the 
need for the full commitment, leadership and involvement of government agencies and stakeholders 
to drive the initiative, with the appropriate levels of authority, budgets and political will. The NFTCC 
seeks to disrupt the enabling factors for the thefts rather than addressing only the symptoms. To 
succeed in this initiative, the national, provincial and regional structures have been established in line 
with the strategy and special police task teams have been formed in all the provinces, which have 
been grouped and supported by private sector initiatives. Furthermore, dedicated prosecutors have 
been identified to deal with the non-ferrous theft cases in all provinces and regions and a National 
Port Authority (NPA) Task Team has been established in KwaZulu-Natal to deal with the export of 
containers leaving Durban Harbour in particular. The export process and relevant legislation have 
been interrogated with the assistance of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and South 
African Revenue Services (SARS) to ensure legislation addresses the needs to more successfully 
manage the threats identified (BACSA 2008a). Furthermore, a national communications task team has 
been established with the aim to build general community support for the work of the NFTCC in order 
to close down the illegal markets supplied through the theft of non-ferrous metals. Greater community 
involvement and a social marketing approach to encourage the reporting of crimes and any 
information related to the work of syndicates and illegal operations which impact the general 
functioning of the country in terms of electricity, transport, communications and other services have 
been adopted (BACSA 2009). 
The National Precious Metals Forum (NPMF) was initially established in 2002 as a joint initiative 
between nine mining houses and the (old) SAPS‟ Diamond and Precious Metal investigation branches. 
Its function and role is primarily to investigate and analyse high-ranking syndicates involved in the 
theft of precious metals. All the participants of the initiative contribute to the team‟s operational 
support, which includes vehicles, personnel and funding. The most important contributing factor to 
the success of this initiative is the sharing of information by all participants to collectively address the 
problem (Coetzee & Horn 2007:79-85). This initiative was then incorporated as a special task force 
known as the National Precious Metals Forum, which was established especially to initiate a 
coordinated approach between the SAPS and the mining industry to combat precious metals‟ theft. 
The restructuring of the detective division in particular has caused some concern in the South African 
mining industry. The industry perceives the integration of the Diamond and Precious Metal branch 
detectives into other detective branches as a detrimental loss of investigative expertise and trust. The 
mining industry believe they would not receive adequate service from the detectives located at police 
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stations, compared to the service they have received from the „specialist‟ Diamond and Precious Metal 
branch detectives (Coetzee & Horn 2007:79-85). 
This ongoing initiative has achieved some excellent successes over the last few years. In March 2010 
a meeting was held with all the relevant law enforcement and intelligence structures to co-ordinate 
the government‟s efforts to assist the mining industry to combat illegal mining. This in turn led to the 
establishment of a multi-agency in July 2010 under the leadership of the Directorate for Priority Crime 
Investigations (the Hawks). In addition to the national approach, international activities are also 
underway to assist in addressing the problem which includes discussions between the governments of 
South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and discussions with the European Police Office and the 
European Union. Discussions have also been initiated with the United Nations to ultimately regulate 
the possession and trade of precious metals internationally in order to address the illicit market 
(Chamber of Mines 2010:125-126). 
4.2.4.2  Sector policing 
Sector policing is a United Kingdom-based policing model that can be traced back to the 
early nineties, and was initially referred to as neighbourhood policing. Sector policing 
adopts a more decentralised approach to policing, intended to address the root cause of 
crime at particular geographical locations in partnership with the communities at local 
level (Marogo 2004:1). 
According to Steinberg (2005:27-28) sector policing is a vague and unstructured term 
which has been through a thousand definitions and redefinitions. In terms of the draft 
National Instruction issued by the SAPS national commissioner in December 2003, it 
entails dividing police stations into sectors and organise community-police sector crime 
forums (SCFs) in each sector. The changes to policing envisaged by this instruction are 
organisationally modest. It envisages that only one or two personnel be redeployed from 
patrol and response work to set up SCFs. It is therefore possible for police stations to 
implement the instruction without introducing substantive changes to grassroots policing. 
The philosophy behind sector policing is however a good deal more substantial than that. 
The rationale for dividing station jurisdictions into sectors was aimed at getting small 
teams of police officials to know particular neighbourhoods intimately. The idea was not 
only to know their sector‟s crime trends well, but with thought, innovation, and the 
necessary organisational support be able to identify the specific problems that fuel 
particular crime trends, and to solve or manage those problems. Thus, while the knee-
jerk reaction by SAPS to an increase of vehicle thefts would be to throw up roadblocks 
around vehicle theft hotspots on a Saturday morning, sector policing would try to identify 
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what in the physical and social environment caused the hotspot to emerge and how to 
deal with those causes. 
In spite of sector policing failing in the UK, the SAPS seem intent on implementing and 
succeeding with it in South Africa. They seem to have learnt from the mistakes made by 
other police agencies as well as lessons learnt from the pilot project launched in 
Johannesburg (Mahuntse 2007:32). During a research survey held to determine the 
views of police officials from the Johannesburg Central Police Station about the 
implementation and management of sector policing in this area, almost all the 
respondents (94%) held the opinion that sector policing is an ideal mechanism in the 
fight against crime (Mahuntse 2007:63-64). 
In addition to the NFTCC and NPMF community policing initiatives discussed above, which 
the participating mine supports, the participating mine has also been involved in various 
sector policing initiatives specifically focusing on crime hotspots close to the mining 
operations. Collaborative searches with the police of possible “black markets” and even 
the residences of identified offenders have proven successful. As mentioned in Chapter 3 
(see Table 3.9), 74 of these offsite collaborative searches have led to successful arrests 
during the five-year period in the dataset.  
From the discussion it is evident that the crime prevention methods applied by the 
participating mine through law enforcement includes a primary approach, namely 
physical patrols and searches, as well as a secondary approach, namely involvement in 
community policing initiatives. At some of the mining sites, the tertiary approach is 
utilized very successfully with site-specific law enforcement initiatives. According to 
Participant 10 “the problem is that the moment the projects are terminated the crime 
returns to the area. The message is therefore clear that security managers must not only 
react when crime becomes a problem at their mining sites, but work on the problem 
continuously.” 
Table 4.1 illustrated the different crime prevention models and approaches explored in 
this chapter to unpack the crime prevention strategy of the participating mine. It was 
determined that the participating mine included situational, social and crime prevention 
through law enforcement prevention measures on a primary, secondary and tertiary level 
as part of the company‟s crime prevention strategy. It is therefore evident that the 
participating mine makes use of an integrated and comprehensive crime prevention 
strategy. Asset theft remains a problem at the participating mine, however. In order to 
address asset theft with a holistic crime prevention approach, factors that may have an 
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influence on the crime prevention strategy of the participating mine needs some 
consideration. 
4.3  FACTORS AFFECTING CRIME PREVENTION 
In contrast to the conventional believe that crime is mostly the result of contributing 
factors such as historical events, socio-economic factors, alcohol and substance abuse, 
there is also the belief that crime can be the result of a calculative analysis of 
opportunity. 
There is often concern that focusing prevention resources on hotspots will simply displace 
the crime to non-targeted areas (Weisburd, Wyckoff, Ready, Eck, Hinkle & Gajewski 
2005:2). However, when immediate spatial displacement was examined, the findings 
supported the position that displacement was less and that diffusion of crime control 
benefits was more likely. 
A substantial number of research studies on factors affecting crime prevention strategies 
were carried out, including those by Ehrlich (1973), Cornish and Clark (1987), Felson and 
Clarke (1998) and Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004). The common trend that emerged 
from these studies is the importance of considering the relationship or link between 
policing efforts at hotspots, as well as crime prevention strategies, crime displacement 
and crime diffusion when formulating a holistic approach to crime prevention.  
Literature on the rational choice theory, crime displacement, crime diffusion, as well as 
the continuous change and interaction between these factors, will now be explored in the 
context of the crime prevention strategy of the participating mine.  
4.3.1  The rational choice theory 
The likelihood of a target becoming prone to criminal incidents depends upon many 
factors (Clarke 1999:22-23). It can be argued that a target causes criminal temptation 
due to a combination of factors also characterised as the so-called “hot products, person 
and object”‟.  
“VIVA” is a characteristic model indicating this “hot factor” approach: 
 Value: The basic value of the object may motivate potential offenders. 
 Inertia: The items of lighter weight (such as equipment, tools, laptops and cell 
phones) are more preferred by offenders than heavier items weight.  
 Visibility: Objects displayed in view become more suitable targets. 
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 Access: Easy access to the object causes makes it easier to commit a crime. 
VIVA however has some serious limitations as a model of hot products as it was intended 
to cover all targets of predatory crime, not just the targets of theft. The VIVA model 
avoided any consideration of motivation and therefore neglected the specific motives for 
theft. The model further neglected those target characteristics that are important when 
contemplating theft and when seeking to conceal or dispose of stolen goods. According to 
Clarke (1999:23-36) these limitations were addressed in the modification of VIVA that 
resulted in another model explaining the incidence of theft known as “CRAVED”. This 
model identified six important characteristics of “hot products” in that they are generally:   
 Concealable  
 Removable 
 Available  
 Valuable 
 Enjoyable 
 Disposable  
Another theory that closely links to the “VIVA” and “CRAVED” models is the “rational 
choice theory” (Melberg 1993:1-5). The rational choice models provide a "rule of thumb" 
about how an action is chosen (a mechanism) by an individual in the sense that the 
choice of action in an interactive situation is often governed by attempted maximisation 
according to specific aims. Applied in the field of criminology, this theory assumes that 
offending behaviour is designed to benefit the offender in some way. It seeks to 
understand how the offender makes crime choices, driven by a particular motive within a 
specific setting, which offers the opportunities to gratify that motive.  
While criminals are generally considered to be driven by their conditioning and their 
environment, economic-based theories portray them as rational decision-makers who 
base their decisions to commit crimes on an analysis of the risks of the crime compared 
with the expected profits (Geason & Wilson 1988:4). In other words, the criminal does a 
“cost-benefit analysis” based on the assumption that offenders actively choose to commit 
crimes and that the decision to commit the crime is made in response to the immediate 
circumstances and the immediate situation in which the offence is contemplated. The 
motivation to offend is not considered to be constant or beyond control, but rather 
dependent on a calculation of costs and rewards than being the result of inheriting or 
acquiring a disposition to offend. 
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As discussed in depth in Chapter 3, the participating mine experienced significant increases in copper-
related thefts during 2009 as a result of an organised criminal threat at some of the mining sites that 
had various redundant underground mining operations where no active mining was done. While 
offenders that steal on surface are limited to what they can conceal and carry, these organised groups 
had weeks to strip the copper cable and were able to move vast amounts of stolen copper during 
these underground thefts, thereby increasing the losses exponentially (see Figure 3.3). 
When formulating a holistic crime prevention approach, it is also important to consider the 
implications of the rational choice theory. Many participants in the case study shared experiences on 
how offenders continuously test the security measures implemented at the participating mine. 
Participant 10 held the opinion that “any security measure that is implemented is only as good as 
those that enforce it. The problem is that in some cases hundreds of cameras are installed but they 
are not properly managed to ensure that employees know that they are being monitored. Experience 
taught us that employees test systems for minor issues to see if action will be taken against them, for 
example. If nothing happens they move to the next level and later remove property because they 
know that they are not being watched.” 
In the literature review it was found that research into the theory that criminal activity 
arises from a rational assessment of the costs and benefits of crime was exceptionally 
prevalent after Becker‟s economic model of crime was published in 1968. There has been 
great interest in conducting research and crime studies on the economics of crime, and in 
particular, establishing the impact and possible role crime prevention strategies as well 
as law enforcement plays on displacing crime (Yang 2006:1-2). 
In the dataset analysed in Chapter 3, it was found that the available “black markets” may 
have an impact on the type of asset at risk at the participating mine. A correlation was 
found between increases and decreases of the copper-related thefts and the increases 
and decreases in the international copper price, while a further correlation was found 
between decreases in copper-related thefts and simultaneous increases in other type of 
asset thefts. 
4.3.2  Crime displacement 
The key concepts in situational crime prevention, according to Gilling (1997:182), are 
opportunity and physical environment. SCP is described as those interventions designed 
to prevent the occurrence of crimes, especially by reducing opportunities and increasing 
risk. It is however argued that crime displacement considerably weakens the 
effectiveness of SCP measures, for while crime rates may decrease in the area where 
situational projects have been undertaken, they might increase in other areas where 
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these measures are not present. The most common criticism of SCP is that it does not 
solve the problem of crime but merely displaces crime (Geason & Wilson 1988:7). An 
SCP approach may therefore result in that the criminal tries again, there or somewhere 
else, or turns to another type of crime.  
Participant 10 explained the phenomenon by means of the following example: “In one such case we 
concentrated on theft of cables on a specific mine. We involved the SAPS, prosecutors and other law 
enforcement agencies in that specific area. We arrested criminals, achieved good sentencing in that 
area from the courts after aggravating evidence was given. We closed illegal scrap dealers down. We 
prosecuted scrap dealers not adhering to specific Acts. We held surprise road blocks in areas near 
scrap dealers with good results. We then monitored the theft of copper in the other areas around this 
specific mine and it become evident that the criminals moved to the other mines in the area.” 
Participant 5 even stated that it is important to evaluate the crime prevention strategy by “trying to be 
one step ahead of competitors in the same vicinity, as criminals will then rather target them”. 
Barnes (1995:96-97) stated that crime may be displaced when offenders are prevented 
from committing one crime and simply shift their manner of offending in some way so 
that they may replace the prevented opportunity with another unlawful act.  
Participant 7 shared the experience that “with the improvement and hardening of targets, the criminal 
tends to shift focus to more soft targets”. Participant 11 pointed out that “when the preventative 
measures overcome the resolve of the criminal, he will shift his attention to another type of crime, or 
location, target or time”.  
Although displacement of crime may be minimal, conclusive proof of the phenomenon is 
extremely difficult to obtain because displacement can in theory take so many different 
forms (Ratcliffe & Makkai 2004:5).  
In the above regard, Participant 4 expressed the opinion that “crime displacement is the strategy that 
professional criminals use to misdirect or mislead the law enforcers to focus on wrong and non-
profitable and/or valueless crime prevention strategies”. For example, copper cable may not be 
secured around the mine area, resulting in the security personnel having to focus more on potential 
recoveries “while white collar crime is happening in the back yard”. It is therefore, according to 
Participant 4, important to “always focus on crime in general, be risk driven and question any situation 
that is happening in your surrounding as why it is happening in this way. Is it a general norm, is it 
permissible by law, why just a sudden change? Why by this specific person/s. Know your area, 
geographically factors, environmentally factors, cultural influences, community interactions, etc.”  
Felson and Clarke (1998:25) classify the types of crime displacement that could occur 
when a crime is prevented: 
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 Crime can be moved from one location to another (geographical displacement).  
 Crime can be moved from one time to another (temporal displacement). 
 Crime can be directed away from one target to another (target displacement). 
 One method of committing crime can be substituted for another (tactical 
displacement). 
 One kind of crime can be substituted for another (crime type displacement). 
Participant 6 provided an example of how the evaluation of crime displacement forms part of the 
participating mine‟s crime prevention strategy, stating: “We have experienced this first hand. As 
target-hardening techniques and other crime prevention measures were implemented in the high-risk 
area, the threat just moved to our low-risk area as it was too difficult to succeed with criminal 
activities in the high-risk area. Security measures and process flows were addressed in the low-risk 
area as well. The fact that crime displacement can occur on site forms part of our crime prevention 
strategy – in other words the scope of addressing the threat is broadened to accommodate the 
possibility of crime displacement.” 
The threat of crime displacement has created more concern than any other externality 
associated with preventive strategies (Mikos 2006:20-21). Displacement of crime is 
thought to lack any socially redeeming value. To understand why, consider the worst-
case scenario called “total displacement”, that is, every crime that is prevented against a 
precaution taker is instead committed against someone else; the overall crime rate is 
therefore left unchanged. The losses suffered by the victims of displaced crimes cancel 
out the gains acquired by precaution takers. Furthermore, precaution takers have spent 
resources, but to no societal benefit. The conventional wisdom thus concludes that 
prevention strategies that do nothing but shift crime are necessarily wasteful, from a 
social point of view.  
4.3.3  Managing an ever-changing threat 
The core component of crime prevention good practice is the adoption of an effective 
problem-solving methodology (Laycock 2005:676). The approach is characterised by a 
series of steps that involves problem identification, crime data analysis, the selection of 
strategy objectives based upon this assessment process, implementation, and evaluation 
of impact achieved. 
A crucial thrust of the problem-solving approach is the need to be systematic about the 
process and not to jump to conclusions before the problem assessment stage has been 
carried out completely (Cherney 2006:1-2). The in-depth problem analysis derived from 
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solid data is very much seen as the kingpin of this methodology given that it will 
determine the success of the final result, namely the “response” and its “impact”. 
A number of schematics and guides have been developed to assist in finding the optimal 
problem solving methodology in practice, the most common being the “SARA” model, 
namely “scan, analyse, respond and assess” (Scheider et al 2004:161). Crime prevention 
practitioners and departments can utilise a range of existing data sources ahead of time 
to develop detailed risk management assessments and crisis plans. Identification of 
potential target areas (crime hotspots) in local jurisdictions is an important first step 
(scanning). Problem-solving strategies encourage further complex analyses of the 
possible threats, the relative likelihood of occurrence, and the potential impact of 
possible response strategies (analysis). It is important to work in conjunction with 
government, social and community entities to develop detailed crisis response and 
prevention plans based on the analysed threats (response). Finally, the continual 
refinement of these response and prevention plans to suit changing conditions and threat 
levels through the use of drills and regular response reviews are encouraged 
(assessment).  
Ekblom (2003:2-3) has developed a problem-solving process known as the “5 Is model”. 
This problem-solving model involves information gathering and data analysis of the 
specific crime problem (intelligence); selection of the full potential range of responses to 
address the identified proximate and distal causes of the crime problem in question 
(intervention); action to convert the identified responses/interventions into practical 
methods (implementation); mobilisation of the identified key stakeholders and agency 
participants (involvement); and comprehensive and holistic evaluation of achieved 
outcomes (impact). 
Senge (2006:73-74) states that “reality is made up of circles but we see straight lines. 
Herein lie the beginnings of our limitation as system thinkers.” It is argued that what we 
see depends on what we are prepared to see. If we want to see interrelationships instead 
of a linear view, we need a thinking system made up of circles. 
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The continuous 
evaluation of the 
progress and results and 
feeding this information 
back into all stages of 
the problem-solving 
process are likewise 
regarded as an essential 
component to ensure 
that it remains effectual 
(Forrest, Myhill & Tilley 
2005:3). Hough and 
Tilley (1998:7) 
illustrated the complex 
and intrinsic relationship 
between the problem-
solving processes and 
stages (Figure 4.1).  
During the five years of conducting research relating to the participating mine‟s crime 
prevention strategy, it was found that the operational strategy was continuously revised 
and amended as security risks emerged. In addition, the strategic crime prevention 
strategy was revised annually with a comprehensive strategy planning week attended by 
a quorum of all the security managers. The participating mine had recognised the 
importance of continuous evaluation of their crime prevention strategy to keep abreast 
with the changes in criminals‟ modus operandi and emerging security threats. The 
participating mine adopted a problem-solving process which they referred to as the 
“intelligence cycle” and which formed part of their overall crime prevention strategy. 
The “intelligence cycle” of the participating mine comprised the following steps: 
 Problem statement: Formulate an accurate problem situation using vulnerability 
and risk assessments to define the security risk. 
 Problem appreciation: Highlight the applicable deficiencies of the current strategy 
to address the nature of the emerging problem and formulate a hypothesis. 
 Collection management: Gather information on the extent of the problem and 
adjust the hypothesis to incorporate all information received. 
 Evaluation: Determine whether hypothesis of the new risk is reliable. 
 Dissemination: Communicate new risk timeously and effectively.  
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 Implementation: Make use of the “plan/do/check/act” process to develop and 
implement security solutions to address the risk. 
 Standardise the solution: Identify systemic and procedural amendments required 
as well as new training needs and plan ongoing monitoring of the solution. 
Participant 15 expressed the importance of ensuring that “proper controls are implemented to 
evaluate the effectiveness of security measures and conduct continuous risk assessments to the 
effect”. In the participating mine‟s crime prevention strategy, the following quote is used to express 
their understanding of the ever-changing threat they face: "When it is obvious that the goals cannot 
be reached, don't adjust the goals, adjust the action steps – Confucius.” 
Patterns of crime should be reviewed as the outcome of crime control policies and the 
distribution of opportunities (Barr & Pease (1990:277-278). It is often argued that crime 
control policies have a limited effect as they merely displace crime. Displacement alone is 
however an inadequate concept, a better formulation encompasses the deflection of 
crime from a target. However, better information management systems are required to 
show displacement and deflection of crime in order to assist in monitoring the distribution 
of crime through time and space and to highlight the true crime patterns and 
effectiveness of prevention strategies. 
4.3.4  Crime diffusion 
If the advocates of situational prevention were less preoccupied with the displacement 
threat, criminological theories could have been developed earlier to address situational 
and choice factors that deflect crime (Clarke & Weisburd 1994:165). What has been 
overlooked is that the results of displacement may sometimes be “benign”, for example 
by spreading the burden of victimisation more equitably across a community, or by 
replacing more serious with less serious crimes. Furthermore, the effects of situational 
prevention measures may sometimes extend beyond the targeted offences to bring more 
general benefits of crime reduction. This is the “complete reverse” of displacement. This 
phenomenon has been noted in a number of evaluations of situational prevention 
measures, without its general nature being truly recognised. Consequently, a variety of 
terms have been used to describe it. Adoption of a standard terminology and definition 
would assist to understand these processes.  
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The term “diffusion of benefits” was proposed by Clarke and Weisburd (1994:167) to 
refer to the spread of the beneficial influence of an intervention beyond the places which 
are directly targeted, the individuals who are the subject of control, and the crimes which 
are the focus of intervention or the time periods in which an intervention is brought. 
Whereas crime displacement refers to the processes that shift crime away from the 
targets that are the 
focus of the crime 
prevention efforts and 
measures, diffusion is 
concerned with the 
processes that spread 
the crime reduction 
benefits beyond those 
targets. Recognition of 
diffusion will bring a 
much-needed balance 
to criminological 
analysis of crime prevention and security measures, but it also provides an opportunity 
for maximising crime control benefits. If the processes that lead to diffusion could be 
identified within a business or community, crime prevention strategies designed to 
harness this phenomenon could be more clearly defined (see Figure 4.2). 
A good example of the potential benefit of “deterrence” to maximise crime diffusion is 
Sherman's (1990:11) “free bonus” effect of police crackdowns. Sherman identified that 
the deterrent effect was carried over beyond the period that the crackdown was 
enforced. Even though offenders were no longer under an increased threat of detection 
and arrest, many of them continued to believe that they may be and behaved 
accordingly. Sherman's proposed solution is to manipulate uncertainty about the risks by 
using available patrol resources in a continuous series of crackdowns and back-offs 
rotated randomly at different times and places. This keeps potential offenders in 
continual uncertainty about the actual risks and may lead them to overestimate the 
prevention measures just in order to be safe.  
The participating mine could consider utilising the vehicle and security patrols more 
strategically with different intervals, random changes in patrolling routes and patrolling 
times, and unexpected “crackdowns” at some of the identified hotspots. This approach 
may also be useful if a mining site has limited manpower resources in order to maximise 
the impact of the security patrols. Security patrol is a preventive resource of considerable 
flexibility, but Sherman's strategy of creating uncertainty about actual risks can be 
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further adapted to enhance diffusion of benefits for situational prevention measures that 
are "fixed", for example surveillance cameras or access control points. 
Sometimes the deterrent reach of situational prevention measures seems to be 
overestimated by potential offenders, who believe that they are under a greater threat of 
apprehension than is really the case. Poyner's (1988:50) evaluation of the use of CCTV to 
address vandalism and graffiti on a fleet of buses in the north of England is a good 
example of how diffusion can be used to maximise the effectiveness of “fixed” situational 
prevention measures. Even though live cameras were installed on only two of the eighty 
buses and dummy cameras on another three, vandalism and graffiti decreased 
significantly for the whole fleet of buses. This diffusion was assisted by some well-
publicised arrests of juvenile vandals resulting from the use of the CCTV systems. In 
another study to evaluate a new CCTV system installed to protect parking lots at the 
University of Surrey, Poyner (1991:100) found another considerable reduction in auto 
thefts at parking lots that were not protected by the new cameras. The diffusion was 
again assisted by well-publicised arrests that the CCTV system enabled the security 
guards to make the arrests.  
The participating mine could consider utilising surveillance technology more strategically 
as well as advertising successes as a result of the use of CCTV systems. It is often found 
that employees are aware of which areas are under surveillance. It is further found that 
employees who were apprehended for theft are often discussed among other employees. 
Uncertainty about where surveillance is conducted could therefore be created with such 
“advertising”, which could prove beneficial if employees become unconfident as to the 
exact extent of the security surveillance. 
Another form of diffusion that was evaluated successfully is the “discouragement” of 
potential offenders identified in Pease's (1991:73-77) evaluation of the replacement of 
coin-fed gas and electricity meters with ordinary billed meters to reduce burglary on a 
British public housing estate. Although meters were removed only from homes that 
previously suffered a burglary, the benefits of a reduced burglary risk diffused 
throughout the estate as a whole. According to the rational choice perspective, potential 
offenders consider effort and reward. When the former has become incommensurate with 
the latter, potential offenders may be discouraged from crime even if the risks of 
detection have not increased. Another way of maximising diffusion may therefore be to 
concentrate protective resources and prevention measures on the most highly visible or 
attractive targets in the hope that potential offenders will assume that preventative 
action has been taken more generally than, in fact, is the case. 
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The City of Lakeland, Florida, began an urban renewal project in 2004 in a downtown 
area that was one of the oldest in the city. This area had significant crime problems, a 
considerable poor population, and was in a state of decay. Smith (2006:33-35) 
conducted a strategic assessment on the successes of the Parker Street Urban Renewal 
Project as it appears to have had a significant impact on crime in the Parker Street area. 
Since the renewal project began, crime has decreased in the Parker Street area, but 
simultaneously crime increased in adjacent areas. Displacement issues frequently 
challenge the overall effectiveness of place-oriented police interventions. It was found 
that if third-party policing incorporates aspects of all the crime prevention attempts to 
identify a problem area, assess the problems, and devise a plan to share the problem 
with the community involved, the initiatives are more successful, as long as the 
community continues to move forward following the crime and ushering it forward using 
these tactics. Similarly at the participating mine, effective communication and 
collaboration between the different mining sites can reduce the shifting of a problem from 
one mining site to another mining site. 
Many participants in the study highlighted crime displacement as a factor they need to manage as 
part of their crime prevention strategies on the participating mine. Participant 15 stressed that 
“security measures need to be implemented with proper controls, audits and continuous evaluation for 
effectiveness to ensure that crime displacement does not come into effect”. None of the participants 
however indicated that tactical crime diffusion forms part of their crime prevention strategies at the 
participating mine. Exploring the benefits of strategic crime diffusion as part of a holistic and 
integrated preventive strategy to address asset theft at the participating mine could prove beneficial. 
The concepts of crime diffusion discussed above could be utilised at the participating mine to enhance 
the physical security measures implemented as well as their efforts to mitigate crime displacement. 
 
4.4  SUMMARY 
Although various crime prevention approaches, models, strategies and measures are 
highlighted in the available literature, the crime prevention strategies found to be most 
prevalent at the participating mine to curb asset theft included the following: 
 Physical security measures commonly used as part of a situational crime 
prevention approach and crime prevention through environmental design as well 
as crime reduction through product design; 
 Social crime prevention approaches including awareness campaigns, community 
upliftment projects and initiatives aimed at increasing the reporting of crime; 
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 Collaboration with law enforcement and participating in community policing and 
sector policing initiatives to facilitate a joint effort to address crime affecting the 
mining operations. 
Factors that influence crime prevention efforts have also been highlighted by the participants of the 
study and the importance of addressing factors like crime displacement as part of a holistic and 
integrated crime prevention strategy was expressed. Furthermore, the crime prevention strategy of 
the participating mine is continuously being reviewed and amended to keep abreast with changes. 
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Chapter 5 
Findings and recommendations 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
The discussion in Chapter 4 focused on the building blocks of the different crime 
prevention approaches and strategies that could be considered in addressing the 
research question (see Table 4.1). This table formed the basis for a discussion of 
situational crime prevention approaches, social crime prevention approaches, and law 
enforcement crime prevention approaches on a primary, secondary and tertiary level. 
In order to unpack the crime prevention strategy of the participating mine in a logical 
manner, Table 4.1 will be used to discuss the findings of this case study in context with 
the research question: “Which crime prevention approaches to curb asset theft are 
practicable at the participating mine?” 
5.2  CRIME PREVENTION STRATEGY AT A SOUTH AFRICAN MINE 
Crime prevention is contentious and therefore different people will have different 
conceptions of what it should entail and different agendas in terms of the kinds of 
organisational and philosophical objectives they are trying to meet (White & Haines 
1996:98). 
In the context of the participating mining company, the shareholders require that money 
spent on security be evaluated in terms of the return on investment (ROI). According to 
the security managers at the participating mine, security measures are being evaluated 
on a continuous basis and are annually audited in order to find the most effective 
preventive security measures in terms of the most effective ROI. According to Participant 
2, the ROI is generally determined through “cost-to-benefit exercises” to ensure that the 
security measures implemented are cost effective. This organisational objective has a 
considerable influence on the crime prevention strategy implemented at the participating 
mine.  
5.2.1  Situational crime prevention approach 
As mentioned, in the period under review the participating mine mainly used crime 
prevention measures such as target hardening, access control, security searches and 
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patrols, and state-of-the-art security technology as part of their primary situational crime 
prevention model. In addition, CPTED and CRPD principles formed part of the selection 
and implementation of situational measures, where feasible. 
On a secondary level, risk assessments and vulnerability assessments were used to 
evaluate and revise the situational security measures. Furthermore, the participating 
mine is conducting comprehensive audits annually at all sites to review the effectiveness 
of the security measures and to make recommendations on improving the security 
approach and to prevent recurrence of incidents. 
On a tertiary level, joint operations were held with the safety department proto-teams of 
the participating mine at hotspot areas in the mining high-risk areas, for example at 
redundant underground sites. 
During interviews held at the participating mine, all the participants mentioned that they 
perceived situational crime prevention measures such as security searches, patrols, 
access control and surveillance to be effective. All of them mentioned, however, that if 
physical and technology security measures were not reinforced with proper controls, 
continuous maintenance and effectual audits, these measures could give a “false sense of 
security”.  
The effect of the participating mine‟s continual security measure audits and evaluation 
strategies became clear when trends in asset theft incidents at the different mining 
operational sites were examined. It was found that in 2007 there had been a significant 
increase in all three high-risk areas, accompanied by a significant decrease at low-risk 
mining operations. In 2008 and 2009 there was a slight increase at the mining operations 
and concentrators while the two highest-risk areas showed a gradual decrease. During 
2010, there was a significant decrease at all the mining sites but a significant increase in 
the highest-risk areas (see Figure 3.7).  
The participating mine was approached to elaborate on these changes. It was found that 
notable changes in crime trends were always followed by changes in security measures. 
The same was found for changes in the type of asset stolen (at risk). 
Additional factors that may influence situational crime prevention measures such as 
crime displacement were considered by the participating mine and formed part of the risk 
assessments and vulnerability assessments conducted in order to revise target 
hardening, access control and use of security technology. However, as at the end of 
2010, strategic and tactical crime diffusion had not yet been incorporated into the crime 
prevention strategy of the participating mine. Utilising resources available to the 
106 
 
participating mine, and incorporating a more strategic and tactical approach to crime 
displacement, could enhance the mine‟s proactive approach to curbing asset theft. 
5.2.2  Social crime prevention approach 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the dataset comprising 2,735 offenders identified in asset 
theft-related incidents recorded at the participating mine in the period 1 January 2006 to 
31 December 2010, it was found that only 29% of identified offenders were trespassers 
on the mine while 71% had been given access by the mine either as permanent 
employees or as employees of contracting companies (see Figure 3.13). This 
circumvented most of the general and basic types of SCP measures. 
Employee awareness is therefore an important element of the primary social crime 
prevention approach. In this regard, during interviews held with security managers of the 
participating mine, most participants expressed the importance of creating awareness of 
crime and of cultivating reporting of crime among employees. Participation of the security 
division in awareness campaigns aimed at cultivating an attitude of “zero tolerance” to 
crime among employees thus formed part of the crime prevention strategy of the 
participating mine. In order to encourage crime reporting among employees, the mine 
further made use of an anonymous whistleblower programme and reward system for 
information that led to successful prevention of crime or identification of offenders. 
Correspondingly, it was found in the dataset of the participating mine that the “zero 
tolerance” approach towards crime policy was applied fairly consistently. Termination of 
employment (including personnel that resigned before the hearings were finalised, 
deserted or were dismissed) comprised 81% of all identified offenders that were 
employed by the mine either as permanent or contracted personnel and found guilty 
during the internal hearing (see Figure 3.14). Furthermore, criminal action was taken 
against 1,814 of identified offenders. Of 1,603 criminal cases in the dataset that were 
finalised, 41% of identified offenders were convicted, of which 65% were employed by 
the mine and 32% were trespassers. Of the 656 offenders in the dataset convicted for 
asset theft, only 5% received effective imprisonment (see Table 3.6). 
On a secondary level, the social crime prevention approach of the participating mine 
focused on addressing issues in communities close to the mining operations. Special 
projects aimed at addressing unemployment and poor socio-economic situations which 
could contribute towards criminal activity were initiated within the communities in 
collaboration with other divisions in the participating mining company. These projects 
include “self-help” employment programmes, “skills training” programmes, “interpersonal 
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peer drive” programmes with entertainment and sports facilities for the youth, to 
mention but a few. 
As part of the social responsibility drive of the participating mine, various long-term 
community enrichment projects were managed by a dedicated community engagement 
division within the participating mining company. These projects included the provision of 
housing, building of schools and medical clinics, and providing support for primary needs 
such as fresh drinking water, electricity and sanitation.  
On a tertiary level of the social crime prevention approach, where plausible, the security 
division was engaged in projects to address issues concerning security or possible 
community conflict and played a supporting role focusing on community regeneration by 
recognising and incorporating tribal authorities in communities situated close to the 
mining operations. 
5.2.3  Crime prevention through law enforcement approach 
In the period under review, crime prevention through effective criminal justice and law 
enforcement formed part of the participating mine‟s crime prevention strategy. On a 
primary level, the participating mine had engaged the local police, prosecutors and 
magistrates of the local courts, as well as members of the special Directorate for Priority 
Crime Investigations and organised crime investigation officers. Making use of 
collaborative and joint teams, various operations were carried out to identify possible 
“black markets” such as scrap dealers who trade with stolen copper cable, arresting 
suspects in informal settlements close to the mining operations, and even addressing the 
underground illegal access threat. The success of this collaborative approach was 
highlighted in the commendable conviction rate of 41% (656 convicted offenders in the 
dataset analysed, see Figure 3.15). 
On a secondary level, the participating mine‟s security division supported community 
policing initiatives. The support of the NFTCC and the NMPF in particular formed part of 
the collaborative security approach to address two of the highest-priority crimes at the 
participating mine, namely theft of copper and theft of product. As part of these policing 
initiatives, the participating mine facilitated specific training initiatives such as “product 
awareness” among border police officers and security officials at harbours. Many mining 
products are unfamiliar to police officers and therefore they may be unable to recognise 
stolen products that are being transported among similar-looking goods.  
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On a tertiary level, sector policing initiatives focusing on crime hotspots close to the 
mining operations were supported. During the five-year period in the dataset, 74 off-site 
collaborative searches led to successful arrests (see Table 3.9). 
5.3  CONCLUSION 
The mining company that participated in the case study shared their experiences in 
formulating their crime prevention strategy, which was found to be integrated and 
comprehensive, using various crime prevention approaches on primary, secondary and 
tertiary level. Furthermore, “root cause” factors that may contribute towards crime at 
mining operations were considered in formulating the company‟s crime prevention 
strategy, as well as crime displacement factors that may influence crime prevention 
measures. As the crime phenomenon is continuously changing, the participating mine 
identified the need to continually revise and update their crime prevention strategy in 
order to deal with this ever-changing threat.  
Although not implemented (or practical) at all sites of the participating mine, the 
participating mine 
utilised crime 
prevention 
measures with a 
situational, social 
and law 
enforcement 
approach on all 
three levels, 
namely primary 
(red), secondary 
(yellow) and 
tertiary (green) as part of their crime prevention strategy (Figure 5.1). 
Although this case study may contribute towards a better understanding of the factors 
and strategies to consider in formulating a holistic and integrated proactive approach to 
curbing asset theft at a South African mine, the study also resulted in some new research 
questions. 
It became evident that formulating an integrated and holistic crime prevention strategy 
to address asset theft is not the only – or even the most important – challenge to 
achieving optimal crime prevention. The next step, namely implementation, also holds a 
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number of challenges. Budget limitations, identifying and utilising available resources 
optimally, adhering to company aligned objectives, proper training and recruitment of 
competent and trustworthy personnel, acquiring cost-effective security technology, and 
ensuring successful integration with technology already in use are but a few additional 
factors that should be considered.  
Once the implementation process has commenced, continuous participation is necessary 
to ensure that the protocols that have been developed are enforced. These include 
maintenance and regular testing of security technology. Simultaneously, an evaluation 
process is required to determine whether crime threats have been addressed successfully 
and the envisaged security objectives have been achieved.  
The evaluation process poses even more challenges, of which the most problematic is 
“How do you measure a prevented crime?”. Interpreting recorded crime incidences 
accurately poses a further challenge: for example, if a security measure aimed at 
detecting irregularities is implemented, an increase in the number of incidents could be 
interpreted as successful detection but could also be interpreted as an unsuccessful 
deterrent.  
In order to appraise the effectiveness of a crime prevention strategy holistically, one 
needs to ascertain how successes should be viewed and develop a comprehensive matrix 
to measure the outcome efficiently. The biggest challenge would however be 
incorporating the assessment of crime displacement and measuring diffused control 
benefits accurately. 
In conclusion, during the researcher‟s journey to explore the research question for a 
period of five years at the participating mine, it became evident that managing a holistic 
and integrated crime prevention strategy to address asset theft is posing numerous 
challenges to the participating mine, as the security risk is ever-changing.  
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Appendices 
 
Annexure A: Interview questionnaire 
 
Biographical data 
Participant reference number: ________________________________ 
Participant position: ________________________________________ 
Participant years’ experience in security management: ____________ 
Participant years’ experience in the mining industry: ______________ 
Interview questions  
1 In your opinion, what threat does crime pose to the mining industry? 
 
 
 
1.1 What do you think are the causative factors or general factors contributing towards crime in the mining industry? 
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1.2 What do you think is the best and most effective way to deal with these factors? 
 
 
1.3 In terms of your security role, how do you address these factors? 
 
 
2 How would you describe situational crime prevention, including physical security such as target hardening, access control, surveillance, 
etc? 
 
 
2.1 With regard to the security measures used by the mining sites to prevent theft, in your opinion: 2.1.1 Which security measures are 
most successful to prevent theft? 
 
 
2.1.2 Which security measures are not successful to prevent theft? 
 
 
2.2 How do you evaluate security measures in order to find the most effective preventive strategy? 
 
 
2.3 In your opinion, what is the best preventive strategy to address theft at mining sites? 
 
 
3.1 How would you describe crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) principles, including natural surveillance, natural 
access control and territorial reinforcement? 
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3.2 In your opinion, can CPTED enhance your current preventative strategy? Please explain your answer. 
 
 
4.1 How would you describe community-based crime prevention principles, aiming at reducing the social, economic and environmental 
factors contributing to crime? 
 
 
4.2 In your opinion, can community-based crime prevention enhance your current preventive strategy? Please explain your answer. 
 
 
5.1 How would you describe crime displacement, referring to the theory that crime may be displaced when offenders shift their attention 
so that they may replace the prevented opportunity with another unlawful act? 
 
 
5.2 How do you compensate for possible crime displacement in terms of your current preventive strategy?  
 
 
6 What kind of information, do you believe, will be useful to assist you in developing the most viable strategy to prevent theft in the 
mining industry? 
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Annexure B: Crime incident questionnaire 
Reference number  Date of offence  Time of offence  
Day of week 
Monday D1 Tuesday D2 Wednesday D3 Thursday D4 Friday D5 Saturday D6 Sunday D7 
Mining section 
BRPM U11 CORP U20 LPM U31 MOD U32 MOT U33 PMR U41 POL U42 
PPL U34 RBMR U43 RPMA U12 RPMR U13 RPMU U14 TPM U35 WVS U44 
Offence  type 
Attempted theft C1 Theft C2 Housebreak C3 Robbery C4 
Values involved (specify in rand) 
Value involved  Value recovered  Potential loss  Production loss  
Detailed description of offence 
 
 
Method used Description  Method used Description  
Cable - burned Cable-related theft m1 Removed - cable store Removed from cable store m17 
Cable - cut Cable-related theft m2 Removed - cable yard Removed from cable yard m18 
Cable - pulled Cable-related theft m3 Removed - locker Removed from a company Locker m19 
Cable - short Cable-related theft m4 Removed - stores Removed from company stores m20 
Concealed in bag 
For example plastic bag/paper bag/sports 
bag, etc m5 Removed - vehicle Removed from a vehicle m21 
Concealed in container For example bin m6 Reported missing Object was reported missing to security m22 
Concealed inside equipment 
For example 
electric motor m7 Robbery - forced from house 
Forcefully removed property from person 
in a house m23 
Concealed on person Object was hidden on person or in clothing m8 
Robbery - forced from 
person 
Forcefully removed property from person 
on foot m24 
Fence - cut Gained entry by cutting a fence m9 
Robbery - forced from 
vehicle 
Forcefully removed property from person 
in a vehicle m25 
Fence - over Gained entry by climbing over a fence m10 Theft out of vehicle 
Property stolen from an attended locked 
vehicle m26 
Fence - through existing hole 
Gained entry through an existing hole in a 
fence m11 Through - garage door Gained entry through a garage gate/door m27 
Fence - under Gained entry by crawling under a fence m12 Through - lock 
Gained entry by breaking open a locked 
entity m28 
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Found abandoned Object was found abandoned m13 Through - roof Gained entry through the roof m29 
Hidden at house 
Object was hidden at suspect's 
house/residence m14 Through - steel door / bars 
Gained entry through a steel/security 
gate/door or burglar bars m30 
Hidden in vehicle Object was found hidden inside a vehicle m15 Through - wall Gained entry through the wall m31 
Hidden outside security 
perimeter 
Object was found hidden outside 
fence/security perimeter m16 Through - window Gained entry through a window/glass door m32 
   Through - wooden door Gained entry through a wooden gate/door m33 
Property involved Description  Property involved Description  
Cable - copper 
Any type of copper cable/stripped copper 
cable i1 Laptop/ notebook All types of mobile computers i16 
Cable - electrical Any type of electrical cable/cords i2 None Failed attempt, no property taken i17 
Cable - other Any other type of cable (not specified) i3 Other property Any other type of property (Not specified) i18 
Cable - fencing 
Any type of fencing cable (not corrugated 
iron) i4 Paint 
Including all paint, painting products, 
thinners, etc i19 
Cable - iron 
Any type or corrugated iron or part 
(palisades/gates) i5 PC/parts 
Any computer related equipment/property 
(not mobile) i20 
Appliances All TVs, DVD players, CD players, hi-fi’s, etc i6 Petrol/diesel/oil 
Any type of fuel or oil used for any type of 
engine i21 
Camera 
Any type of camera/digital recording (also 
surveillance) i7 Radio - company 
Any type of security radio, two-way or 
part of radio (charger) i22 
Cash Money i8 Safety equipment 
Hard hats, underground lamp, rescue 
packs, safety shoes, etc. i23 
Cell phone Cell phone or any part of cell phone i9 Solar panel 
Any type of solar panel, battery or part of 
solar system i24 
Clothing Overalls, jackets, shirts, etc i10 Stationery Paper, pens, pencils, etc i25 
Consumables Coffee, tea, sugar, milk, meat, etc i11 Steel pipes Any type of steel pipe or part of steel pipe i26 
Documents Official company documents i12 Theft out of vehicle Any property stolen out of a vehicle i27 
Equipment All types of equipment not safety related i13 Tools 
Any spanners, screwdrivers, measuring 
tape etc. i28 
Firearm All types of firearms, pistols, revolvers, etc. i14 Vehicle Vehicle belonging to company i29 
Furniture All beds, chairs, tables, etc i15 Wheels Any type of tyres, part of tyres or wheels i30 
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Weapon / violence used Description  Weapon / violence used Description  
Blunt object For example hardhat, shoes, hammer, etc w1 Knife  w9 
Bottle Glass bottle/broken bottle w2 Open hand Slap someone with hand w10 
Explosives Used or threaten with explosive device w3 Panga  w11 
Firearm Any type of firearm/rifle w4 Pushed Pushed someone w12 
Fist Hit someone with fist w5 Sharp object For example scissor, screwdriver, etc w13 
Foot Kicked someone w6 Stick 
Including any type of stick, pole, kierie, 
sjambok, etc w14 
Forehead Hit someone with forehead (head butt) w7 Stone  w15 
Grabbed Grabbed someone w8 Verbal threats Threats of violence made w16 
Area/place where crime was committed or detected 
Concentrators p1 Declines p2 Hostels p3 Offices p4 Plants p5 
Refineries p6 Shafts p7 Smelters p8 General  mine premises p9 Outside mine premises p10 
Number of suspects arrested  
Suspect No 1: Details 
Gender Male g1 Female g2 Unknown g3         
Race African r1 Coloured r2 Foreign r3 Indian r4 White r5 Unknown r6   
Age 16 and under a1 17 to 20 a2 21 to 30 a3 31 to 40 a4 41 to 50 a5 51 and over a6 Unknown a7 
Employee type Contractor e1 Mine e2 Non-mine e3 Security e4 Unemployed e5 Unknown e6   
Suspect No 1: Result 
Deported o1 Guilty o2 Not guilty o3 Undetected o4 
Warned and released o5 Warrant of arrest o6 Withdrawn o7 Pending hearing o8 
Suspect No 1: Sentence (if guilty) 
Fine of R500 or less s1 Imprisonment of less than 3 months s8 Deported s16 
Fine of R501 to R1,000 s2 Imprisonment of 3 to less than 6 months s9 Correctional services s17 
Fine of R1,001 to R2,000 s3 Imprisonment of 6 months to less than 12 months s10 Suspended fine s18 
Fine of R2,001 to R3,000 s4 Imprisonment of 1 to less than 2 years s11 Suspended imprisonment s19 
Fine of R3,001 to R4,000 s5 Imprisonment of 2 to less than 3 years s12 Warned and released s20 
Fine of R4,001 to R5,000 s6 Imprisonment of 3 to less than 4 years s13 Warrant of arrest s21 
Fine of more than R5,000 s7 Imprisonment of 4 to 5 years s14 Pending sentence s22 
  Imprisonment of more than 5 years s15   
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Annexure C: Interview questionnaire biographic data 
Matrix: Biographic data of participants interviewed during 2007
 
 
Interview question R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 Total
Years: security experience 26 26 28 18 38 17 21 32 21 28 21 38 18 22 16 370
Years: security management 23 21 23 8 25 5 21 6 3 16 10 11 9 5 12 198
Years: mining experience 19 7 10 6 27 5 19 6 3 23 16 30 16 5 6 198
Mining area R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 R10 R11 R12 R13 R14 R15 Total
Mining sites 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Process plants 1 1 1 1 4
Senior management 1 1 1 1 4
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Annexure D: Statistical tables 
Table 1: Asset theft-related incidents recorded at the participating mine per year
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category Year
Number of 
incidents
Value involved
Value 
recovered
Loss to mine Production loss
Total loss to 
mine
Copper related 2006 648 2,208,465 1,328,383 880,082 3,153,600 4,033,682
Copper related 2007 761 4,660,320 2,179,114 2,481,206 800,000 3,281,206
Copper related 2008 525 2,846,008 1,769,249 1,076,758 1,076,758
Copper related 2009 501 4,343,487 2,000,455 2,343,032 654,016 2,997,048
Copper related 2010 498 6,696,811 4,258,773 2,438,038 2,438,038
Copper related Total 2,933 20,755,090 11,535,975 9,219,115 4,607,616 13,826,731
Property related 2006 634 5,741,242 4,477,448 1,263,794 1,263,794
Property related 2007 561 3,561,632 1,192,160 2,369,472 2,369,472
Property related 2008 683 5,616,851 3,476,597 2,140,254 2,140,254
Property related 2009 723 4,871,133 2,519,439 2,351,694 2,351,694
Property related 2010 511 4,290,650 3,014,649 1,276,001 1,276,001
Property related Total 3,112 24,081,508 14,680,293 9,401,215 9,401,215
118 
 
Table 2: Asset theft-related incidents recorded at the participating mine per type
 
 
 
 
 
Other property related: asset type Total 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Aluminium/corrugated iron/steel 281 25 29 45 116 66
Appliances 58 9 11 13 14 11
Batteries 57 7 5 16 15 14
Brass 26 3 4 7 5 7
Building material/furniture 140 39 31 25 28 17
Cable - electrical/other 71 17 19 12 14 9
Camera/radio 115 21 24 31 24 15
Cash 35 5 14 9 4 3
Cell phone 220 55 47 38 51 29
Clothing 54 12 8 13 12 9
Consumables 190 30 42 35 43 40
Equipment/tools 1,130 268 216 241 233 172
Housebreak - damage/locks 44 13 9 8 8 6
Laptop/computer/computer parts 280 28 48 75 76 53
Other 22 6 2 5 7 2
Paint 178 44 21 51 37 25
Petrol/diesel/oil 59 7 6 22 15 9
Safety equipment/medical supplies 88 23 22 19 10 14
Solar panel 18 7 0 5 2 4
Theft out of vehicle 11 3 2 4 2 0
Tyres 16 8 0 4 3 1
Vehicle/trailer 19 4 1 5 4 5
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Table 3: Other property-related incidents that occurred “on site” per area
 
 
Table 4: Other property-related incidents per type of detection or method used per area
 
 
 
 
Type of place Total 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Business premises/offices 113 18 23 28 29 15
Mining operation 2,043 463 340 436 470 334
Concentrator 285 20 54 79 80 52
Smelter 80 17 20 17 18 8
Refinery 36 3 12 4 5 12
Detection or method used Total
Business 
premises/offices
Hostel/residential 
village
Mining 
operation
Concentrator Smelter Refinery Off site
Reported to security 659 45 20 397 77 26 6 88
Robbery 91 4 6 16 4 0 0 61
Housebreak 265 39 45 106 11 1 2 61
Through - lock/locker 87 2 4 54 19 4 2 2
Through - steel door/bars 19 1 0 9 5 2 0 2
Through - window 10 0 1 6 0 0 0 3
Removed - vehicle 64 5 1 44 0 0 0 14
Fence - cut, over or under 32 0 3 22 7 0 0 0
Cut and stolen 37 1 5 24 5 1 0 1
Alarm/camera 16 0 0 5 11 0 0 0
Off site/residence/SAPS 47 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
Vehicle search 129 2 7 109 4 5 0 2
Suspect search 993 19 70 763 71 35 19 16
Recovered by security 663 16 58 463 72 7 7 40
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Table 5: Copper-related incidents per type of area or place
 
 
Table 6: Identified offenders per race, gender and age
 
Type of place or area Total 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Access gate 64           2            23          22          15          2            
Cable racks 161         12          27          34          22          66          
Cable yards 164         35          26          42          32          29          
Change house 7             2            1            2            2            
Concentrator 46           1            12          15          14          4            
Hostel/residential village 88           24          36          16          9            3            
Off site/outside perimeter 32           2            7            15          6            2            
Office/store/workshop 47           12          14          4            8            9            
Pump/fan/sub 323         64          74          73          54          58          
Refinery 9             4            2            1            1            1            
Salvage yard 20           5            7            1            3            4            
Shaft 1,422      416        422        156        235        193        
Smelter 38           10          12          10          6            
Surface 239         25          40          74          38          62          
Underground 156         22          30          31          41          32          
Waste dump 117         12          29          30          21          25          
Race Gender
Age: 16 years 
and under
Age: 17 to 20 
years
Age: 21 to 30 
years
Age: 31 to 40 
years
Age: 41 to 50 
years
Age: 51 years 
and over
Age: 
unknown
African Female 0 2 35 46 37 9 22
African Male 6 53 758 647 503 198 192
Coloured Female 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Coloured Male 0 0 3 1 0 0 0
Foreign Male 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
White Female 0 0 7 3 0 2 0
White Male 0 11 50 49 55 35 6
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Table 7: Property-related incidents place or area per outcome
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of place Not guilty Pending Recovery only Resolved Undetected Warrant Withdrawn
Off site 4 32 58 44 182 5 12
Hostel/residential village 11 13 64 51 59 10 10
Business premises/offices 2 6 14 28 59 4
Mining operation 91 188 472 645 532 25 90
Concentrator 5 10 85 51 114 7 13
Smelter 2 1 6 38 26 0 7
Refinery 2 8 17 7 1 1
